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Abstract  
 
This study investigates how the two pragmatic markers I mean and you know are used by 
Chinese EFL learners as compared to British speakers.  
 
To describe how these two markers by used by the Chinese learners, this study first 
investigates how they are used in the British speakers’ data. To obtain a finer picture of 
how they are used by the native speakers, the interpretation of their pragmatic meanings is 
open to all plausible explanations instead of being confined to one single theory or 
framework. As a result, this study sets up its own categories and comes up with much 
longer function lists than previous studies. In addition, a new framework is proposed.  
 
Following the completion of a detailed description of the pragmatic functions of I mean 
and you know, a detailed and systemic comparison between them in terms of the specific 
functions they play and their positioning are carried out on the grounds that these two 
markers are analyzed by following the same approach in the same data set. By 
highlighting the similarities and differences between them and explaining why, the 
comparison improves our understanding how they relate to each other in conversation.  
 
Compared to the British speakers, the Chinese learners show different patterns of I mean 
and you know in their L2 English. The main features of the learners’ uses of I mean and 
you know are: firstly, I mean is markedly under-represented and less pragmatized while 
you know is markedly over-represented and more pragmatized; secondly, both I mean and 
you know are used in more restricted contexts; finally, the pragmatic functions of I mean 
are more evenly distributed while you know heavily depends on a very small number of 
functions.  
 
Since I mean and you know are very unlikely to be taught in the classroom, the accounting 
for the patterns of them in the learners’ data is approached from the perspective of second 
language acquisition. This study follows the assumption that learners’ L2 production can 
be seen as the result of the interaction of all potential factors and the importance of a 
certain factor varies from one L2 phenomenon to another. The analysis seems to suggest 
that the learners’ uses of I mean are greatly influenced by the congruence between the 
pragmatic meaning and semantic meaning of I mean while the learners’ uses of you know 
are mainly affected by L1 influence. Other factors that seem to have impact on the 
production of both markers include the tasks performed by the learners and the learners’ 
proficiency level.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This thesis will investigate how two English expressions – I mean and you know – 
are used by Chinese EFL learners as compared to native speakers of English. These 
two expressions belong to a group of linguistic items which currently are most 
frequently termed either ‘pragmatic markers’ (adopted in this study) or ‘discourse 
markers’. Other typical members of this group include expressions such as oh, well, 
like, actually, because, and, but and so. 
 
One main motivation for choosing an investigation of pragmatic markers as the topic 
of this study is that linguistic expressions of this group are full of contrasts. On the 
one hand, they are just simple-looking words or constructions i.e. they are very poor 
in semantic meaning and are syntactically peripheral. Therefore, traditional grammar 
cannot say much about them. For example, in Quirk et al.’s (1972) description of 
English grammar oh is classified as an interjection which is regarded as a minor 
category describing “something of a museum of oddments” (Quirk et al., 1972: 411). 
Moreover, because of the trivialness of their appearances, they have acquired titles 
such as fillers, verbal fillers and gambits and are often stigmatized by native speakers. 
For instance, Watts (1989) carries out a study which investigates how native speakers 
perceive the use of pragmatic markers such as you know, right, well and like. His 
evidence shows that these markers are negatively evaluated. One of the speakers in 
his data thinks that you know has association with people from the north of Britain 
although he himself uses you know to preface his comment on the footballers.  
 
For the same reason pragmatic markers would be very unlikely to attract Chinese 
EFL learners’ attention because many of them believe only big and difficult words 
(words that few people know) are worth studying and knowledge of them is the key 
proof of one’s language ability. 
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On the other hand, pragmatic markers are ubiquitous in conversation and a 
substantial number of linguistic studies on English pragmatic markers that have been 
conducted since 1980s have shown that in contrast to their simple appearances and 
social stigma, they are, in fact, pragmatically indispensible in spoken discourse.  
 
Acting as signposts in real time communication, pragmatic markers can facilitate the 
hearer’s understanding. According to Fox Tree and Schrock (1999), oh can help 
native speakers of English interpret information in spontaneous talk. Their findings 
show that recognition of words was faster after oh than when the oh was either 
excised and replaced by a pause or entirely excised, and semantic verification of 
words heard earlier in the discourse was faster after oh than when the oh was either 
excised and replaced by a pause or excised entirely. Flowerdew and Tauroza’s (1995) 
test of the effect of discourse markers such as so, right, well, ok and now on 
Cantonese speakers’ comprehension of English lectures shows a similar result that 
the subjects understood the lecture with discourse markers better than the lecture 
without them. Not surprisingly, a spoken discourse which lacks such markers would 
be detrimental to listeners’ comprehension. Tyler (1992) finds that native speakers of 
English perceived the lecture delivered by the Chinese teaching assistant as 
incoherent and difficult to comprehend because it lacked discourse markers. 
 
In addition to the function of helping the hearer process the information conveyed by 
utterances, Crystal (1988: 48) claims that pragmatic expressions such as you know 
can be seen as the oil which helps us “perform the complex task of spontaneous 
speech production and interaction smoothly and efficiently”. 
 
As opposed to native speakers’ rather negative view on pragmatic markers, Olynak et 
al. (1990) claim that the use of pragmatic markers can be seen as a positive 
contributor in listeners’ perception of non-native speakers’ fluency. In their study of 
French speakers’ L2 English, they compared subjects of high fluency with those of 
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low frequency. The result shows that more pragmatic markers were used by the high 
fluency group.  
 
Similar findings are reported by Sankoff et al. (1997) who investigate how speakers 
of English use pragmatic markers in their L2 French. Their results indicate that “very 
low-frequency use of discourse markers is a signal of lesser overall linguistic 
competence, whereas higher frequency is the hallmark of the fluent speaker” 
(Sankoff et al., 1997: 204). The overall picture that emerges from their analysis 
suggests that “the ability to express oneself fluently and confidently in a second 
language entails the use of those discourse markers that native speakers produce so 
effortlessly” (Sankoff et al., 1997: 214).  
 
Given the essential roles that pragmatic makers play in spontaneous talk in English 
and their contribution to fluency, it is self-evident that for learners of English 
mastering the use of them should be equally important to their acquisition of 
grammatical competence. Wierzbicka (1976:327) posits that learners’ communicative 
competence would be greatly impaired if they did not understand the meaning of 
pragmatic markers. Svartvik (1980) even points out that learners’ errors in pragmatic 
markers could be more problematic than their grammatical mistakes in oral 
communication because “if a foreign language learner says five sheeps or he goed, he 
can be corrected by practically every native speaker. If, on the other hand, he omits a 
well, the likely reaction will be that he is dogmatic, impolite, boring, awkward to talk 
to, etc., but a native speaker cannot pinpoint an ‘error’” (Svartvik, 1980:171).  
 
However, so far research in interlanguage pragmatics, which mainly focuses on the 
pragmatic aspects of learners’ language, has not shown very much interest in how 
learners use these simple-looking words or constructions, which can potentially be an 
important indicator of learners’ pragmatic competence, which is far more difficult to 
be assessed than grammatical skills. Most of the studies (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al.,1989; 
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Chen, Ye, & Zhang, 1995; Du, 1995; Liao & Bresnahan, 1996; Takahashi, 1996; 
Spencer-Oatey, 2000) have been almost exclusively about identifying strategies 
employed by learners when performing “certain functions, in particular interpersonal 
functions such as apologies, requests, or complaints” (Ellis, 1994: 159). The lack of 
studies on the use of pragmatic markers in learners’ language is another important 
reason for carrying out the current study, which will compare the learners’ 
performance with native speaker’s, because it can be assumed that the higher 
pragmatic ability learners have, the closer their performance to native-speakers’.  
 
Previous studies on learners’ use of pragmatic markers also show that more in-depth 
studies are needed because most of them (Hays, 1992; Nikula, 1996; Romero Trillo, 
2002; He, 2002; Hellermann & Vergun, 2007; Fung & Carter, 2007; Liao, 2009) only 
present a rather general picture of how pragmatic markers are used by learners, 
although learners with various L1 backgrounds are investigated. They mainly look at 
what pragmatic markers occur in their data and their overall frequencies. So their 
major findings include: compared to native speakers non-native speakers tend to 1) 
use pragmatic markers less frequently; 2) use a smaller number of pragmatic markers; 
3) use pragmatic markers in more restricted contexts; and 4) use pragmatically 
transparent markers such as and, because, but and so. However, Müller’s (2005) 
study is an exception. Instead of looking at all occurring pragmatic markers in her 
data, her study narrows down to four markers and her comparison between native 
speaker data and non-native speaker data is made on the basis of the specific 
pragmatic functions played by each marker. But she does not make an attempt to 
account for the characteristics of the non-native speakers’ uses of the four pragmatic 
markers.  
 
Following Müller’s (2005) study, this study will aim to give an in-depth description 
of how pragmatic markers are used by Chinese EFL learners by focusing on two 
markers – I mean and you know. To give the best possible account, this study will 
5 
 
first investigate what exactly these two markers do in the baseline data i.e. the native 
speaker data, because a thorough investigation of the baseline data is essential for the 
following comparison between the Chinese EFL learners’ data and the native 
speakers’ data. To depict a more comprehensive picture of how I mean and you know 
are used by Chinese EFL learners, the comparison between the two data sets will be 
made not only in terms of pragmatic functions that I mean and you know play but 
also their positioning and co-occurring linguistic items. Although the description of 
the two markers will be mainly qualitative, statistical tests will be carried out where 
applicable. To take a step further than Müller (2005), this study will also attempt to 
account for the similarities and differences shown between the two groups.  
 
There are four reasons why this study has chosen to investigate these two particular 
markers: I mean and you know. Firstly, they are among the most frequent pragmatic 
markers in English spoken discourse and they have been extensively discussed in 
previous studies. Secondly, they also frequently occur in the Chinese learners’ data 
chosen by this study. Thirdly, as shown by previous studies, they are extremely 
elusive and to pin down their functions is very difficult because they can occur in a 
wide range of contexts. According to Müller (2005: 165), you know has been argued 
to play almost thirty functions in the literature and more than half of them are 
supported by at least two authors. In her data twelve functions have been identified.  
 
Finally, considering I mean and you know together can sharpen our understanding of 
their pragmatic meanings. As shown by previous studies (Schiffrin, 1987; Brinton, 
2007), the pragmatic functions of these two markers are to a greater or lesser extent 
influenced by their original semantic meanings, which are complementary to each 
other. Therefore, their overall pragmatic functions would be assumed to be 
complementary, as pointed out by Schiffrin (1987:309). However comparison 
between I mean and you know is either very brief (Schiffrin, 1987) or rather general 
(Fox Tree and Schrock, 2002). 
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When comparing their functions, Schiffrin (1987: 309) briefly mentions that “I mean 
focuses on the speaker’s own adjustments in the production of his/her own talk” 
while “y’know proposes that a hearer adjust his/her orientation (specially knowledge 
and attention) toward the reception of another’s talk”. Although Fox Tree and 
Schrock (2002) present a systematic comparison of I mean and you know by referring 
to the main functions that played by them in previous research, their comparison is 
carried out in only five categories: interpersonal, turn management, repair, 
monitoring and organizational. Since this study aims to give each marker an in-depth 
description, it would be a good opportunity to take a further step in their comparison 
i.e. to make an in-depth comparison of their pragmatic functions so as to show in 
what ways they are pragmatically complementary to each other. For instance, an 
attempt will be made to account for why there are contexts where both markers can 
occur. With respect to those contexts where only one of them can apply, explanations 
as to why I mean not you know or vice versa will be sought.  
 
As mentioned earlier, I mean and you know have been extensively studied in the 
literature and a large number of proposals as to what functions they play have been 
made. However, instead of applying those previously identified functions directly to 
the chosen data by this study, this study will aim to set up its own categories on the 
basis of previous findings and of the uses that occur in the data analysed. The main 
reason for this decision is because the data that most previous studies work on tend to 
be rather small compared with the data of this study. For example, Őstman (1981:68) 
admits a small sample in his analysis of you know, which is based on 17 dinner 
conversations among which only 5 to 7 are studied in more detail. Schourup’s (1985) 
data consist of 3 extended dyadic face to face conversations between 6 undergraduate 
volunteers. The data that Schriffin (1987) uses consist of sociolinguistic group 
interviews of 7 Jewish American speakers among whom there are 3 couples.  
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As the most recent study on you know available when the present study started, 
Müller’s(2005) analysis uses a much bigger database, which comes from 
Gissen-Long Beach Chaplin Corpus. Her native speaker data consists of 53,023 
words from 34 speakers while her non-native speaker data consists of 95,555 words 
from 77 German EFL learners. All speakers are university students. But her data only 
include one activity: students are asked to retell and discuss the film “Chaplin”, 
which is seen as the limitation of the data by Müller herself as she points out that “it 
could not be expected that all discourse markers would be used, nor that those which 
occurred would be used in all their functions” (Müller, 2005: 34). Compared to 
Müller’s data, the data for this study are not only bigger but also cover a wider range 
of topics. For example, the native speaker data of this study consist of 90 direct 
recorded conversations which took place in various venues such as homes, offices, 
parties and restaurants and were produced by not only university students (although 
majority of the speakers are) but also university staff, writer, journalist, musician, 
dentist, accountant, carpenter and housewife. Although it could not be expected that 
all functions of I mean and you know would occur in the native speaker data of this 
study either, different or more functions of them can be expected to emerge.  
 
To achieve the goal of revealing how I mean and you know are used by Chinese EFL 
learners as compared to native speakers, the present study will address the following 
questions :  
1) What pragmatic functions do I mean and you know play in L1 English 
conversation?  
2) What are the similarities and differences between I mean and you know 
with regard to their pragmatic functions and why? What are the 
similarities and differences between them in terms of distributions and 
positioning?  
3) What are the characteristics of the Chinese EFL learners’ use of I mean as 
compared to the native speakers of English? What are the potential 
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factors that could contribute to the similarities and differences between 
them and why?  
4) What are the characteristics of the Chinese EFL learners’ use of you know 
as compared to the native speakers of English? What are the potential 
factors that could contribute to the similarities and differences between 
them and why?  
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 will aim 
to present a general picture of research in the field of pragmatic markers or discourse 
markers by giving an account of its historical development, main theoretical and 
methodological issues such as its terminology, classifications, linguistic theories and 
analytical models that have been used. Since this study, which is purely descriptive, 
has chosen two linguistic expressions which have the least contention as to their 
membership status, it will not attempt to make contributions in the discussion of 
theoretical issues. However, explanations will be given as to why certain positions on 
relevant theoretical and methodological issues have been taken in this study. In 
chapter 3, detailed information of the data used in this study will be provided. Also, 
analytical terms used in the analysis will be defined or clarified.  
 
Chapter 4 will give a detailed account of how the pragmatic functions of I mean and 
you know are identified and how a modified analytical framework came into being by 
drawing upon previous findings including a pre-existing framework and by adapting 
this to cover all the instances which are found in my native speaker data. This chapter 
will, then, end up with an in-depth comparison between I mean and you know, which 
are analyzed under the same framework and on the basis of the same data set.  
 
Chapter 5 will show the characteristics of I mean and you know in the Chinese EFL 
learners as compared to the British speakers in terms of statistical findings, which 
include comparisons of overall frequencies, the distributions of subfunctions and 
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distributions of positioning between the non-native speaker data and the native 
speaker data.  
 
Chapter 6 will seek to account for the similarities and differences shown by Chapter 
5. Among various potential variables that may have an impact on learners’ L2 
English, the features of how I mean is used by the Chinese learners will be 
interpreted mainly from the perspective of cognitive constraints on acquisition while 
explanations of those of how you know is used in the learners’ data will focus on the 
learners’ L1 influence. To know if learners’ L1 influences their L2 English, we need 
to know how the Chinese equivalents of I mean and you know – wo de yisi shi and ni 
zhidao – are used in L1 Chinese. Since currently there has not much research done 
on them, this chapter will also contain a small-scale study of how wo de yisi shi and 
ni zhidao behave in L1 Chinese and their behavior will be compared to how I mean 
and you know are used by the Chinese EFL learners. Finally, chapter 7 will 
summarize the major findings of present study.  
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Chapter Two  
Literature review 
This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section will aim to give an 
overview of the historical development of the research on pragmatic 
markers/discourse markers. In section 2.2 theoretical and methodological issues in 
this research area will be reviewed. Since this study is purely descriptive and there is 
a general agreement among researchers as to the membership status of the two 
pragmatic markers chosen by this study, this study will not attempt to make 
contributions to theoretical issues such as definition and classification or to propose a 
new method of analysis. The main purpose of section 2.2 is to provide relevant 
background information so as to explain why certain theoretical or methodological 
positions have been taken in this study. Finally, section 2.3 will give a review of 
previous studies on L2 learners’ use of pragmatic markers.  
 
2.1. A panoramic view of research on pragmatic markers 
Previous research of pragmatic markers or discourse markers seems to show that 
such research (e.g. Lakoff, 1973; Wierzbicka, 1976; Keller, 1979; Murray, 1979) 
started in the 1970s when the focus of linguistic study began to shift from 
grammaticality in terms of syntax to the appropriateness of a sentence in a given 
context (Lakoff , 1973: 453). Interestingly, Lakoff’s (1973) study on well, the first 
study on well, does not aim to explore the pragmatic functions of well. Instead, he is 
interested in appropriateness of an answer to a question following Labov’s (1970) 
study of appropriateness of a question. The reason that well appears in his 
observation seems to be because the injection – well – often occurs in the context 
where it is used to preface an answer. Lakoff (1973) notes that one constraint on well 
is that it cannot preface a direct answer to a question. As shown by example 2.1, 
which he quotes from Garner (1969), well cannot preface the first answer i.e. the 
direct answer – three o’clock.  
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2.1 
  Q    What time is it? 
  A:    Three o’clock. 
        My stomach says that it is nearly lunch time. 
        The sun just came up 
        (Lakoff, 1973: 455, but the list of answers is shortened) 
1980s appears to be a very important period for research of pragmatic markers 
because it witnesses not only increasingly more attention from researchers but also a 
number of influential publications, which have paved the way for this subfield of 
linguistic research to flourish from the 1990s onwards. Schourup (1985) gives a 
book-length description of pragmatic markers such as well, oh, like, well, you know, I 
mean, mind you and sort of by applying his “tripartite model” (Schourup 1985:7). 
Schiffrin’s (1987) study, another book-length account of oh, well, and, but, or, so, 
because, now, you know and I mean, has become one of the most often cited studies. 
Her model of five planes of talk has been applied by later studies (e.g. Salmons, 1990; 
Hays, 1992; Demirci & Kleiner, 1997; Kyratzis & Ervin-Tripp, 1999; Fung & Carter, 
2007).  
 
In addition to publications of descriptions of pragmatic markers, there are also a 
number of theories developed during this period which are extensively applied in 
later research. The first theory is Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory, 
which is further developed by Blakemore (1987, 1988, 1992). Blakemore’s 
relevance-based model seems to attract a bigger number of users (Watts, 1988; Blass, 
1990, 1992; Jucker, 1993; Lamiroy, 1994; Takahara, 1999; Andersen, 2000) than 
Schiffrin’s (1987) model. Another important theory that is applied in the analysis of 
pragmatic markers is Brown & Levinson’s (1987) Politeness Theory. All the major 
models or theories will be further reviewed later in section 2.3. Schiffrin (1987) and 
Fraser (1988) initiate the discussions on theoretical issues such as how to define and 
classify these problematic expressions, which tend to be kept in a ragbag by 
traditional grammar.  
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The booming of research on pragmatic markers since 1990s can be shown in the 
following aspects. Firstly, interest in this group of linguistic expressions has spread 
from the English language to a number of other languages such as Italian (Bazzanella, 
1990), French (Olynak et al., 1990; Lamiroy, 1994; Sankoff et al., 1997; Hansen, 
1998; Andersen et al. 1999), Spanish (De Fina, 1997), German (Meng & Schrabback, 
1999), Latin (Kroon, 1995), Japanese (Takahara, 1999; Park, 1998), Korean (Park, 
1998) and Chinese (Chen & He, 2001; Lee-Wong, 2001; Feng, 2008; Liu, 2009) 
although the English language is still the one that has received the most attention 
from researchers. As a result, the later discussion on theoretical issues of pragmatic 
markers will be mainly based on studies on English pragmatic markers.  
 
Secondly, a range of variables that can affect the use of pragmatic markers have been 
investigated. Among them, age seems to be the one which has attracted the most 
attention. For instance, Stenström (1990) carries out a corpus-based comparative 
study of pragmatic markers used by teenagers and adults in London. Meng & 
Schrabback (1999) compare how children and adults use two German interjections – 
hm and na. Romero Trillo (2002) compares children and adults’ use of English 
discourse markers. Hasund (2002) conducts a corpus-based comparative study of like 
used by teenagers between English and Norwegian.   
 
Another variable that interests researchers seem to be the impact that speech context 
can have on use of pragmatic markers. Chen & He (2001) study how the Chinese 
pragmatic marker, duibudui, is used in the classroom. De Fina (1997) compares the 
use of an L1 Spanish pragmatic marker, bien, in the classroom and conversation. 
Fuller (2003) shows the differences in the use of discourse markers between two 
speech contexts: interviews and conversations. Fung & Carter (2007) study reveals 
features of discourse markers in the speech of pupils in secondary classrooms in 
Hong Kong. 
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Other variables that have been explored include social class and gender. For example, 
Huspek (1989) analyzes you know and I think variation in some American industrial 
workers’ speech which tends to be associated with very high frequency of you know 
and relatively low frequency of I think. Stubbe and Holmes (1995) compare 
pragmatic markers between middle class and working class. Holmes’ (1986) studies 
characteristics of women’s use of you know, which tends to be regarded as a 
“women's language” form as compared to men’s. Erman (1992) makes her 
comparison between female and male in two different interactions: same-sex and 
mixed-sex interactions.  
 
Finally, pragmatic markers have become a platform where researchers from different 
research fields converge. One group that has been attracted by pragmatic markers is 
researchers whose interest is in language change. Their research on pragmatic 
markers has become a very important part of study of grammaticalization. The 
question they aim to address is what changes have taken place between pragmatic 
markers and their homomorphous forms. Thompson & Mulac (1991) carry out a 
study on the epistemic parenthetical – I think. They argue that since I think has taken 
on the pragmatic function of “expressing the degree of speaker commitment, 
functionally roughly as an epistemic adverb such as maybe with respect to the clause 
it is associated with” (Thompson & Mulac 199l: 313), I think should not be viewed 
as the “that-deletion” alternation of the construction I think that where I is the subject 
and think is the main verb. Traugott (1995) also observes that expressions such as I 
think, even, actually, and really have gone through “a pragmatic-semantic process 
whereby ‘meanings’ become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief 
state/attitude toward the proposition, in other words towards what the speaker is 
talking about” (Traugott, 1989: 35).  
 
The search for evidence of grammaticalization of lexical items has been carried out 
not only synchronically but also diachronically. Brinton has done several studies on 
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looking for evidence of when a lexical item begins to take on pragmatic meanings 
from Old English to Modern English. For instance, Brinton (1998) presents 
diachronic evidence of grammaticalization of only from free adverb to adversative 
conjunction in English while Brinton (2007) gives evidence of the historical 
development of the pragmatic marker – I mean.  
 
Researchers who are specialized in language contact also show their interest in 
pragmatic markers. What they aim to reveal is how pragmatic markers are used by 
bilingual speakers. There are quite a few studies (Salmons, 1990; Goss & Salmons, 
2000; Fuller, 2001) which are about German-English bilinguals. They seem to have 
rather similar findings i.e. in German discourse the system of German discourse 
markers appears to have been replaced by the English system (Salmons, 1990). The 
English discourse markers seem to be first borrowed into the German language and 
then replace the German markers (Goss & Salmons, 2001; Fuller, 2001).  
 
Maschler’s (1994) investigation of Hebrew-English bilinguals shows a different and 
interesting picture. She notes that a recurring pattern in the English conversations of 
the Hebrew-English bilingual speakers i.e. they often switched to Hebrew when they 
needed to use discourse markers. Sankoff et al. (1997) also reports that the 
French-English bilingual speakers switched to English discourse markers in French 
discourse, though to a very slight degree. 
 
It is not surprising at all that pragmatic markers have become a topic for the next 
group which consists of researchers who show interests in contrastive or 
cross-linguistic studies and translation because pragmatic markers as a small 
subsystem of language would be an ideal candidate for comparative studies across 
languages. As Wierzbicka (1976: 366) points out languages are too complex to be 
compared as wholes. What should be compared are subsystems “which are small 
enough to be examined in their entirety, and which at the same time promise to be 
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particularly revealing” rather than “a random selection of isolated features of 
grammatical and lexical systems”.  
 
Ariel (1994: 3252) also contends that the subsystem of pragmatic markers appear to 
be universal because even unrelated languages can have rather similar pragmatic 
markers. But their universality differs in different functional levels. Markers, which 
mainly function as discourse organizers, will occur universally, “although their 
formalization as well as frequency of use may vary” while markers functioning on 
the interpersonal level will show more social or cultural variations, hence will be less 
universal.  
 
English has been compared with quite a few other languages such as German 
(Fischer & Drescher, 1996), Scandinavian dialects (Andersen, 1997), Korean (Park 
1998), Japanese (Takahara, 1998) and Chinese (Zhang, 2007; Chen, 2011). Fischer & 
Drescher (1996) conduct their comparison between two of Woody Allen’s dramas – 
Death and God – and their German translations. The English pragmatic marker well 
has been found to have 10 equivalents (also, naja, na, komm, ach, na also, ja, tja, 
schon, gut) in German. This finding echoes Kroon’s (1995:17) discussion of the 
English discourse marker because, which is again a multifunctional marker because 
it can occur in three types of utterance relations:  cause, evidence and justification. 
But French needs to use three different markers i.e. the English marker because has 
three French equivalents: parce que, puisque and car. Fischer & Drescher’s (1996) 
findings show that contrastive analysis, i.e. translation, is very helpful in terms of 
revealing functions of pragmatic markers. 
 
Andersen’s (1997) cross-linguistic study of comparing English pragmatic markers to 
their equivalents in three Scandinavian urban dialects aims to prove if universal 
features of teenage speech exist or not. This cross-linguistic survey of pragmatic 
markers seems to support the view that similarities of teenage speech across 
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languages do exist. For instance, the English pragmatic like has a parallel in all the 
three Scandinavian dialects (liksom/typ in Stockholm and Bergen, lissom/ligesom in 
Aarhus). All the equivalents have similar and pragmatic meanings of like.  
 
As can be seen from the above contrastive studies of pragmatic markers, translation 
is a very useful technique. So it is not surprising that experts of translation have also 
noticed this linguistic phenomenon. Bazzanella & Morra (2000) consider the 
translation of pragmatic markers as a crucial and stimulating area for translation 
theory. They suggest that the priority of translation of pragmatic markers should be to 
preserve the functionality of the marker in question. Therefore, translators have to 
assign temporary and context-specific translations. Sometimes even mutually 
exclusive translations can be used for the same marker, for example, well can be used 
in either agreement or disagreement.  
 
Interestingly, pragmatic expressions have even attracted attention from child 
language acquisition, a research area which seems to be even more dominated by 
studies of child’s acquisition of morphology and syntax than SLA. Although study of 
how a child acquires pragmatic markers has just started, some interesting findings 
have been reported. Andersen et al. (1999) compare how American English-speaking, 
Lyonnais French-speaking and Chicano Spanish-speaking children use discourse 
markers in conversations where they role-play with puppets representing a variety 
roles such as father and mother in family settings, and doctor, nurse and patient. The 
comparison shows striking cross-linguistic parallels in the way children learn to use 
discourse markers. The three groups all show similar preferences in discourse 
markers. For example, when playing roles of higher status such as mum or doctor, 
English-speaking children use more well, so, now, then; French speaking-children 
use more alors, bon (ben; et ben), maintenant, allez, and Spanish-speaking children 
use more bueno, pues, ahora/ahorita, entonces/luego. When playing lower-status 
roles such as baby and patient, uh (English), euh (French), or eh (Spanish) show 
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higher frequencies.  
 
Montes (1999) reports a longitudinal case study of how a Spanish-speaking child 
(1;7 to 3;0)  acquires discourse markers such as ah, oh, ay, oy, uy and eh. The 
observation shows that the child started from the more literal, contextual uses to the 
more elaborated discursive functions which emerged later. For example, the meaning 
of I see as I understand emerged later than did the literal meaning of I see (an 
object).  
 
Kyratzis & Ervin-Tripp (1999) investigate the development of acquisition of 
discourse markers by having four- and seven-year children paired in best friend 
dyads perform role play and story-telling. One of the differences between the two age 
groups suggests that different functions of discourse markers may be acquired at 
different ages. The following two examples show that function of justification of 
because may be acquired earlier than cause.  
2.2 
(4-year-old girl) Jan  
12     okay [puts the other human figure aside] 
13     this is me. so I’m supposed to act her 
14     and you’re supposed to act her 
15     because you’re the mom/[hums] (p1333) 
              (Kyratzis and Ervin-Tripp 1999: 1333, quoted as example (12)) 
2.3 
(7-year-old girl) Lyn   
5      you know, she cries 
6      because her brother turned into a little bear (p1331) 
              (Kyratzis and Ervin-Tripp 1999:1331, quoted as example (11)) 
 
Lastly, even forensic linguistics has shown its interest in pragmatic makers. 
Blackwell’s (2000) analysis shows that discourse markers can play a role in forensic 
purposes which heavily depend on analysis of content words. She points out that 
“discourse markers such as well, honest and look are an essential feature of natural 
spoken language, and their patterns of occurrence in a disputed text (e.g. transcribed 
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police interview) may aid the forensic linguist in evaluating conflicting claims about 
the text’s origin” (Blackwell, 2000: 13).  
 
2.2 Theoretical and methodological issues in the research of pragmatic markers 
This section consists of 4 subsections. Section 2.1 will look at the issue of 
terminology, which “presents a particular difficulty” (Schourup, 1999:228). A review 
of the various proposals as to which term should be used in the literature will be 
presented and explanation as to why the term “pragmatic marker” has been chosen 
by the current study will be given. Section 2.2 will discuss the main features and 
functions of pragmatic markers and classification of pragmatic markers. Section 2.3 
will be a review of the main theories or models used previous studies of pragmatic 
markers. Section 2.4 will review various methods used to establish pragmatic 
functions of pragmatic markers in previous research and explain how this study has 
made its decision as to what methods should be used.  
 
2.2.1 Terminology 
By searching the references of pragmatic markers for this study more than 10 
candidates have been found, but currently only a number of them have remained in 
use. Those terms that seem to have died out include gambit (Keller, 1979), speech 
marker (Olynak et al., 1990), pragmatic particle (Őstman, 1981, 1982, 1995; Foolen, 
1997), phatic connective (Bazzanella, 1990), pragmatic connective (Lamiroy, 1994), 
discourse connective (Blakemore, 1987; Unger, 1996), discourse item (Stenström, 
1990); pragmatic force modifier (Nikula, 1996); discourse operator (Redeker, 1991) 
and pragmatic operator (Ariel, 1994). One main reason for these terms being 
abandoned might be that they are either too general or too narrow. For example 
“speech marker” sounds a very general term because it does not necessarily have to 
be confined to linguistic expressions. “Discourse item” seems to be general as well 
because it could include any item in a discourse. On the other hand, “discourse 
connective” would be too narrow because it highlights the linking function, which is 
19 
 
only one of the main functions of these small words. The word ‘operator’ in 
‘discourse operator’ or ‘pragmatic operator’ can be associated with conjunctions, 
which are represented by logical truth-tables such as &, V, >, →, : and   in 
formal semantics. The reason for dropping the term “gambit” is obviously due to its 
negative connotation, which suggests that this group of expressions does not have 
any important function and is not worth studying.  
 
The most frequently used terms are discourse marker (Schiffrin, 1985, 1987; Watts, 
1989; Brinton, 1990; Salmons, 1990, Blakemore, 2002; Fuller, 2003; Müller, 2005; 
Fung & Carter, 2007), pragmatic marker (Watts, 1988; Redeker, 1990; Andersen, 
1997, 1998, 2000, 2001; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004; Feng, 2008; Norrick, 
2009) and discourse particle/particle (Wierzbicka, 1976; Svartvik, 1980; Blass, 1990; 
Abraham, 1991; Kryk, 1992; Fischer & Drescher 1996; Van Barr, 1996; Schourup, 
1985; Bolinger, 1989; Hasen, 1998; Lee-Wong, 2001; Aijmer, 2002). Among them 
‘discourse marker’ is the most preferred candidate while ‘discourse particle/particle’ 
and ‘pragmatic marker’ show a similar frequency. However, discourse 
particle/particle shows a tendency of dying out. The main reason for objections to 
‘discourse particle/ particle’ is because ‘particle’ has traditionally been used to refer 
to a unified grammatical category (e.g. modal particles in German and Chinese) 
while the linguistic expressions under study in this group either cannot fit into any 
well-established category i.e. they tend to be put in a waste basket or come from 
various categories such verbs, conjunctions, prepositions, adverbials and interjections. 
Most researchers who use ‘discourse particle/particle’ tend to study those languages 
which are rich in particles such as German (Abraham, 1991; Fischer & Drescher, 
1996), Polish (Kryk, 1992), Latin (Kroon, 1995); French (Hasen, 1998) and Chinese 
(Chappell, 1991; Lee-Wong, 2001).   
 
The vast number of competitors is not the only reason that contributes to the 
complicated picture of terminology. Another problem is that the same author would 
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use different terms while the same term used by different authors may not refer to the 
same group of linguistic items. For instance in her earlier studies (Erman, 1986, 1987, 
1992) Erman uses ‘pragmatic expression’ but changes to ‘pragmatic marker’ in her 
later study in 2001. Schourup (1985) first uses ‘discourse particle’ and switches to 
‘discourse marker’ in 1999. Aijmer changes her term from ‘discourse particle’ 
(Aijmer, 2002) to ‘pragmatic marker’ (Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004). 
Although ‘discourse marker’ has become the most popular term, it does not always 
have the same reference. Some researchers follow Fraser’s (1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 
1999) definition which treats ‘pragmatic marker’ as the cover term and ‘discourse 
marker’ is one type of ‘pragmatic marker’ while many more others follow Schiffrin 
(1985, 1987) who uses ‘discourse marker’ to cover a wide range of linguistic 
expressions including you know and I mean, which are not considered as discourse 
markers but another subcategory of pragmatic markers – parallel markers (for details 
of Fraser’s classification of pragmatic markers, see section 2.2).  
 
Despite the fact that discourse marker is the most preferred term, this study has 
chosen pragmatic marker because firstly this study aims to reveal the pragmatic 
functions of I mean and you know and secondly it best catches the main features of I 
mean and you know, which do not contribute to propositions they work with either 
semantically or syntactically. Like Erman (1986, 1987), I take the view that discourse 
marker has the problem of confining I mean and you know to a single function i.e. 
organizing discourse. Using the term pragmatic marker will allow me to examine 
their functions from as many angles as possible.  
 
2.2.2 Features, functions and classification of pragmatic markers 
Like the confusing terminology, the definition of pragmatic markers is not 
straightforward either. There is a substantial variation as to the number of linguistic 
expressions that should be classified as pragmatic markers. According to Brinton 
(1998:11) the number ranges from a dozen to five hundred and the most frequently 
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discussed pragmatic markers include actually, anyway, I mean, now, so, then, well, 
you know and you see. To define pragmatic markers, two questions need to be 
answered: 1) what characteristics do pragmatic markers have? 2) what functions do 
pragmatic markers play? Section 2.2.2.1 and section 2.2.2.2 will look at the answers 
to the above two questions proposed in the literature respectively. Section 2.2.2.3 
will review the issue of the classification of pragmatic markers.  
 
2.2.2.1 Features of pragmatic markers 
A number of researchers have contributed to the description of characteristics of 
pragmatic markers. Svartvik (1980) summarizes the features of well as a pragmatic 
marker as compared to well as a manner adverb or as a degree word. 
1) it is very difficult to decide which function or word class it should belong to 
2) it is very difficult for lexicographers to pin down what it means 
3) it is very difficult to translate it idiomatically into another language. 
4) it only occurs in spoken language with a very high frequency 
 (A summary of the features of well as a pragmatic marker based on Svartvik (1980: 
168-169))  
 
Őstman (1982, 1995) proposes features of pragmatic markers on the basis of 
structural and functional criteria. Unlike Svartvik (1980) whose observation is made 
on one English marker, well, Őstman (1982:149) has a group of cross-linguistic 
expressions in mind because he believes that pragmatic markers are a universal 
phenomenon.  
1) they are short  
2) they are prosodically subordinated to another word  
3) they do not contribute to the propositional content of the sentence   
4) they tend to occur outside an utterance and modify that utterance as a whole  
 (A summary of features of pragmatic markers based on Őstman (1982: 150))  
He points out that criterion 3) – propositional emptiness criterion – should be more 
important than the others (Őstman, 1982: 150), which explains Svartvik’s (1980) 
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observation that describing what well as a pragmatic marker means is a difficult job.  
 
Brinton (1990: 46-47) presents a longer list of the features of pragmatic markers. She 
includes features of high frequency, orality and akwardness of fitting into any 
word-class on Svartvik’s (1980) list and features of being phonologically short and 
unstressed, semantically empty and syntactically optional in Őstman’s (1982, 1995) 
proposal. An additional feature in her list is the positioning of pragmatic markers: 
they are very flexible although sentence-initial is the preferred position.  
1)  they predominantly occur in spoken discourse  
2) they are very frequent 
3) they are short  
4) they are phonologically reduced or unstressed 
5) they occur either outside the syntactic structure or loosely attached to it 
6) they are very flexible in terms of positioning but generally sentence-initial  
7) they are difficult to place within a traditional word class  
(A summary of features of pragmatic markers based on Brinton (1990: 46-47)) 
 
As can be seen from the following list proposed by Hansen (1998), the additional 
feature is the observation that pragmatic markers tend to cluster. By comparing with 
the above lists, we can conclude that researchers seem to agree that being 
semantically empty and syntactically optional are the two key characteristics of 
pragmatic markers.  
1)  they take the entire host sentences, proposition, or utterance in their scope  
2) they normally do not carry stress 
3) they cannot be coordinated but can and often do cluster 
4) they do not contribute to propositional meaning 
5) they are grammatically optional  
(A summary of features of pragmatic functions based on Hansen (1998: 42)) 
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Like Őstman (1982, 1995) and Jucker & Ziv (1998), these features are viewed as 
prototypical rather than defining in this study. Those expressions which display more 
of the features can be considered as prototypical members while those which show 
fewer characteristics may be considered more peripheral. According to Jucker & Ziv 
(1998:3), one advantage of this scalar conception is that it can better account for “the 
range of items displaying partially overlapping characteristics across a variety of 
languages.” For instance, Őstman (1982: 99) notes that English pragmatic markers 
do not follow his criterion 2) (“pragmatic markers are prosodically subordinate to 
another word”).  
 
Semantic emptiness and syntactical optionality are considered as the most essential 
features of pragmatic markers in this study. They are used as the key criteria to 
distinguish pragmatic use from non-pragmatic of I mean and you know by this study.  
 
2.2.2.2 Functions of pragmatic markers 
From the following review of the functions of pragmatic markers in the literature, we 
can see another feature of pragmatic markers emerge: they are multifunctional. 
Őstman (1982: 152) claims that pragmatic markers perform two types of tasks: 
interactional and attitudinal. The interactional functions are either sociological or 
discourse-functional, while the attitudinal functions mainly focus on cognitive and 
psychological aspects. Brinton (1990) gives a list of functions that pragmatic markers 
play, shown below. Unlike Őstman (1982) who describes functions of pragmatic 
markers in very broad categories, Brinton (1990) lists rather specific functions. Most 
functions on her list can actually fit into Őstman’s (1982) interactional category 
except functions 4) and 8). They appear to fit into the attitudinal category because 
there is a cognitive motivation behind using a pragmatic marker to buy more time or 
to mark foregrounded or backgrounded information. The former benefits the speaker 
by winning more time to organize his/her thoughts while the latter benefits the hearer 
by making the information processing easier.  
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1) initiate discourse 
2) to mark a boundary in discourse, i.e. to indicate a shift or partial shift in topic 
3) to preface a response or a reaction 
4) to serve as a filler or delaying tactic 
5) to aid the speaker in holding the floor 
6) to effect an interaction or sharing between speaker and hearer 
7) to bracket the discourse either cataphorically or anaphorically 
8) to mark either foregrounded or backgrounded information 
(A summary of functions of pragmatic markers based on Brinton (1990: 47-48)) 
 
Brinton (1998) makes another proposal of functions of pragmatic makers. Compared 
to her earlier list (Brinton, 1990), this proposal includes even more specific functions, 
which are classified into two broad categories in Halliday & Hasan’s (1976: 26-28) 
terms – textual and interpersonal. 
Textual functions  
1)  getting the hearer’s attention,  
2)  initiating and ending discourse,  
3)  sustaining discourse, marking boundaries (topic shifts and episode boundaries),  
4)  constraining the relevance of adjoining clauses,  
5)  repairing discourse 
Interpersonal functions 
1) subjective functions such as expressing response, reactions, attitudes, 
understanding, tentativeness, or continued attention 
2)  interactive functions such as expressing intimacy, cooperation, shared 
knowledge, deference, or face-saving (politeness).  
( A summary of functions of pragmatic functions based on Brinton (1998: 12)) 
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2.2.2.3 Classification of pragmatic markers 
Bruce Fraser (1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 1999) has contributed a great deal to 
theoretical issues of pragmatic markers, such as how to define, classify and approach 
pragmatic markers. Fraser (1996) gives a very detailed account of his classification 
of pragmatic markers. Before discussing his classification in detail, it should be 
pointed out that in his system “pragmatic marker” and “discourse marker” are 
hyponymous i.e. discourse marker is one type of pragmatic marker while many other 
researchers treat these two terms as synonyms. The broadness of “pragmatic marker” 
in Fraser’s system is reflected in its definition, which is based on the assumption that 
sentence meaning can be divided into two separate and distinct parts: propositional 
meaning and non-propositional meaning. Fraser (1996:167) has called the 
non-propositional part of sentence meaning Pragmatic Markers. Table 2.1 below is a 
summary of Fraser’s (1996) taxonomy of pragmatic markers.  
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Table 2.1 Taxonomy of pragmatic markers (Fraser 1996) 
Main categories  Subcategories  Examples  
Basic markers: 
contributing 
conceptual 
information over 
and above that of 
the propositional 
meaning 
Structural basic 
markers 
mood (declarative, interrogative or 
imperative) 
Lexical basic 
markers 
Performative 
expressions  
I promise… I 
(hereby) 
apologize… 
Pragmatic expressions please (kindly), 
perhaps (maybe)  
 
Hybrid basic 
markers 
Declarative-based 
hybrids 
Tag questions, 
positive tag 
questions,  
Interrogative-based 
hybrids 
Can (can’t) 
you...?         
Why not…?     
May I…?              
I suggest that…           
Imperative-based 
hybrids 
Talk, or I’ll shoot. 
Wash, and I’ll 
dry.  
Commentary 
pragmatic markers: 
having 
propositional 
meaning over the 
entire message and 
procedural 
meaning signaling 
the message as a 
comment 
Assessment markers Amazingly, Derrick passed the exam.  
Manner-of-speaking 
markers 
Frankly, you need to stop now 
Evidential markers Conceivably, Tim is right.  
Consequent-effect 
markers  
To clarify, no one is permitted to smoke in 
this building!  
Hearsay markers Reportedly, the game was postponed because 
of rain.  
Mitigation markers If you don’t mind, bring it to me about 7 this 
evening.  
Parallel markers: 
signaling an entire 
message in 
addition to the 
basic message 
Vocative markers Standard titles e.g. Mr President 
Occupation names: doctor, waiter 
General nouns: Brother, boy, guys 
Pronominal forms: you, everyone 
Speaker displeasure 
markers 
Damned, damn well, right now, the hell 
Solidarity markers  My friend, we simply have to act together and 
face this problem.  
Discourse markers: Topic change back to my original point, before I forget, by 
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signaling the 
relationship of the 
basic message to 
the foregoing 
discourse and 
providing 
instructions to the 
addressee on how 
the utterance to 
which the 
discourse marker is 
attached is to be 
interpreted.  
markers the way  
Contrastive markers Anyway, but, however, on the other hand 
Elaborative markers above all, in other words, what is more, in 
addition… 
Inferential markers after all, so, as a consequence, therefore, as 
a result, because of this/that … 
 
Obviously discourse marker is a very important category among the four types of 
pragmatic markers in Fraser’s classification because most of his publications focus 
on discourse markers e.g. how to define discourse markers (Fraser, 1999), how to 
approach discourse markers (Fraser, 1990), and how to classify English discourse 
markers (Fraser, 1998). Although discourse marker is only one group of pragmatic 
markers in Fraser’s classification, there is a key overlapping between the main 
features of Fraser’s discourse markers and those of pragmatic makers or discourse 
markers discussed in section 2.2.1 where discourse markers, pragmatic markers or 
many other terms are seen as competing candidates for the same group of linguistic 
expressions. Fraser (1990: 387-390) lists the following features of discourse markers 
when discussing how to study them. Among them, characteristic 4), i.e. zero 
semantic and syntactic participation, is among the most frequently proposed features 
in the literature, hence the most essential characteristic.   
1)   they are very difficult to analyze by traditional grammatical categories 
2)   they will not serve both roles (discourse marker and its homophonous form) in 
the same sentence. 
3)   they typically occur only in utterance-initial position but they do occur in 
utterance-internal or utterance-final position. 
4)   their presence or absence does not alter the potential discourse relationship 
between the message which follows and the foregoing discourse.  
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Instead of grouping pragmatic markers on the basis of the functions they play as 
Fraser (1990) does, Ariel’s (1994: 3251) classification is made on the correlation 
between form and function. The first category is termed ‘transparent operators’ 
(‘pragmatic operator’ is used instead of ‘pragmatic marker’ by Ariel) because their 
pragmatic meaning can be directly inferred from their semantic meaning. Examples 
of this category include but, or, so and because. The second category is called 
‘intermediate operators’ because although their function can be related to their 
semantic import, it cannot be derived automatically. Pragmatic markers such as you 
know, I mean, after all, of course, and or something are under this category. The last 
category is labeled ‘opaque operators’ because there is almost no link shown between 
their function and semantic meaning. Pragmatic markers such as oh and well can be 
seen as members of this group. Ariel (1994) claims that most pragmatic markers are 
in “somewhere on a continuum ranging from transparent linguistic expressions to 
completely opaque expressions interpreted by reference to their idiosyncratic rules of 
use” (Ariel 1994: 3251). 
 
Ariel’s (1994) classification has been found very helpful in accounting for 
acquisition of pragmatic markers. Hays (1992) observes that the most frequent 
pragmatic markers used by the Japanese EFL learners are and, but and so, which are 
on the transparent end of the continuum. Nikula’s (1996: 89) comparison between 
advanced Finnish EFL learners and British speakers reveals that the non-native 
speakers find it easier to resort to explicit markers, which have relatively transparent 
meanings. Fung & Carter (2007) report similar findings. The Hong Kong learners in 
their study are found to show a liberal use of pragmatic markers such as and, but, 
because, and so but a relatively restricted use of markers such as yeah, really, say, 
sort of, I see, you see, well, right, actually, cos, and you know. The reason that 
learners tend to use more transparent markers than intermediate or opaque markers 
could be that the more transparent the markers are the less difficult for learners to 
acquire. Since I mean and you know are both under the intermediate category, this 
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study will look at the correlation between the specific functions and the semantic 
meaning when accounting for the characteristics of learners’ use of these two 
markers. However, a similar continuum of the congruence between pragmatic 
meaning and semantic meaning is used.  
 
2.2.3 Main theories or models used in previous studies of pragmatic markers  
In this section, Schourup’s (1985) Tripartite Model, Schiffrin’s (1987) Discourse 
Coherence Model – Five Planes of Talk, Blakemore’s (1987, 1992) Relevance Model 
and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) Politeness Theory will be discussed. As can be 
seen from the following review, Schourup’s and Schiffrin’s models are designed for 
analyzing functions of pragmatic markers while the Relevance Model and Politeness 
Theory are not. The Relevance Model is a pragmatic model developed to “account 
for the psychological constraints that govern the hearer’s choice of context for the 
interpretation of a given utterance” (Blakemore, 1987: 12). It has been applied to this 
research field because pragmatic markers used by the speaker can help accommodate 
the hearer’s cognitive need of real time processing of the utterance. Politeness 
Theory is developed to account for the redressing strategies used by the speaker in 
performing face-threatening acts so as to minimize the detriment to both speaker and 
hearer’s face in social interaction. It has been applied in studies of pragmatic markers 
because it can account for the speaker’s social motivation in using pragmatic markers 
in conversation.  
 
2.2.3.1 Schourup’s (1985) Tripartite Model 
The core of Schourup’s model is his proposal of considering unexpressed thinking of 
conversants in describing conversation because conversants are not only talking but 
also thinking and their unexpressed thoughts have a direct impact on what they are 
saying. Although unexpressed thinking is inaccessible to direct observation, its 
existence should not be denied.  
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Schourup (1985:4) posits that unexpressed thinking is a very important aspect of 
conversation because conversants do not say everything that crosses their mind “but 
judiciously retain, shape, and sequentially place them in ways that often display 
considerable gamesmanship”. Given the importance of the unexpressed thinking of 
conversants in conversation, he proposes that the situation of a participant in a 
conversation should consist of three worlds:   
The covert thinking of the speaker, what that speaker has presently in mind but 
has not disclosed, will be referred to below as the private world; what is on 
display as talk and other behavior on the part of conversants and is thus available 
to both the speaker and any other(s) will be called the shared world; and the covert 
thinking of other conversants, which is inaccessible to the speaker, will be called 
the other world.  
                                                    (Schourup, 1985: 7) 
Schourup (1985:3) also proposes that the role played by pragmatic markers 
(discourse particle is used in Schourup’s study) is mediating in a specific way 
between the private world, the other world and the shared world.  
 
There does not seem any application of Schourup’s model in the studies of pragmatic 
markers reviewed in this study except one study – Salmons’ (1990) study of bilingual 
discourse markers. He compares the applications of Schiffrin’s (1987) Coherence 
Model and Schourup’s model in his German-American corpus. However, the 
Tripartite Model does attain its goal of identifying a core use for the pragmatic 
markers considered in Schourup’s study. Given that the role of pragmatic markers is 
defined as the way that pragmatic markers mediate between the private world, the 
other world and the shared world, the core meaning of I mean in Schourup’s 
framework is to indicate what the speaker has said and what the speaker has in mind 
are not well matched i.e. I mean indicates a nonequivalence of what is in the shared 
world and what is in the private world. Interestingly, under this framework the 
pragmatic marker like is found to play the same role as I mean, i.e. it mediates 
between the shared world and the private in the same way as I mean does. The 
explanation of the difference between like and I mean offered by Schourup (1985: 
147-148) is: like indicates a minor nonequivalence which is unlikely to cause 
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misunderstanding of the intended meaning while I mean indicates a substantial 
nonequivalence which requires correction or would lead to misunderstanding. Such a 
difference does provide a plausible explanation as to why I mean is often used to 
preface corrections while like is not.   
 
The core function of you know in this Tripartite Model is to indicate that “the speaker 
expects that there is no communicatively significant discrepancy between what is 
now in the private world and what is now in the other world, with respect to what is 
now in the shared world” (Schourup, 1985:102). So one obvious difference between 
I mean and you know under this framework is that you know involves the hearer 
while I mean does not, which does match to the general impression described by 
other researchers i.e. I mean is more speaker-oriented while you know is more 
hearer-oriented. But the core meanings of I mean and you know identified by this 
model do not seem to fit into the description that the pragmatic functions of these 
two markers are complementary. In addition, this model does not seem to be able to 
reveal any more specific differences between I mean and you know. Since one main 
aim of this study is to reveal the specific contexts of these two markers, Schourup's 
Tripartite Model will not be applied in this study.   
 
2.2.3.2 Schiffrin’s (1987) Discourse Coherence Model 
Schiffrin’s (1987) investigation of a number of pragmatic markers is one of the most 
important studies in the literature. Redeker (1991:1139) points out that Schiffrin’s 
(1987) study is “an ambitious and valuable attempt to integrate meticulous empirical 
analysis of the functions of discourse markers with a theory of discourse coherence”.  
 
According to Schiffrin (1987), the goal of developing the Coherence Model is to 
provide not only a theoretical background for her study of discourse markers but also 
a model on which both her analysis of specific markers and her general conclusion 
are based. Schiffrin (1987:3) maintains that the key assumptions of language central 
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to her analysis are: language always has a context, is context sensitive, always 
communicative and designed for communication. She continues to propose that 
discourse has three main properties: structure, meaning and action. Structure and 
meaning are more about discourse “as extended sequences of smaller units, e.g. 
sentences, propositions and utterances while action is “more concerned with 
language as it is used in a social interaction” (Schiffrin, 1987: 7). These three 
properties of discourse interact with each other because language has structure, 
conveys meaning, and is used to perform actions.  
 
Schiffrin (1987) sees coherence as crucial to discourse for it distinguishes discourse 
from random collections of smaller units. Like speakers and hearers who make great 
efforts to construct coherence in conversation, discourse analysts strive for a 
description of how coherence is constructed. She (Schiffrin, 1987:24) points out that 
her coherence model focuses on local coherence, which is constructed through 
relations between adjacent units in discourse but can be expanded to more global 
coherence. She further proposes that discourse markers in her model are viewed as 
“indicators of the location of utterances within the emerging structures, meanings, 
and actions of discourse” (Schiffrin, 1987: 24).  
 
The main idea of Schiffrin’s Coherence Model (“five planes of talk” in Schiffrin’s 
term) is that discourse markers can function in five different components of 
coherence, namely exchange structure, action structure, ideational structure, 
participation framework and information state. Each discourse marker has one 
primary plane but can function on more than one level, either separately or 
simultaneously. The following is the definitions of the five planes summarized by 
Fraser (1999).  
Exchange Structure, which reflects the mechanics of the conversational 
interchange (ethnomethodology) and shows the result of the participant 
turn-taking and how these alternations are related to each other; 
Action Structure, which reflects the sequence of speech acts which occur within 
the discourse; 
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Ideational Structure, which reflects certain relationships between the ideas 
(propositions) found within the discourse, including cohesive relations, topic 
relations, and functional relations; 
Participation Framework, which reflects the ways in which the speakers and 
hearers can relate to one another as well as orientation toward utterances; and 
Information State, which reflects the ongoing organization and management of 
knowledge and metaknowledge as it evolves over the course of the discourse. 
                                               (Fraser, 1999: 934) 
 
As mentioned in the earlier review, Schiffrin’s model has influenced a number of 
later studies of pragmatic markers. Not surprising, her model has received a lot of 
criticism (e.g. Jucker, 1988; Redeker, 1991). The main criticism seems to be about 
whether it is necessary to propose five different planes. For example, Jucker (1988) 
criticizes the five planes model by pointing out that the “information state” would 
actually include all the other levels. Redeker (1991) proposes a three-component 
coherence model instead, namely ideational structure, rhetorical structure, and 
sequential structure, which are roughly equivalent to ideational, action and an 
extended variant of exchange structures in Schiffrin’s model. Another problem with 
this model is its applicability. Jucker (1988:221) points out well is classified as a 
marker which primarily functions at the plane of participation framework, which 
reflects speaker and hearer relationship and orientation towards utterances, but the 
core function of well proposed by Schiffrin does not seem to be influenced by her 
five planes of talk. Schiffrin (1987: 126) defines well as “one device used by 
speakers in their attempts to build coherence in the face of multiple options: well 
anchors the speaker into a conversation precisely at those points where upcoming 
coherence is not guaranteed”. Jucker (1988: 224) further points out that Schiffrin’s 
model “makes it almost impossible to discern the common core underlying all the 
seemingly disparate uses of well.” 
 
The main reason that Schiffrin's model is not directly applied to the analysis of this 
study is because it only reveals three main functions of I mean (Schiffrin, 1987: 300) 
while Brinton's (2007) framework (for details see section 4.1.1), which is used as a 
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starting point in this study, presents a more detailed description of I mean. 
 
2.2.3.3 Blakemore’s (1987, 1992) Relevance Model  
Blakemore’s Relevance Model is another influential theory in research of pragmatic 
markers. As mentioned in the earlier review, there seem to be more advocates of this 
theory than those of Schiffrin’s Coherence Model. As just mentioned in the above 
subsection, Jucker (1988) points out that Schiffrin’s Coherence Model has failed to 
account for the use of well. In his later study, he even claims that Blakemore’s 
Relevance Theory is “the only theory that can account for all the uses of well on the 
basis of a general theory of human communication on cognitive principle” (Jucker, 
1993: 438).  
 
Blakemore’s Relevance Model can be seen as a product of the interaction between 
the assumptions she has formed on what makes successful communication and 
Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory. Blakemore (1992:27) claims that 
Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory could be regarded as an attempt to develop 
the notion of relevance, which is left undefined in Grice’s (1975, 1989) account of 
the Co-operative Principle.  
 
In Blakemore’s model, there is a distinction between what the speaker means and 
what his/her words mean. Every utterance produced on a particular occasion by the 
speaker has a variety of possible interpretations. Successful communication requires 
the hearer to recover the message intended by the speaker. The success of narrowing 
all the possible interpretations down to the intended one is because the hearer uses 
the Relevance Principle as the criterion to evaluate all the possibilities i.e. the hearer 
assumes that the first interpretation that satisfies the criterion is the only one. The 
Relevance Principle claims that every act of communication creates a presumption of 
its own optimal relevance. Therefore an utterance will reach its optimal relevance if 
it has enough contextual effects and if it does not cause the hearer unjustifiable 
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processing efforts.  
 
Since success of communication is achieved by cooperation between the speaker and 
hearer, what the speaker should aim to do is to make the interpretation of his/her 
utterance easier. For example, the speaker can help to constrain the interpretation 
recovered by the hearer by constraining the hearer’s choice of context. Pragmatic 
markers (‘discourse connective’ is used by Blakemore) used by the speaker in 
conversation can be a very useful device, signaling to the hearer the most likely way 
that the speaker wishes his/her utterances to be interpreted.  
 
There are three ways identified by Blakemore in which information conveyed by an 
utterance can be relevant:  
1) It may allow the derivation of a contextual implication 
2) It may strengthen an existing assumption (by providing better 
evidence for it) 
3) It may contradict an existing assumption 
                                (Blakemore, 1992:138) 
Accordingly, three types of discourse connectives have been identified (Blakemore 
1992: 138-142): 
1) discourse connectives which introduce contextual implications (so, therefore) 
2) discourse connectives concerned with strengthening (after all, besides, moreover, 
furthermore, utterance-initial also, indeed) 
3) discourse connectives which introduce denials (however, still, nevertheless, but) 
 
Before moving on to the next subsection, I should point out that in Blakemore’s 
relevance-based account of interpretation of utterances, the two concepts – context 
and coherence – are defined differently from those in coherence-based accounts. As 
stressed by Blakemore, context is not confined to “either to the immediate physical 
environment or to the immediate preceding text or discourse” (Blakemore, 1992:18). 
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Instead, context is defined as a subset of the hearer's beliefs and assumptions about 
the world. In coherence-based accounts of utterance interpretation the role of context 
is restricted to establishing coherence relations (Blakemore, 1987: 110). But it is very 
common to see discourse consisting of utterances that do not show coherence 
relations but can still be comprehensible as shown by example (2.5).  
(2.5)  
A     What did Susan say?  
B     You’ve dropped your purse.  
(Blakemore 1987: 110 quoted as example (6)) 
 
The relevance-based account also claims that the right context for interpretation of an 
utterance will not be given to the hearer in advance of the utterance, but will be 
constructed in the course of interpreting the utterance by the hearer. Therefore, 
shared knowledge is viewed as “a result of, rather than a prerequisite for, successful 
communication” (Blakemore 1992: 21).   
 
Unlike the coherence-based model, which views coherence as the evidence or 
characteristic which distinguishes discourse from a random collection of sentences, a 
relevance-based account sees coherence “as a result of the way in which hearers use 
contextual information in their search for relevance” (Blakemore, 1992:2). Therefore, 
the same utterance can be perceived as coherent by some hearers but incoherent by 
others.  
 
Blakemore's Model will not be followed in this study because its advantage does not 
lie in revealing how pragmatic markers behave in specific contexts. As shown in 
Andersen's (1998: 148) study of the pragmatic marker like, the advantage of the 
framework of relevance theory is that it can provide a unitary account of like. 
 
2.2.3.4 Brown and Levinson’s (1987) Politeness Theory 
The concept of ‘politeness’ in Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory is much more 
abstract than those specific polite rules such as opening doors for others, saying 
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please or thank you. As Bloomer (2005: 112) points out, Holmes’s version, where 
‘politeness’ refers to “behavior which actively expresses positive concerns for others, 
as well as non-imposing distancing” (Holmes, 1995:5) is very close to what is meant 
by ‘politeness’ in Brown and Levinson. The core of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) 
theory is the notion of ‘face’, which refers to the public self-image that every 
competent adult member of a society wants to have. It consists of two related 
components:  
(a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to 
non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition.  
(b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially 
including the desire that this self-image be accepted and approved of ) claimed 
by interactants.  
                                  (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61) 
 
To ensure smooth social interactions, participants work together to maintain each 
other’s face. However, in actual communication, there are certain kinds of acts which 
inherently run contrary to the face wants of interactants. These acts are termed 
face-threatening acts (FTAs). For instance, the act of giving advice will threaten the 
hearer’s negative face because it can pose pressure on the hearer to either perform or 
not perform, while the act of disagreeing will damage hearer’s positive face because 
it shows the speaker does not want what the hearer wants. Of course, to avoid face 
loss, the best strategy for interactants is “don’t do the FTA”. But unfortunately, FTAs 
such as request, apology, disagreement and refusal are part of our communicative 
needs. What interactants can do is to formulate their requests, apologies or refusals in 
a way that they can protect their face to the maximum degree.  
 
Brown and Levinson identify four types of politeness strategies, namely 1) without 
redressive action, baldly 2) positive politeness 3) negative politeness and 4) off 
record. The first politeness strategy is to do the FTA directly without any actions of 
redressing being made. This strategy is often used in situations where interactants 
have a very close relationship or the FTA is done in an emergency or in the interests 
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of the hearer. Positive politeness strategies are used to minimize the detriment to the 
hearer’s positive face. For instance, the speaker can use compliments to make the 
hearer feel good about him/herself or build up solidarity by claiming common 
ground. Negative politeness strategies are used to protect the hearer’s negative face 
i.e. his/her freedom from action and imposition. Using hedges is one of the ways that 
the speaker can decrease the imposition on the hearer. The last strategy is indirect 
strategy. For instance, instead of directly declining the hearer’s invitation, the speaker 
should indirectly state the reasons why s/he cannot accept the invitation. Brown and 
Levinson also predict that the more a FTA threatens the speaker’s or hearer’s face, 
the more the speaker will want to choose a higher-numbered strategy.  
 
Brown & Levinson’s Politeness Theory has been related to research of pragmatic 
marker because pragmatic markers are part of the linguistic efforts made by the 
speaker to attend to the hearer’s face. Brown and Levinson observe that you know 
can be used as a positive politeness strategy. By using you know, the speaker shows 
his/her interest in the hearer by his/her effort to “draw the hearer as a participant into 
the conversation” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 107). You know is found to be used to 
mitigate FTAs such as disagreeing and giving suggestion in the present study. So in 
Brown and Levinson’s term, you know is also used to attend to the hearer’s negative 
face.  
 
The Politeness Theory does help to account for the cases where I mean and you know 
serve the purpose of maintaining interactants' negative or positive face. But it cannot 
account for those cases where the two markers play ideational or textual functions. 
So the application of this model is confined to cases where I mean or you know is 
used to preface FTAs in this study. 
 
As will be seen later in this thesis, no pre-existing model has been applied directly to 
the analysis of the chosen data. The reason for this is that a bottom-up approach 
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would suit this study better than a top-down approach does, given that the aim of the 
present study is to give a detailed account of the two pragmatic markers considered. 
A top-down approach starts with a pre-existing model and the analysis will be carried 
out under the model. A bottom-up approach, on the other hand, starts with 
investigation of the contexts where pragmatic markers are used, then assigns various 
functions to them and finally more often than not sets up its own framework. As 
Erman (1987: 114) points out the main problem with a top-down approach is that 
priority will be given to the model and those functions identified in the analyzed data 
which cannot fit the model will have to be disregarded.  
 
The application of bottom-up analysis seems to be a rather common practice in 
previous research. For instance, Holmes (1986) investigates what functions are 
played by you know in her data and comes up with her classification which is made 
over a continuum of certainty and uncertainty. Müller (2005) gives a very detailed 
description of a number of pragmatic markers without using a previous framework. 
The pragmatic functions identified in her data are classified into two major 
categories: textual level and interpersonal level. In the present study, the 
identification of pragmatic function of I mean and you know starts with investigating 
its own data by drawing upon previous findings on these two markers and then all 
identified functions are classified over a continuum of speaker-orientation and 
hearer-orientation to meet the need of carrying out a detailed comparison between I 
mean and you know.  
 
Since there are various underlying motivations as to why the speaker uses pragmatic 
markers, this study will seek any plausible explanations rather than focus on one 
single explanation. As Aijmer (2002:11) points out, focusing on the Relevance 
Theory, which accounts for the speaker’s cognitive motivation, means politeness i.e. 
the social motivation may be neglected.  
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2.2.4 Methods used in establishing pragmatic functions of pragmatic markers in the 
literature and in the present study 
In this subsection, four main issues of establishing pragmatic meanings of pragmatic 
markers will be reviewed. Firstly, what other aspects of description of markers 
should be included in addition to their functions? Secondly, how many functions can 
a pragmatic marker have? Thirdly, how to define functions of pragmatic markers? 
Finally, why is paraphrase or translation a useful technique in pinning down the 
meaning of pragmatic markers?    
 
Although it seems that there have not been explicit discussions as to what should be 
included in the description of a pragmatic marker in the literature, previous research 
shows that in addition to pragmatic functions, the core of the description, other often 
described aspects include prosodic features and positioning. Svartvik’s (1980:169) 
description of well is made from seven perspectives: “position in discourse, 
collocation, prosody, pauses, incomplete surrounding structure, functions and 
Swedish equivalents”. Erman (1986:131)’s analysis of you know, you see and I mean 
is also made from seven aspects:  
1) position in utterance/turn 
2) syntactic environment 
3) semantic relationship between clauses connected by them 
4) position and use in information structure 
5) phonological properties 
6) listener reaction to them 
7) interaction with pause  
 
The commonality between Svartvik (1980) and Erman (1986) is that both 
descriptions include functions, prosodic features and positioning. For the present 
study, description of functions is no doubt the main concern. Other aspects include 
positioning and co-occurring linguistic elements. This study does not include 
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prosodic features because the data chosen in this study do not carry prosodic 
information. It is true that prosodic information such as intonation plays a very 
important role in interpreting what pragmatic markers mean. Certainly more research 
needs to be done in this aspect as Bolinger (1989:300) comments in his study of 
intonation features of well that “aside from an occasional acknowledge that 
intonation plays a role, few details have been offered.” However, according to 
Svartvik (1980: 172) there is no distinct correlation found between prosody and 
meaning. Bolinger (1989:338) does agree with Svartvik’s criticism of “Crystal & 
Davy’s attempt to assign meanings to well that belong rather to the intonation”.  
 
This study includes the description of positioning of I mean and you know because 
flexibility of position is a key feature which differentiates their status as pragmatic 
markers vs. their use as fully lexical verbs. Although “there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between position and function” (Erman, 1987:206), a certain 
function might have its preferred positions or individual markers might have 
different preferred positions. This study also includes the description of co-occurring 
elements of I mean and you know because one feature of pragmatic markers is that 
they tend to cluster. Co-occurring expressions sometimes can even be linguistic clues 
to the interpretation of the functions of pragmatic markers (Aijmer, 2002: 30).  
 
As discussed earlier, to pin down what pragmatic markers mean is a difficult job 
because they tend to occur in various contexts. There are three approaches as to how 
many functions a pragmatic marker can have. They are the maximalist, minimalist 
and polysemy approaches. Maximalist is also termed ‘homonymy’ approach because 
it allows sometimes a very large number of different senses assigned to the marker 
while minimalist is also called ‘monosemy’ approach because it aims to “isolate a 
unitary core meaning, usually of a highly abstract and schematic nature, from which 
all uses of a given item can be derived” (Hansen, 1998: 86).  
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In the earlier studies (Murray, 1979; Svartvik, 1980; Őstman, 1981, 1982, 1995; 
Carson, 1984; Schourup, 1985; Schiffrin, 1985; Fraser, 1990) of pragmatic markers a 
minimalist approach is rather prevalent because one main concern for them is that the 
pragmatic meaning of a marker should be able to explain why marker A rather than 
marker B is used in a given context. Murray (1979:728) proposes to give “a unified 
account of well, narrow enough to distinguish it from oh, broad enough to capture the 
diversity of its use”. Caron (1984:26) attempts to identify the core use of well which 
can be applied to all instances of well and can provide a plausible explanation as to 
why well appears in those particular contexts. Őstman (1995:97) claims that 
“research on pragmatic particles should aim to answer question why X was used here, 
and not Y”. Fraser (1990:395) claims that “a core meaning must be found and 
evaluated for the other markers as well”.  
 
The minimalist approach is certainly very useful for this study because one of its 
aims is to explain why certain functions can only be played by I mean but not you 
know or vice versa. However, core meaning tends to be very abstract or general, and 
therefore it is almost impossible to see how it can help to achieve another key goal of 
this study i.e. to compare I mean and you know in terms of specific functions they 
play. Therefore, like Hansen (1998) and Aijmer (2002), in this study I have decided 
to take the middle way approach i.e. the polysemous approach in which pragmatic 
markers are viewed as having different functions, which are related to the core 
meaning in a polysemous way.  
 
As to the establishment of functions of pragmatic markers, one has to look into the 
contexts where a pragmatic marker occurs, because as Erman (1987:114) points out 
the context and function should be considered as one entity, so if we state one we 
have to state the other. Both Erman (1987) and Schiffrin (1985) establish the 
functions of pragmatic markers by the coherence relations between two adjacent 
utterances or propositions linked by the pragmatic markers in question. Erman 
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(1987:114) said she had to postulate the existence of a covert semantic link between 
adjacent propositions so as to have a meaningful discourse analysis and two main 
types of coherence relations were identified – causal and concessive. Schiffrin’s 
(1985:643) analysis of well is carried out by looking paired utterances such as 
question and answer; request and compliance sequences. Schiffrin (1987:24) claims 
that her coherence model focuses on local coherence, which is constructed through 
relations between adjacent units in discourse.  
 
However, the two utterances connected by pragmatic markers do not always display 
coherence relations. For instance, pragmatic markers can preface utterances 
functioning in digressions from a topic or topic changes (Lenk, 1998:19). Schiffrin 
(1985:643) also reports that there are occurrences where well cannot be explained by 
a pairwise view of coherence in her study.  
 
However, Redeker’s (1990) taxonomy of coherence relations includes adjacent units 
which do not show the coherence relations mentioned by Schiffrin (1985) and Lenk 
(1998) above. They are termed sequential relations. The table below is the summary 
of Redeker’s (1990:369) taxonomy of coherence relations.  
Table 2.2 Taxonomy of coherence relations (Redeker 1990) 
 
Coherence 
relations 
Ideational 
relations 
temporal sequence, elaboration, cause, reason, consequence 
Pragmatic 
relations 
Rhetorical 
relations 
antithesis, concession, evidence, justification, 
conclusion  
Sequential 
relations  
Paratactic transitions to next topic or next 
point 
Hypotactic  into or out of a commentary, 
correction, paraphrase, aside, 
digression, or interruption segment 
 
Although Redeker’s (1990) classification of coherence relations can help to identify 
more functions than Erman (1987) and Schiffrin (1985, 1987), it fails to account for 
cases where pragmatic markers are used to preface FTAs, thus functioning in 
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mitigating FTAs. In the present study, the labeling of pragmatic functions will give 
priority to coherence relations. For instance, both I mean and you know are found to 
preface speaker’s attitude in this study, but they will be coded as ‘indicating speaker 
attitude’ only under the condition that the utterance which expresses the speaker 
attitude and its adjacent utterance do not display any coherence relations. In other 
words, the establishment of functions of pragmatic markers will consider the 
coherence relations between the adjacent utterances linked by the markers in 
question before sequential relations and other interpretations such as the function of 
softening FTAs.  
 
The last issue discussed in this subsection is about the technique of pinning down 
pragmatic meanings of pragmatic markers – paraphrase or translation – a very useful 
tool which the present study has inherited from previous research of pragmatic 
markers. Although it has been widely used by researchers (Wierzbicka, 1976, 2003; 
Svartvik, 1980; Carlson, 1984; Bolinger, 1989; Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004; 
Brinton, 2007), Wierzbicka (1976:328) seems to be the one who explicitly argues 
that paraphrase is the only possible way to accurately decompose the meanings 
embodied in pragmatic markers because pragmatic markers play the role of 
“illocutionary forces’ which are “bundles of assumptions, intentions and other more 
or less elementary “postures” and “turns” of the mind”. She further proposes that 
since the meaning of a sentence is compressed into a marker the right way of stating 
its meaning should be to reconstruct the sentence (Wierzbicka, 1976: 328). The 
following two sentences are the paraphrases of the pragmatic marker well offered by 
Wierzbicka (1976: 360):  
1) I don’t want more time to pass like this. 
2) I say: this is well; something else has to be said. 
According to Wierzbicka (1976: 360), sentence 1) could account for well in examples 
2.3 and 2.4 while sentence 2) could be the paraphrase of well in example 2.5. 
2.3 
   – Well, did Harry capture the aardvark? (The speaker is waiting for the addressee to say 
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something) 
2.4 
   – Well, to make a long story short… (The speaker is reluctantly permitting.) 
2.5 
   – You’ll find yourself in the Fourth Square in no time. Well, that square belongs to 
Tweedledum and Tweedledee…  
 
However, researchers who have used paraphrase all seem to point out the benefits it 
has brought to their research. Svartvik (1980) used paraphrase to establish the 
functions of well. His paraphrases of well were done in both English and Swedish. 
According to Svartvik (1980:172) paraphrasing in both English and Swedish not only 
helps identify the meanings of well but also divide his data into functional categories. 
He further points out that the Swedish translation “can be seen as serving a dual 
purpose: to provide contrastive statements as well as to further highlight the 
meanings of well” (Svartvik, 1980:172).  
 
Carlson (1984:3) claims that his intuitions of well are sharpened by its English 
paraphrase oh and one of its Finnish counterparts. Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 
(2004) propose that translations can be used as a heuristic device for setting up 
lexical fields. To establish meaning relations between markers of expectation, they 
look at Swedish and Dutch equivalents of expectation markers – actually, in fact and 
really – in translation corpora (including English into Swedish and Dutch and their 
translations back into English). The advantage of the translation method is “it 
provides rich details about both the source and the target items involved” (Aijmer & 
Simon-Vandenbergen 2004: 1797).  
 
Translation technique is also used in Brinton’s (2007) analysis of I mean, which 
helps start the analysis of I mean in this study. Unlike most of the studies where the 
pragmatic markers considered are either paraphrased in a sentence or other pragmatic 
markers whose meanings may be equally complicated, I mean in Brinton’s (2007) 
analysis is translated into rather transparent markers such as because, in other words, 
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namely and for example. Undoubtedly, this has made the application of her findings 
to the data of this study much more feasible. As will be seen later in this thesis, this 
translation technique has also been applied in the analysis of you know.  
 
To sum up, the positions that I have taken in terms of the above four issues of how to 
establish pragmatic functions of pragmatic markers are: firstly the present study will 
include co-occurring linguistic expressions and position of pragmatic markers; 
secondly the study will take the polysemous approach i.e. the identified functions of 
a marker relate to its core meaning in a polysemous way; thirdly it will give priority 
to the labeling of pragmatic meaning of a marker by the coherence relations between 
two adjacent utterances.  
 
Finally following Brinton’s (2007) study, this study will use the translation technique 
in its analysis. For example, it will translate I mean or you know into markers which 
tend to have a transparent form and function correlation to establish the broad 
categories. As to the identification of the subcategories, other criteria like the 
lexical-grammatical features that may consistently co-occur with the specific 
sub-types of I mean and you know will also be considered. For instance, one of the 
main functions of I mean is to repair. Under this category, I mean can be roughly 
translated into ' what I meant to say'. One subcategory of repair identified in this 
study is assumption correction (for details see section 4.1.2.1.1). Identification of this 
subcategory is strengthened by the fact that I mean tends to co-occur with negation.  
 
2.3 Previous studies on L2 learners’ use of pragmatic markers  
As mentioned earlier, pragmatic markers in the English language have received the 
most attention among all languages. Similarly, most of the previous studies of 
pragmatic markers in SLA are about L2 English produced by learners with various 
L1 backgrounds.  
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Romero Trillo (2002) investigates 6 pragmatic markers: look, listen, you know, I 
mean, well and you see in his Spanish EFL learners’ data. Both his native speaker and 
non-native speaker data consist of two data sets – children and adults. The 
comparison between children and adults in the native speaker data shows that there is 
an increase in the use of pragmatic markers in the adults. Although the 
English-speaking children and the Spanish EFL children show a similar pattern in 
their use of the markers, the adult non-native speakers fail to match their native 
speaker counterparts because “the appearance of these markers in non-native adults 
is even more limited than in the native children corpora” (Romero Trillo, 2002: 779).  
 
Fung & Carter (2007) look at what discourse markers Chinese EFL learners use in 
the context of classroom as compared to British speakers. On the basis of the main 
functions of discourse markers, the discourse markers occurring in their data are 
classified into 4 categories: interpersonal category, referential category, structural 
category and cognitive category. Their findings show that the Chinese EFL learners 
are found to display a liberal use of referentially functional discourse markers (and, 
but, because, ok, so, etc) but a relatively restricted use of other markers (yeah, really, 
say, sort of, I see, you see, well, right, actually, cos, you know) while native speakers 
are found to use discourse markers in a wider variety of contexts. 
 
Hays (1992) records what discourse markers are used by the Japanese EFL learners. 
The frequencies of the used markers shows that the most frequent ones are and, but 
and so, which carry more referential meaning. He argues that the preferences shown 
by the Japanese learners could be that markers with more referential meaning might 
be easier to be acquired.  
 
Nikula (1996) investigates how advanced Finnish EFL learners use pragmatic 
markers in their L2 conversation. She notes that compared to the native speakers the 
learners showed higher frequencies in those markers (e.g. I think, I suppose, I don’t 
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know, maybe, really) which have a close translational equivalent in Finnish. By 
comparing the speakers’ L2 English and L1 Finnish, she argues that such preference 
is a sign of positive transfer i.e. the learners’ use of these markers is facilitated by the 
learners’ L1.  
 
Demirci & Kleiner (1997) also suggest that L1 could account for the characteristics 
of the Turkish learners’ use of pragmatic markers. Their findings show that Turkish 
learners used more markers which have equivalents in Turkish. For example, they 
used more but, because, and so but less well, oh and anyway. They also note that but 
played two main functions – contrastive and resumptive – in the native speaker data 
while only the function of contrastive was used in the non-native speaker data. They 
argue that the absence of the resumptive use of but in the non-native speaker data is 
because the Turkish equivalent of but does not function in resumption in L1 Turkish.  
 
Given that most studies on describing characteristics of learners’ use of pragmatic 
markers in the literature are done by comparing native speaker and non-native 
speaker performance at a very general level, Müller (2005) decides to make her 
comparison between German EFL learners and native speakers of English at the level 
of individual functions because she thinks that “ a sound comparison between native 
speaker and non-native speaker discourse markers use has to be carried out at the 
level of individual functions and not just of the discourse markers in general” (Müller 
2005: 242). 
 
Müller (2005) looks at four pragmatic markers well, you know, like and so in German 
EFL learners’ conversation as compared to how they are used by native speaker 
speakers of English. In addition to statistical results, the bulk of her study is devoted 
to a detailed description of what specific functions those markers play in her learners’ 
data. As a result, the similarities and difference between native and non-native 
speakers are not only shown through frequencies and distributions but also individual 
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functions of each pragmatic marker. Undoubtedly, such a description improves our 
understanding as to how pragmatic markers are used by non-native speakers. 
However, Müller does point out that she has not been able to identify reasons for the 
difference frequencies shown between the two groups. Although she notes that there 
are some functions only occurring in the native speaker data, she does not attempt to 
account for their absence in the non-native speaker data. For instance, her 
explanation for the absence of the quotative you know (i.e. when you know is used to 
introduce a quotation) is simply that the Germans seem do not know this 
subfunction.  
 
As can be seen from the above review, previous research on L2 learners’ use of 
pragmatic markers seems to come up with a similar pattern regardless of their L1 
backgrounds i.e. L2 learners tend to use pragmatic markers less frequently than do 
native speakers and they prefer to more transparent markers. But to better understand 
how pragmatic markers are used by L2 learners, we cannot ignore the variations 
among the individual markers in terms of their frequencies and more importantly in 
terms of their specific functions. Obviously more in-depth corpus-based studies like 
Müller’s (2005) study are needed in this branch of research. 
 
In this chapter I first presented a broad picture of research of pragmatic markers by 
looking at the historical development of this branch of linguistic study and how 
pragmatic markers have been approached by researchers with a wide range of 
research interests. Then, I reviewed the main theoretical and methodological issues in 
this research field and explained why certain positions in those relevant theoretical 
and methodological issues have been taken in this study so as to achieve the best 
possible description of I mean and you know in L1 English. Finally, I reviewed 
studies on L2 learners’ use of pragmatic markers and explained why the present 
study will follow Müller’s (2005) study by comparing I mean and you know in native 
speaker data and non-native speaker data on the level of specific functions they play.  
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Chapter Three 
 Methodology 
This chapter consists of 5 sections. Section 3.1 will give a detailed description of the 
analyzing materials used by this study. Section 3.2 will show how the native speaker 
data and non-native speaker data are transcribed. Section 3.3 will discuss which 
cases of I mean and you know are not considered in this study. Section 3.4 will show 
how reliability of data coding is achieved in this study. Finally, section 3.5 will 
clarify some terms used in describing the positioning of I mean and you know.  
 
3.1 Data 
This study is based on the analysis of spoken texts from published corpora of both 
native speakers and EFL learners.  
 
As baseline data, I selected the face-to-face conversations of private dialogue in 
ICE-GB (International Corpus of English-Great Britain) “where nearly one-third of 
the samples consist of spontaneous dialogues. This is the most common type of 
speech that English speakers engage in” (Nelson et al., 2006). These conversations 
were all recorded non-surreptitiously between 1990 and 1993 mainly either at home 
or at work. This subcorpus consists of 185,208 words and involved 338 speakers 
whose age ranges from 18 to 92. Its main discourse types are asking and providing 
information, describing one’s experience either of one’s work or personal life, and 
giving opinions. 
 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data come from two subcorpora: SECCL 1.0 (Spoken 
English Corpus of Chinese Learners) from SWECCL 1.0 (Spoken and Written 
English Corpus of Chinese Learners) and SECCL 2.0 from SWECCL 2.0 
respectively. Both SWECCL1.0 and SWECCL2.0 are major projects accomplished 
by teams of Chinese researchers. SWECCL1.0, led by Nanjing University, was 
completed by cooperation among eight universities and research institutes, while 
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SWECCL2.0 had as many as thirty-four universities as its participants.  
 
Both SECCL1.0 and SECCL 2.0 are recordings of spoken tests of a national English 
test for English major students in China, which is entitled TEM4 (Test for English 
Majors, Band 4). Examinees are second year university students, who are about 20 
years old. One of the main differences between these two spoken corpora is that 
SECCL1.0 collected data from 1996 to 2002 while SECCL2.0 covered tests from 
2003 to 2006.  
 
The oral test consists of three tasks, but only data from task 3 is used in my analysis 
because task 3 is dialogues while both task 1 and task 2 are monologues. In task 3, 
examinees are divided into pairs. Each of them is given a cue card telling them their 
role in the conversation and also the situations in which their conversation takes 
place. Then they are given three minutes to prepare and four minutes to talk. In order 
to ensure that all examinees have something to talk about, the topics of task 3 have to 
be relevant to university students’ daily life or study. Therefore, what they are mainly 
asked to do is to give opinions, discuss or argue with their friends or school fellows 
on certain issues such as education and jobs. Since the ranking of examinees’ 
performance is provided in both SECLL 1.0 and 2.0, I decided to compare a group of 
best-performers of Chinese EFL learners, who I would define as intermediate 
learners, with native speakers. Because only one topic is given for task 3 each year, I 
included conversations from 1996 to 2006 so as to maximize the variety of topics in 
the EFL learners’ data. In order to ensure that the size of Chinese EFL learners’ data 
is comparable to that of British speakers, Wordsmith 5.0 was used to calculate the 
total number of words of selected EFL conversations, because the number of words 
each file contains is not available. Table 3.1 provides a summary overview of the 
data. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of the two sub-corpora chosen by this study 
British speakers Chinese EFL learners 
ICE-GB SECLL1.0&2.0 
Private direct conversations between 
1990 and 1993 
Role-played conversations of 
intermediate learners between 1996 and 
2006 
Dyadic or group conversations recorded 
either at home or work 
Dyadic conversations recorded during a 
national English test 
Main discourse types are describing 
experiences, asking for and providing 
information and giving opinions. 
Main discourse types are seeking advice, 
discussing or arguing with friends or 
school fellows on given topics. 
185,024 words 185,480 words 
 
Since the Chinese EFL learners’ data are role plays, they are admittedly not the same 
as the British speakers’ data which are authentic. But the role-played dialogues in the 
learners’ data can actually generate interactions which resemble natural 
conversations because they are “spontaneous and open role-plays” (Kasper 2000: 
323) where participants do not take on social roles different from their own and the 
course and outcome of the conversation are not predetermined. However, the native 
speaker data do cover a wider range of topics, discourse types, and age groups than 
do the learners’ data. Therefore, the variety of topics, discourse types and age may be 
intervening variables in this study. 
 
3.2 Transcription of data 
The transcriptions of both data are orthographic rather than prosodic, but there are 
some slight differences between them. For example, in the native speaker data, only 
pauses are encoded and a binary system of long and short pauses is used (<,,> and 
<,> stand for long pause and short pause respectively) while in the non-native 
speaker data punctuation marks of comma, full stop and question mark are used and 
pauses are also encoded but no distinction between long and short pauses is made. 
Another difference is that the conversations in the native speaker data are broken into 
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lines and numbered while those in the learners’ data are not. As a result, when 
examples from the native speaker data are referred to, the number of the conversation 
and the number of the line are used while when examples from non-native speaker 
data are cited, only the file name of the conversation is mentioned.  
 
3.3 Cases of I mean and you know that are not considered in this study 
Since this study focuses on pragmatic use of I mean and you know, those cases where 
they are not considered as pragmatic markers are excluded. Like Müller (2005), 
being syntactically optional is regarded as the essential feature among the properties 
of pragmatic markers in this study. Therefore, for I mean, instances where it takes as 
complement either a clause as in example a) or a nominal group as in example b), or 
a to-infinitive as in example c) are excluded.  
a)  I mean that nothing is totally safe. 
b)  I don’t mean the teacher. I mean the student. 
c)  I mean to hold a feast for my guests.  
(Longman Online Dictionary) 
 
For you know, the following examples are excluded in this study: those where it is 
part of an interrogative form in examples d) and e), takes a complement, either a 
clause as in example f) or a nominal group as in example g), or is used in a more or 
less fixed phraseology as in examples h) and i). 
d)  Do you know…? 
e) How do you know…? 
f) You know where Lord Street is. 
g) You know the kind of thing.  
h) You know what I mean. 
i)  As you know… 
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Also, in this study those instances where the pragmatic functions cannot be 
established due to the insufficient context are excluded because the identification of 
the pragmatic functions of I mean and you know is based on the interpretation of the 
context in which they occur: as Brinton summarises “For many scholars, the central 
function of pragmatic markers is to express the relation or relevance of an utterance 
to the proceeding utterance or to the context” (Brinton 1996:30). They are put under 
the unidentified category.  
 
Fortunately, only a small number of unidentified cases are caused by unclear words 
in the recording or the absence of intonation marking in the transcription, while 
majority of them are like examples (3.1) to (3.4) where the current speaker either 
abandons his/her message and restarts another message or has not completed his/her 
message before the next speaker takes his/her turn. 
 (3.1)  
175B    Perhaps he was twenty-three and been divorced twenty-three three times I mean 
<,> <laughter>  
176B    It seems a <unclear-word>  
177B    Because he was obviously an innocent you know abroad literally 
     (S1A-014-ICE-GB) 
(3.2)   
     28D     Are we insured <,>  
     29C     At last  
     30C     I mean I was  
     31A     It seems very expensive 
 (S1A-008-ICE-GB) 
(3.3)   
     255B    I 've I 've read masses of stuff but I mean y you can only draw on things that 
             are appropriate to what you 're doing can't you  
     256B    I mean I could write a whole sequence of stuff based on you know 
     257B    How does he  
     258B    I mean how does he 
 (SLA-045-ICE-GB) 
(3.4)   
     164B    I was wondering <,,>  
     165B    would you like to do some sight singing  
     166A    Mm  
     167A    Yes  
     168A    I'd love to  
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     169B    Just you know  
     170A    Would you like me to use your this book or  
     171B    No 
     (SLA-045-ICE-GB)   
 
3.4 Data-coding 
To ensure that the reliability of the analysis was as high as possible, the following 
measures were taken to strive for consistent interpretation of the pragmatic meanings 
of I mean and you know. Firstly, one-third of the British conversations were taken as 
samples to set up the categories of the pragmatic functions before the full study. All 
samples were checked by another analyst and disagreements resolved through 
discussion. The rest of the data, then, were coded twice and there were a few weeks 
between each coding. Again, controversial cases were resolved through discussion 
with another analyst. The agreement rate between the two codings was about 80% 
while 70% is considered to be sufficient to ensure reliable results according to Müller 
(2005:28). 
 
3.5 The positioning of I mean and you know 
In the analysis of the positioning of I mean and you know, this study not only 
investigates their turn position but also their proposition position so as to give a 
detailed account of their behaviour when they appear in turn medial position. There 
are 5 terms which need to be clarified when describing their positioning. They are 
proposition, linker, pre-linker, medial-linker and post-linker. 
 
In this study, a proposition refers to the part of an utterance which plays a part in the 
transitivity of a clause (Halliday 1994). A general term of linker is used for the sake 
of convenience to refer to those linguistic expressions which are not included in 
transitivity analysis, although it is not ideal. They include pragmatic markers such as 
you know, I mean, well, conjunctions such as so, and, because and interpersonal 
expressions such as basically, personally and I think.  
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Example (3.5) is a typical example where you know or I mean appears in proposition 
initial position. 
(3.5)  
    326A    Did you catch that word  
    327B    And the others <laugh>  
    328B    Actually it 's strange  
    329B    you know so many people just don't bother to shop anywhere else for those  
 (SLA-017-ICE-GB) 
 
However, there are cases where the marker is not at the very beginning of a 
proposition but co-occurs with other linkers. The proposition positions of I mean or 
you know in examples (3.6) and (3.7) are all coded as proposition initial, but I mean 
in example (3.6) and (3.7) are termed pre-linker and post-linker respectively and you 
know in example (3.7) is termed medial-linker because of their spatial relationship 
with their co-occurring linkers. This classification of linkers also applies to turn 
initial position when the pragmatic mark in question is with other linkers.    
 (3.6)  
     141B    Why do why do you think he doesn't write then  
     142B    Does he not have the time  
     143B    or do you just think he 's not <unclear-syllables>  
     144A    I don't know  
     145A    I mean I think really uhm <,,> it 's very difficult to to to produce any form 
             of art unless you are driven <,>  
(SLA-015-ICE-GB) 
(3.7)  
      20A    I wanted  
      21B    About you wanted to keep the fea uh  
      22A    Oh yeah  
      23A    And I said well you know I mean a lot of people wouldn't be necessarily be  
             interested in uh <,,> element theory but if they if they thought that it c it  
             could be handled in feature geometry <,> then they would probably read the  
             element bit as well and they might ultimately become interested in it <,>  
   (SLA-005-ICE-GB) 
 
All ranking clauses are treated as independent propositions. For instance, both main 
clauses and subordinate clauses are considered as separate propositions rather than as 
parts of propositions. In example (3.8), the proposition position of I mean, which 
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occurs in the middle of a clause complex but at the beginning of a main clause, is 
coded as proposition initial. I mean in example (3.9) is also in proposition initial 
position because it appears at the beginning of a subordinate clause, which is 
introduced by ‘because’.  
(3.8)  
113B    Because uh I think <,> some able-bodied people <,> may think we can be too  
        fragile to touch <,> to push over <,> to tip out of our chairs  
114B    but <,> if we say what we're what we're capable of and people are careful I  
        mean<,> I don't think it's that risky  
    115B    I think it's exciting <,>  
(3.9) 
209B    I I thought it was probably better to actually write the thing first and send it to 
        them than than to just contact them <,,> I mean because they always want  
        proof of one 's work  
    (SLA-066-ICE-GB) 
 
Most proposition positions in the ICE-GB data can be easily decided by the 
transcription i.e. whether I mean or you know is transcribed in the beginning, middle 
or end of a line. However, there are instances where the proposition position cannot 
be identified automatically. Example (3.10) is a typical example where you know is 
transcribed on a separate line, which means it can either be seen as the end of the 
previous line or the beginning of the next line. 
(3.10)  
     158B    The first thing she said was feline  
     159B    She was the most feline person I'd seen all year <,>  
     160B    you know  
     161B    And people do people do tend to describe themselves  
     162B    and also <,> if people have a very limited vocabulary which a lot of people  
             do <,> it's interesting looking at them and seeing <,> in what ways it 's  
             limited <,,>  
  (SLA-037-ICE-GB) 
You know is coded as proposition final here because it is more likely that you know 
relates back to line 159 because of the conjunction ‘and’ in line 161.  
 
Example (3.11) is a case where I mean appears at the end of a line, but is coded as 
proposition initial given the typical use of I mean. 
58 
 
(3.11)  
     96B    Mhm  
     97B    Yeah  
     98B    I I really don't know I mean 
     99B    The way that I <,> would approach th those sort of things would be just to do   
            them as an interest as a hobby  
     100B   and uhm if they if you got somewhere then that's great  
     101B   but n not to sort of pin too much on it  
 (SLA-033-ICE-GB) 
My analysis suggests that I mean is most often used to connect two separate 
propositions usually appearing in two successive lines, with I mean starting the 
second proposition and linking back. There is a plausible link between line 98 and 
line 99 in example (3.11). Therefore, it is less likely that I mean here relates back 
only to line 98. The more plausible assumption of I mean being transcribed in the 
end of line 98 would be that B might pause slightly after ‘I mean’ to think about 
exactly how to express the next point, but intend to carry on (it is unfortunate that the 
technical information about the ICE-GB corpus gives no indication of how decisions 
were made as to how lines are broken). On the other hand, if it is you know that 
appears at the end of a line, it would typically relate back only to the line it is in and 
not connect to the next. 
 
As to proposition medial, a further distinction is made as to whether the pragmatic 
marker in question occurs inside a constituent such as NP, VP and PP or between 
constituents. In example (3.12), you know is inside the noun phrase ‘a feature theory’, 
so its position is termed ‘within a constituent’ while in example (3.13), the position 
of you know is termed ‘between constituents’ because it appears between the verb be 
and its complement. 
(3.12)  
    13A     What Bruce Hayes was saying  
14A     Well I mean he he is a bit weird to have a to combine <,> particl par particle  
         <,> theory with a you know feature theory 
(SLA-005-ICE-GB) 
(3.13)  
    48A     There were two hour practicals on Wednesdays which took me ten minutes  
             because I wasn't bothered with the accuracy of my <,> results  
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    49A     The idea was you know we were supposed to do all these graphs and stuff  
(SLA-008-ICE-GB) 
 
In this chapter I firstly gave a detailed account of the analyzing materials used in this 
study. Although the native speaker data chosen by this study are bigger and more 
representative than those used in previous studies, I am aware of the differences 
between the native speaker data and the non-speaker data in this study. For instance, 
as will be seen in the following discussion, when accounting for the features of the 
Chinese learners’ use of I mean and you know, discourse type is considered as one of 
the factors that affect the learners’ production of these two markers. Then, I 
explained how pragmatic and non-pragmatic cases of I mean and you know are 
distinguished in this study. I also mentioned the procedures that this study has 
followed so as to improve the reliability of data-coding. Finally, some terms used in 
describing the positioning of I mean and you know have been clarified with 
illustrations.  
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Chapter Four 
Functions of I mean and you know in the native speaker data 
This chapter consists of 3 main sections. To begin with, section 4.1 will show how 
pragmatic functions of I mean are identified in the British speakers’ data with 
illustrations and how my own framework is formed. Section 4.2 will, then, 
demonstrate how categories of you know in the native speaker data are set up by 
following the same approach used in analyzing I mean and the identified categories 
will be classified under the same broad framework as I mean. By doing so, another 
objective of this study, a detailed and systematic comparison of I mean and you know, 
can be achieved. Thus in the final section such a comparison will be presented.  
 
To ensure the consistency of the data-coding of this study, the following three 
guiding principles will be followed. Firstly, labelling priority will be given to local 
contexts in the identification of the pragmatic functions of the two markers. For 
example, wider contexts (which can cover a few turn exchanges) will be considered 
only when no obvious functions can be identified via the two messages connected by 
the two markers. Typical examples are functions such as summarization (for details 
see sections 4.1.2.1.8 and 4.2.2.1.10) and resumption (for details see 
section 4.1.2.3.4 ). 
 
Secondly, as to those functions that can be identified through investigating local 
contexts, labelling priority will be given to cases where coherence relations can be 
identified by the two linked messages. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (p 43), the 
pragmatic function of the two markers will be coded as ' indicating speaker attitude' 
only when the message that expresses the speaker's attitude and its adjacent message 
do not show any coherence relations.  
 
Finally, with regard to those cases where the markers in question play more than one 
function, labelling priority will be given to the more important function (for details 
see Chapter 4, p 86) or the more typical function (for details see Chapter 4, 
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p131-132).  
 
As to the terms used to label the pragmatic functions of the two markers, one point 
needs to be clarified here. Like Erman (1987:114) the identification of the functions 
examines in what context the marker in question occurs. However, for the sake of 
convenience, instead of labelling a function as ‘occurring with certain context'’, all 
the functions are named after the contexts where I mean or you know occurs. For 
instance, when the two markers are considered as playing the role of justification, it 
actually means that they co-occur with the context of justification i.e. the justification 
is realized through the two messages linked by the markers rather than the markers 
themselves. 
 
4.1 Functions of I mean in the native speaker data 
As a very frequent phrase in English conversation, I mean has received a lot of 
attention.  Although various functions of I mean have been proposed, there seems to 
be a consensus among researchers (Crystal & Davy, 1975:97; Swan, 1992:377) that it 
is extremely difficult to pin down what exactly I mean means.   
 
Brinton’s framework (2007) has been chosen as the starting point for this study 
because her corpus-based study gives a more detailed account of I mean than other 
previous studies, most of which are rather brief, ranging from a short paragraph 
(Swan,1994) to a few pages (Crystal & Davy, 1975; Schourup, 1985). Although there 
are a few book-length studies (Goldberg, 1980; Schiffrin, 1987), they are based on 
very limited data and only focus on the general functions of I mean. Schiffrin 
(1987:300) claims that the three broad functions that I mean plays in her analysis are 
modifier of the speaker’s ideas, modifier of the speaker’s intentions and replacement 
repair given the semantic meanings of I mean. However, to answer the question of 
what exactly I mean means, a further investigation of the specific contexts in which 
these general functions are realized is essential because I mean “is tied to its moment 
of utterance and indicates but does not itself specify the nature of the nonequivalence 
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the speaker finds to exist between what is said and what is meant” (Schourup 
1985:148). More specific functions such as explicitness, exemplification and cause 
identified in Brinton’s analysis certainly help to reveal that the speaker’s ideas are 
actually expanded by giving more details, providing further examples and giving 
explanations.  
 
However, since her study focuses on the historical development of I mean, her 
examples are from quoted speech of written English corpora to “provide a better 
comparison with the (necessarily) written corpora of Middle and Early Modern 
English” (Brinton, 2007:41). Therefore, to allow new functions to emerge from the 
spoken data of this study and avoid the problem of forcing the data to suit a 
pre-existing framework, her framework was treated as the starting point and was 
deliberately left open to not only new functions but also reclassification of the 
functions.  
 
This section will be organized as follows. In section 4.1.1, Brinton’s framework will 
be introduced. Section 4.1.2 will give a detailed account of functions of I mean 
identified in this study and my own classification.  
 
4.1.1 Brinton’s framework (2007) of I mean 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the four main categories that Brinton identifies in her 
findings of the pragmatic meanings I mean are appositional meanings, cause, speaker 
attitude and interpersonal meaning. Following Schiffrin’s classification (Schiffrin, 
1987:300), Brinton also believes that the pragmatic functions of I mean can fall into 
two broader categories, metalinguistic (modifying the speaker’s ideas) and 
metacommunicative (modifying the speakers’ intentions). The category of 
appositional meanings is metalinguistic because all its subcategories “focus on code, 
on the particular expressions used” (Brinton, 2007:45) while the other three 
categories are metacommunicative because these usages of I mean are intersubjective 
(Brinton, 2007: 50, 53).  
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Table 4.1 Summary of pragmatic functions of I mean in Brinton’s (2007) study  
Functions  Examples 
Appositional meanings  
Repair (=what I meant to 
say) 
(4.1) “I’ll see you in the morning.” She laughed. “I 
mean, afternoon.” 
(4.2) “How many…I mean, how long is it since you 
got the first of these?” 
Reformulation(=in other 
words) 
(4.3) I just want to look at the stuff. I mean, examine it 
physically, not experience it emotionally. 
explicitness(=namely, that 
is) 
(4.4) It could be embarrassing, you see. Politically, I 
mean. 
Exemplification(=for 
instance) 
(4.5) Miranda was a star; I was space dust. I mean, 
when she made cheerleader our sophomore year, I got 
elected treasure of the Latin Club.[sic] 
Cause (=because or I’m 
saying it because) 
(4.6) Don’t you think it’s time you put that thing away. 
I mean, look at it, it’s antique; you could hurt yourself 
with it. 
Speaker attitude  
Express emphasis or assert 
the veracity of an utterance 
(4.7) But Cousin Alexander is rich. Really rich, I 
mean. 
Express evaluation or 
judgment 
(4.8) I mean, it’s humiliating to be beaten by someone 
who doesn’t even walk properly. 
Express sincerity(=I’m 
serious when I say) 
(4.9) I would never pick up the phone and call him; I 
mean, I wouldn’t do that. 
Interpersonal meaning (4.10) It is because she isn’t that she is successful… if 
you understand what I mean. 
(4.11) “If it was, then conceivably Congressman 
Metcalf resented that and –Well. You see what I mean 
(4.12) Or the paper does rather. Know what I mean? 
 
However, there are some slight differences between them with regard to under which 
of these two categories certain functions should be subsumed. Example (4.13) is an 
example cited by Schiffrin where I mean is used to preface expansion of the 
speaker’s prior ideas. Therefore, it is metalinguistic.  
(4.13)  
a    But I think um ten years from now, 
b    it’s going to be much more liberal. 
c    I could see it in my own job 
d    I mean, when I started working for the government, there were no colored  
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     people. 
e    And today eh…uh…twenty five, thirty percent, forty percent of the people I work  
     with are—are colored.  
         (Schiffrin 1987:296) 
According to Schiffrin’s interpretation, I mean here prefaces the speaker’s 
explanation of why he believes racial integration is increasing. However, in Brinton’s 
analysis, I mean indicates that “the speaker is being attentive to the hearer’s need for 
explanation” (Brinton, 2007: 50) and can be paraphrased by ‘I am saying this 
because’. Therefore, it should be coded as cause, which is metacommunicative in 
Brinton’s classification. 
 
Brinton’s study is concerned with the historical development of I mean, so she 
includes all cases of I mean. To show the diachronic change of the usage of I mean, 
she distinguishes between the semantic meaning (“full meaning” in Brinton’s (2007: 
43) term) and pragmatic meaning of I mean. But her category of interpersonal 
meaning, which is considered pragmatic in her framework, will be excluded in this 
study because I mean in those examples (4.10-4.12) is part of more or less fixed 
phrases in which it has its full lexical meaning. 
 
In sum, Brinton’s framework excluding the category of interpersonal meaning will be 
used as the starting point for this study. The next section will show how a finer 
description of I mean in this study has been developed on the basis of Brinton’s 
framework. 
 
4.1.2 Pragmatic functions of I mean in this study 
As shown by Table 4.2, this study came up with a longer list of the pragmatic 
functions played by I mean than does Brinton’s analysis. One of the reasons for 
Brinton’s shorter list might be due to her data, which consist of quoted speech from 
written corpora because it would reduce the chances of including those instances 
which tend to occur in authentic conversations and those instances which show very 
low frequencies. Summarization and resumption are two typical examples. They do 
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not appear on Brinton’s list because identification of them would involve a rather 
long turn or a couple of turn exchanges. Also, both of them show very low 
frequencies (resumption 2% and summarization 1.4%, respectively). 
Table 4.2 Classification of pragmatic functions of I mean in this study 
Hearer-oriented Interactant-relationship-oriented Speaker-oriented 
Assumption-correction 
Exemplification 
Explicitness 
Reformulation 
Cause 
Reason 
Result 
Summarization 
Softener of FTA 
Interactional repair 
Justification 
Conclusion 
Indicating speaker 
attitude 
Hesitation marker 
Quotative 
Restart 
Resumption 
Transactional repair 
 
 
It should be noted that the majority of the newly identified functions are the result of 
further categorization of Brinton’s categories. Take the subfunction of repair in her 
category appositional meanings as an example. There are no subcategories of repair 
identified in her analysis, but it seems that repair has further been categorized into 
vocabulary repair and grammatical repair in previous studies. Crystal & Davy 
(1975:97) posit that the speaker uses I mean to repair either syntactically awkward 
utterance or a wrongly chosen word. Goldberg notes that I mean “tends to repair a 
prior phonological or grammatical error” (1980:244) when it is in utterance medial 
position. In the present study four subtypes of repair are identified. Brinton’s 
examples (4.1) and (4.2) would both be coded as transactional repair because in both 
cases I mean marks the correction of wrong information. As opposed to transactional 
repair, another subtype of repair, interactional repair, is identified in cases where 
what the speaker is correcting is a socially inappropriate message rather than wrong 
information (for details see section 4.1.2.2.1). The reason for making a distinction 
between these two kinds of repairs is because transactional repair is about 
modification of messages while interactional repair handles interactants’ relationship. 
The third type of repair is called restart because I mean is used to reorganize an 
incomplete utterance (for details see section 4.1.2.3.2) while the fourth subtype is 
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coded as assumption-correction because what the speaker is trying to repair is the 
gap between the hearer’s potential assumptions on the basis of what has just been 
said and what the speaker has intended to say (for details see section 4.1.2.1.1).  
 
Another typical example is Brinton’s category of cause under which her two 
interpretations of I mean ‘I am saying it because’ and ‘this happens because’ are 
subsumed. The rationale for coding these two interpretations separately in this study 
is that, when I mean is read as ‘This is my reason for saying x’, the upcoming 
message prefaced by I mean serves to justify the previous message which is, in most 
cases, face-threatening so as to maintain the relationship between the speaker and 
hearer, while, when I mean is read as ‘This is the reason why x happens’, I mean is 
used to indicate how the upcoming message semantically relates to the prior one. As 
a result, the former interpretation was recoded as justification while the latter one 
was recoded either as cause or reason in this study (for details see sections 4.1.2.2.2, 
4.1.2.1.5 & 4.1.2.1.6). Interestingly, I mean also occurs in the context where it can be 
paraphrased as ‘so’ in this study. But it shows rather low frequency, which could be 
the reason for its absence on Brinton’s list. Again, the two subcategories of result and 
conclusion (for details see sections 4.1.2.1.7 & 4.1.2.2.3) are set up for the same 
reason as the distinction being made between cause, reason and justification. The 
category of result is set up as opposed to categories of cause and reason because the 
message prefaced I mean is the consequence of the previous message while the 
category of conclusion is set up as opposed to the category of justification because 
the upcoming message is the speaker’s inference made on the basis of the previous 
message.  
 
Not only do Brinton’s categories provide a very good start for the analysis of this 
study, her technique of identifying the pragmatic functions played by I mean has also 
been applied because of its practicality and consistency, which supports her claim 
that: 
But often the semantic-pragmatic interpretation of I mean in any given context 
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rested on translation equivalents, such as ‘namely’ or ‘in other words’. This 
offered the most reliable and transparent method for teasing out pragmatic 
meaning in these contexts and provided the greatest possibility for replicability. 
(Brinton 2007: 41) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3 below, which shows the translation equivalents of I 
mean, I mean in the majority categories can have a rough translation. 
Table 4.3 Translation equivalents of I mean 
Hearer-oriented Interactant-relationship- 
oriented  
Speaker-oriented 
 Translation 
equivalents  
 Translation 
equivalents 
 Translation 
equivalents 
Assumption- 
correction 
 
what I 
meant to 
say 
Softener of 
FTA 
well (as a 
pragmatic 
marker) 
Indicating 
speaker 
attitude 
I’m serious 
when I say 
Exemplification 
 
for instance  Interactional 
repair 
what I 
meant to 
say 
Hesitation 
marker 
 
Explicitness 
 
namely, 
that is  
Justification 
 
I’m saying 
it because 
Restart 
 
 
Reformulation 
 
in other 
words 
Conclusion So Resumption as I’m 
saying this  
Cause because Transactional 
repair  
what I 
meant to 
say  
Reason because 
Result so 
Summarization so 
Quotative   
 
However, a translation equivalent of a category does not necessarily mean that it can 
equally apply to all cases of that category. Both examples (4.14) and (4.15) can be 
categorised as explicitness. In example (4.14), line 71 specifies what exactly the 
speaker refers to by ‘big cracks in his face’ and I mean here can be roughly translated 
as ‘namely or that is’ while in example (4.15) by ‘her home’ Speaker B means ‘her 
own home’, but it seems that the same equivalent does not fit in line 278 as well as it 
does in line 71 of example (4.14).      
(4.14) 
68A    Yeah he had some sort of disease <.>undiag  
69A    undiagnosed I I believe  
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70A    So he had these great big big cracks in his face <,,>  
71A    I mean extremely deep wrinkles <,>  
(S1A-008-ICE-GB) 
(4.15)  
277B   They sent one to my mother after she died or something 
278B   Well<,> it was sent to her home and then it was sent I mean to her own home uh 
and she’d moved from there of course and was in the nursing home and they sent 
it there 
     (S1A-007-ICE-GB) 
It could be argued that in (4.15) the speaker breaks off after ‘it was sent’ (having 
intended to say ‘then it was sent to the nursing home’) and restarts ‘I mean to her 
own home’ (referring back to ‘to her home’). In that case, ‘that is’ would actually 
sound ok. But without intonation it’s not possible to be sure. 
 
Also, different categories can share the same translation. For example, transactional 
repair and interactional repair can both be replaced by ‘what I meant to say’. To 
further distinguish them, a closer look at the specific contexts is needed so as to see 
what is being repaired, the information or an inappropriate message.   
 
In sum, starting from Brinton’s framework, this study has developed a much finer 
description of I mean by looking closer at the specific contexts in which I mean is 
used. Among the functions of I mean identified in this study, exemplification, 
explicitness and reformulation are the only functions from Brinton’s framework 
which are directly applied to the data analysis of this study. The category of ‘speaker 
attitude’ is kept but renamed as ‘indicating speaker attitude’ because it seems to 
better capture the function of I mean in this category where the speaker’s attitude is 
expressed by the message either prefaced or followed by I mean rather than by I 
mean itself (for details see section 4.1.2.3.5). Although cause is still used, it only 
applies to cases where I mean is used to indicate the semantic relationship between 
the linked messages. The remaining functions are either newly identified or the 
products of further categorizations of Brinton’s categories of repair and cause.  
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In addition to newly identified functions, this study also attempts to reclassify the 
pragmatic functions of I mean from a different perspective. Instead of viewing them 
in terms of what type of modification (modification of the speaker’s expressions vs. 
modification of the speaker’s intentions) is made, the classification of this study was 
made on the basis of for whose benefit the modification is made. As can be seen from 
Table 4.2, there are three categories: hearer-oriented, interactant-relationship-oriented 
and speaker-oriented. The first category is termed hearer-oriented because the overall 
function of I mean in this category shows the speaker’s effort to help the hearer 
interpret the messages more efficiently by marking the adjustment of the prior talk 
taking into account the hearer’s likely interpretations and processing difficulties or 
the logical connection between messages. The second category is called 
interactant-relationship-oriented because I mean marks the face-work done by the 
speaker to maintain a smooth relationship between the interactants. Since a socially 
inappropriate message or a face-threatening act can actually threaten both the speaker 
and the hearer’s faces, some face work such as repairing or justifying needs to be 
done to save both sides’ face so that the relationship between them can be maintained. 
The reason that the final category is labeled speaker-oriented is that the linguistic 
efforts marked by I mean are made for the purpose of accommodating the speaker’s 
needs. For example, the speaker uses I mean to correct his/her own mistakes, or 
indicate his/her attitude. 
 
In the following sections, a detailed account of the pragmatic functions played by I 
mean in this study will be presented.  
 
4.1.2.1 Hearer-oriented  
4.1.2.1.1 Assumption-correction 
This is one of the subtypes of repair identified in this study. It is termed 
assumption-correction because what the speaker is trying to repair is the hearer’s 
potential assumptions derived from what he/she has just said. 
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(4.16)  
58B    But he's a perfectionist 
60B    I mean there 's a 
61B    I 'm not saying you 're not 
(S1A-008-ICE-GB) 
The upcoming message in example (4.16) serves to guide the hearer to interpret the 
previous message in the way that the speaker intends. Since line 58 could be 
interpreted as ‘what you are saying is he is a perfectionist while I am not’, by telling 
the hearer explicitly in line 61 that such an assumption should be ruled out, the 
speaker can limit the hearer’s interpretations so as to save the hearer’s processing 
time and avoid unnecessary misunderstanding. I mean here can be interpreted as ‘I 
guess this could be one of your interpretations of my message. But what I want to tell 
you is this is definitely not what I mean’. Not surprisingly, negation frequently 
appears in the upcoming utterance although not necessarily.  
(4.17)  
47C    But they make sure they sort of they seem to make sure that the processes take long 
enough for you to miss your train  
48C    So you have to wait for hours <,,>  
49C    A sort of manip  
50C    Well this was in Timisoara actually where we had to wait  
51A    In where 
52C    Timisoara where we had to  
53B    <unclear-words> to dilettante  
54C    And sort of riots started there  
55C    But I mean my only recollection of it is sleeping in a wood for about four or five 
hours  
56C    Rather idyllic  
(S1A-014-ICE-GB) 
Extract (4.17) is an example of assumption-correction without negation. C is telling 
his/her travelling experiences in Timisoara. Hearing that riots started in Timisoara in 
line 54, the listener could be expecting a story of a horrible experience. But what C 
can remember is actually something idyllic. Although negation does not appear, with 
the help of ‘but’ in line 55, I mean signals to the listener that the upcoming message 
is contrary to his/her potential expectation. 
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4.1.2.1.2 Exemplification  
This function is called exemplification because the upcoming message either serves 
as the backup of the previous message or as further example(s) when the previous 
message is about something rather broad. In the latter case, I mean works with 
expressions such as something like, for example, and things like. 
(4.18)  
189F   I'd be far more upset if somebody say scratched one of my records <,> than tore 
one of my books  
190F   I mean I seem I don't read books for pleasure, at all  
191F   I mean I think nineteen eighty-two was last time I read a book  
(S1A-013-ICE-GB) 
In line 190, F claims that he/she does not enjoy reading at all and continues telling 
the hearer in line 191 that the last time he/she read a book was about ten years ago 
(the conversation was recorded in 1991). Such a detail is designed to give the listener 
a clearer idea of how much the speaker dislikes reading books.  
(4.19) 
78B    D' you mean having the space there and uh  
79A    Yes  
80A    Absolutely  
81A    Uhm or whatever they provide  
82A    Uhm <,> well they I mean they they do <,> things like aerobics and <,> basketball 
<,> uhm and they have a a whe a wheelchair <,> team of basketball players uhm  
83A    But th I don't know <,> 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
In line 82, ‘aerobics and basketball’ are some details of ‘whatever they provide’ (line 
81) and things like helps signal that A is giving examples.  
 
4.1.2.1.3 Explicitness  
(4.20)  
107B   So we agreed that there was independence competitiveness <,> uhm <,> there was 
a third one I said before  
108A   Well the whole the whole drivenness of working hard  
109B   I know  
110B   All right drivenness  
111B   Uhm <,,> secondly as I mentioned before more difficulty than I suspect I would 
have had in dealing with men of my father 's age just not knowing how to relate to 
them <,>  
112B   Uhm <,> thirdly uhm <,,> mm let me think <,,>  
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113B   Are we talking about my views now I mean now at my age or my views then  
       <,>  
114A   OK  
115A   Well both  
(SLA-075-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.20), speaker B uses the message prefaced by I mean to specify 
whether A wants him/her to talk about his/her view ‘now’ or ‘then’.  
 
4.1.2.1.4 Reformulation 
In this function, I mean can be paraphrased as ‘in other words’. Although this 
function is identified in Schiffrin (1987: 302), she considers it as a replacement repair. 
In this study, this function is coded as reformulation as it is in Brinton’s analysis.  
(4.21)  
18A    Will that be full-time  
19B    No <,,> but it pays what I would call a part-time wage  
20A    Uhm <,> and can you do your own hours  
21A    I mean you can be there whenever you want 
  (S1A-011-ICE-GB) 
In line 21, the speaker actually repeats what he/she says in line 20 but puts in a 
slightly different wording. It seems that the repeated information in line 21 is 
redundant, but the repetition should make it easier for the hearer to process the 
message. 
 
4.1.2.1.5 Cause 
(4.22)  
97A    Didn't like going to school  
98B    Uhm <,,> uh what I didn't like uh <,> was leaving my mum really  
99B    I think that was it  
100B   I was I was insecure  
101B   Uhm <,,> I can remember that I mean it was it was particularly bad at primary 
school  
102B   I can I can remember I can remember the first day <,>  
103B   I can remember vividly my first day at primary school  
104B   I cried a lot 
(S1A-076-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.22), the fact that the speaker can still remember that he/she felt very 
insecure in school is caused by his/her particularly bad experience of primary school. 
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I mean here can be paraphrased as ‘because’, indicating a cause-effect link between 
the messages linked by I mean.  
 
4.1.2.1.6 Reason 
(4.23)  
135B   Well like I sold a cheapo ten pound Walkman and I 'm ashamed of this  
136B   It's the only black marketing I did for sixty quid sixty roubles really you know  
137B   But I mean it's because I needed to go on a trip for a week in Leningrad 
(S1A-014-ICE-GB) 
Although I mean in (4.23) can also be paraphrased as ‘because’ because the 
upcoming message in line 137 explains why B sold his walkman cheaply in the black 
market, it should be distinguished from the I mean in example (4.22). In example 
(4.23), it was the speaker’s decision to do black marketing for the reason that he/she 
needed the money for a trip to Leningrad, while in (4.22) there is no speaker’s 
volition involved. 
 
4.1.2.1.7 Result 
As opposed to cause and reason where I mean can be interpreted as ‘because’, I 
mean in this category can be roughly translatable as ‘so’. Therefore, this function is 
called result. 
(4.24)  
52A    Uhm <,,> and you say here writing B B C <,,> museums <,> and so on  
53B    Yeah <,>  
54A    Right <,,>  
55A    Do you have the background information on all or any of these  
56B    I mean<,,> museums I have uh some kind of background in just because the work 
that I was doing was quite closely affiliated with museums and stuff  
57B    Uhm <,> I mean I 'm applying this week for a job at the V and A  
58B    and I've already been told there's a strong internal candidate <,,> in the India 
department 
In example (4.24), for speaker B, the fact that he/she has some background in 
museum leads to his/her action of applying for a job at the V and A (Vitoria and 
Albert Museum). 
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4.1.2.1.8 Summarization  
(4.25)  
1A     <unclear-words> So it was OK in fact <unclear-word>  
2A     And it went all right  
3A     so I've decided that uhm I'm as far as that bit of the paper goes <,> I'm just going to 
modify a little bit the bit that goes on about element theory <,> rather than not 
element theory sorry feature geometry rather than develop it there <,>  
4A     Because me and John said  
5A     well he said they they they could definitely handle it <,> but it because they'd get 
round it by underspecifying this that and the other and having tricks where the 
underspecified bits got put in <,>  
6A     but there's so many different forms of it that they 'd easily manage it <,>  
7A     So basically I mean I said to him <,,> well the rea I want to keep element th uh 
feature geometry in <,> I said because not <,,> because <,,> you know I'm 
pandering to people who support it 
(S1A-005-ICE-GB) 
To identify the function that I mean plays in (4.25), we need to look at the 
relationship between the upcoming message line 7 and all the previous messages 
from line 1 to 6. A is recounting what has happened to his/her paper, a very 
complicated theoretical issue which would obviously need a longer turn. After 6 lines 
of talk, A summarizes what he/she has said so far for the listener because this 
summarization should make it easier for the listener to understand and remember the 
main points of the story so that the conversation can move forward smoothly. It is 
clear that another two pragmatic markers so and basically before I mean contribute to 
the identification of this function. 
 
4.1.2.1.9 Quotative 
This is another category which is very rarely played by I mean. It only occurs twice 
in this study and in both cases I mean co-occurs with another pragmatic marker you 
know, which frequently plays the role of indicating the coming message is a 
quotation (for details see section 4.2.2.1.11).  
(4.26)  
18A    What was I saying  
19A    God I've lost my thread <,,>  
20A    I wanted  
21B    About you wanted to keep the <.>fea uh  
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22A    Oh yeah  
23A    And I said well you know I mean a lot of people wouldn't be necessarily be 
interested in uh <,,> element theory but if they if they thought that it <.>c it could 
be handled in feature geometry <,> then they would probably read the element bit 
as well and they might ultimately become interested in it <,>  
   (S1A-005-ICE-GB) 
Here I mean, with well and you know, signals to the hearer that the coming message 
is a direct quote of what the speaker said.  
 
4.1.2.2 Interactant-relationship-oriented 
4.1.2.2.1 Interactional repair 
(4.27)  
94B    and people now do things like art therapy and dance therapy <,> uh which is  
       great  
95B    It's very good work but I think <,> that art and dance actually include <,> the idea 
of therapy within them <,>  
96A    When you say recovering the whole person it suggests that there is something  
        lost 
97A    I mean you know is there something incomplete 
98A    I mean <,> uh what's w what's what’s incomplete <unclear-words> <,>  
(S1A-004-ICE-GB) 
The informational content in line 96 is not wrong, what A is repairing in line 97 and 
line 98 is the social inappropriateness that the message conveys. Line 96 sounds as if 
A is questioning the validity of what B has just said about dance therapy, but it seems 
that A is not in a position to do so because in this conversation B is a professional 
dancer. As can be seen from example (4.27), A has actually utilized two I means to 
complete his/her social repair from a very face-threatening act stating A’s own belief 
about something that concerns B (line 96) to a less face-threatening question inviting 
B to state his/her opinion (a yes-no question in line 97) and then to an inquiry (a 
wh-question in line 98). 
 
There are a few cases in this category where the interactional repair is done through 
change of speaker key. For instance, in example (4.28) speaker B is joking in line 
120 about the value of ‘this work’ (here referring to speaker B’s work of teaching a 
dancing group which involves disabled people). It does not seem very appropriate to 
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talk about such a serious topic in a joking way, so B switches to a serious speaker 
key in line 121.  
(4.28)  
117A   Is is there anything else that <,> is there some is there anything else that's that you 
found particularly valuable about <,> this work <,,>  
118B   I think yeah I think uh <,,> I think it 's it 's a way of giving <,,> as well  
119B   I mean<,> I think <,> we're all used to taking <,,>  
120B   I mean it it sounds <laugh> <,> sounds a bit holy doesn't it really <laugh>  
121B   No but I mean it's it's very good to to share <,> things with people <,> and to share 
what you know<,> and to <,> to learn what <,> other people can give to you and 
what you can give to them <,> 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
 
Cases similar to example (4.28) have also been observed in Schiffrin’s analysis 
(1987). But they are put under the category of modifier of speaker’s intentions. 
Example (4.29) is cited by Schiffrin to show that “I mean is also used to reestablish 
the tone of a conversation by establishing a serious speaker key” (Schiffrin 1987: 
298). Although there is a change from joking tone to a serious tone in both example 
(4.28) and example (4.29), the difference between them is that in example (4.28) it is 
speaker B who changes his/her own tone while in example (4.29) what Irene is trying 
to do is to lead the conversation to a serious tone because it is not Irene but Henry 
that is joking in the prior talk.  
(4.29)  
Irene    a. Henry, if they wanna do it, they’ll go away and do it! 
b. What’m I gonna do, take a gun and KILL’em? 
Henry   c. I hate you! Hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh 
Debby   d. I didn’t mean t’start thishhhhh 
Irene    e. No, we argue about this       all the time.= 
Henry   f. hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh  
Irene    g. =All the time. Always. Because I really don’t- 
Henry   h. If I wanna get my adrenalin    worked up we- she 
          Comes in hhhhhhhhhhhh 
Debby   i. Keeps y’young! 
Irene    j. I mean I’ve seen girlfriends of mines parents, sit shiva 
          For them, [a mourning ritual] 
        k. because they were marrying out of their religion. 
(Schiffrin, 1987: 298) 
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3.2.2.2 Justification 
This function is termed justification because I mean can be interpreted as ‘I am 
saying this because’ i.e. the upcoming utterance explains why the previous message 
has been said. The speaker’s view plus further explanation of why the speaker has 
come up with such a view would more likely to win the hearer’s agreement. More 
importantly, when the explanation is prefaced I mean, it could convey a message to 
the listener that ‘You do not have to agree with me. Feel free to disagree with me if 
you want to’. Thus, I mean decreases the potential imposition on the listener when 
functioning in justification. The three subtypes of justification identified in the native 
speaker data of this study are epistemic justification, justification of evaluation and 
justification of speech act (these terms are taken from Thompson, forthcoming).  
(4.30)  
284A   You'd be able to afford it up there wouldn't you  
285C   Yeah <,>  
286C   I mean we d take out a little mortgage  
287F   Yeah 
288A   I mean you wouldn't necessarily need a house  
(S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
(4.31)  
28A    Well that's all right  
29A    you're in good company  
30A    I mean with you with your Oxford degree are now going to be photocopying and 
Sue with her degree is actually putting things in alphabetical order  
31A    that should make you both feel a lot better  
32B    <laugh> 
(S1A-011-ICE-GB) 
 
Example (4.30) is coded as epistemic justification because the reason why A thinks C 
would be able to afford an accommodation up there is that A thinks C wouldn’t 
necessarily need a house while example (4.31) is coded as justification of evaluation 
because the reason for A’s assessment that ‘you’re in good company’ is that both the 
listener and Sue are degree-holders and are doing similar simple jobs. However, the 
distinction between epistemic justification and justification of evaluation is not 
always clear-cut. Example (4.32) is a case of justification which lies between these 
two subtypes of justification. 
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(4.32)  
141B    Why do why do you think he doesn't write then  
142B    Does he not have the time  
143B    or do you just think he 's not  
144A    I don't know  
145A    I mean I think really uhm <,,> it 's very difficult to to to produce any form of art 
unless you are driven <,> 
146B    Yeah  
147A    Uhm  
148B    But does he does he not just like write for himself  
149A    Internally driven I meant 
(S1A-015-ICE-GB) 
The coding of example (4.32) depends on how A’s reply ‘I don’t know’ (line 144) is 
interpreted. I mean would be considered as a marker of justification of evaluation if 
‘I don’t know’ is read as A does not think that there is an easy answer like ‘he doesn’t 
have the time’ to the question ‘Why doesn’t he write?’. But ‘I don’t know’ here can 
also be read as A not being sure about the two choices given by B. In this second 
reading, I mean is coded as epistemic justification. 
 
(4.33)  
154A    Well do it somewhere else 
155A    I mean look  
156A    there's plenty of other places to put it 
157A    How about here 
(S1A-010-ICE-GB) 
Example (4.33) is called justification of speech act because what the speaker is 
justifying here is a speech act of giving a command or suggestion, an intrinsically 
fact-threatening act. To save both the speaker’s and the hearer’s faces, the simplest 
strategy is to avoid any FTA. The speaker, however, has chosen to carry out this FTA 
because it can be justified i.e. although it is an FTA, it is done for the good of the 
hearer.  
 
As can be seen from the later discussion, this function of I mean shows the highest 
frequency, which means that I mean is mainly used to justify what the speaker has 
just said. This seems to be supported by the fact that most of the previous studies 
include examples of justification and they can fit into the above three subtypes of 
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justification identified in this study although they are assigned various terms rather 
than justification. For instance, Schiffrin’s example of modification of speaker’s 
ideas, which was quoted as example (4.13) above (repeated here for 
convenience),can be coded as epistemic justification because the message that the 
speaker’s experience of working with more and more colored people is used to 
explain why the speaker thinks that the racial integration is increasing. 
(4.13) 
a    But I think um ten years from now, 
b    it’s going to be much more liberal. 
C    I could see it in my own job 
D    I mean, when I started working for the government, there were no colored 
     people. 
e    And today eh…uh…twenty five, thirty percent, forty percent of the people I work  
     with are—are colored.  
         (Schiffrin 1987:296) 
 
One of Brinton’s examples of cause, which was quoted as example (4.6) above 
(repeated here for convenience), can be coded as justification of speech act. Again, 
the prior message in example (4.6) is an FTA, telling people what they should do, but 
is carried out for the sake of the hearer’s benefit. The speaker tells the hearer to ‘put 
that thing away’ because he/she thinks ‘that thing’ could potentially hurt the hearer if 
it is not.  
(4.6)  
Don’t you think it’s time you put that thing away. I mean, look at it, it’s antique; you 
could hurt yourself with it.  
(Brinton 2007: 50) 
 
Interestingly, there are a few cases of I mean in this category where the upcoming 
message is used to justify what has just been done rather than said by the speaker.  
(4.34)  
3B    How does it compare in size to Martin's hall  
4B    You've seen Martin's hall haven't you 
5C    Well it's about the s  
6C    Yes  
7C    It's comparable I would think but with a lower ceiling  
8C    <unclear> 
9B    Lower  
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10B   Lower than Martin's  
11B   Gosh  
12B   I think I mean his ceiling's not not high 
(S1A-073-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.34), ‘Gosh’ itself in line 11 does not qualify as a message but is more 
like an action indicating that the speaker is surprised. The message prefaced by I 
mean explains why speaker B is surprised.   
 
4.1.2.2.3 Conclusion 
(4.35)  
181B   How did Peggy get on with her guitar  
182B   I 'm not sure I ever got round to asking her  
183A   Well I don't know is the short answer because she uh never actually answered the 
question when I asked her  
184B   Ah  
185B   I asked her but she never answered the question when I asked her  
186A   uhm <,> I mean I always get the feeling it was a grave disappointment in some 
way but uh whether that's  
(S1A-023-ICE-GB) 
As opposed to the justification category, where it is the upcoming message that 
justifies the previous message, in example (4.35) the previous message ‘Peggy never 
answered the question’ represents the reason for the upcoming message ‘I always get 
the feeling it was a grave disappointment in some way’. I mean can be paraphrased 
as ‘so’. Therefore, this example is coded as conclusion. 
 
4.1.2.2.4 Softener of FTA 
To be more accurate, this category should be better termed disagreeing because I 
mean is almost exclusively used to mitigate one FTA of disagreeing as shown in 
example (4.33). The reason of choosing a more general term softener of FTA is 
simply for the convenience of comparing with you know, which is observed to 
mitigate other FTAs such as breaking bad news or giving a command ( for details see 
section 4.2.2.2.3).  
 (4.36)  
326B    Mrs Thatcher had elocution lessons didn't she yeah yeah  
327B    Nothing could make that voice apart from artificial training  
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328A    No I mean I think <unclear-word> is quite useful cos it can help you use your 
voice  
(S1A-018-ICE-GB) 
As can be seen from example (4.36), interpretation of this function has to go beyond 
the same speaking turn because we usually disagree with other people’s opinions. 
The comments on elocution made by B sound negative while A’s message after I 
mean shows his/her disagreement that actually elocution can be good because it can 
help people use their voice properly. Since disagreeing is an intrinsically 
face-threatening act, efforts to mitigate it are likely to be made by the speaker. In 
example (4.36), the strategy that the speaker employs is to agree, albeit minimally, 
with the hearer first and then to use I mean to introduce his/her disagreement. This 
“agreement followed by disagreement prefaced by I mean” pattern applies to most 
instances of disagreeing in this study.  
 
Example (4.37) is the only example found in the data of this study, where I mean 
prefaces another FTA of giving a command.  
(4.37)  
191B    Uhm so that's quite a good thing but I think she's <,> much too scared to confide 
in them <,,> you know <unclear-words> 
192A    So she's playing a part  
193B    Yes she's playing a part  
194A    Yes  
195B    And I don't think that's healthy at all  
196A    Very tiring  
197A    could be tiring  
198B    Yes yes  
199B    Oh she is she is punishing herself  
200A    Yes  
201B    So I don't know  
202B    I 'm I 'm not quite sure  
203A    But you see I mean you mustn't flagellate yourself because her back thing <,,> 
proved that she was never going to be the easy adolescent was she  
204A    and it might have been something else 
(S1A-054-ICE-GB) 
 
As mentioned earlier, those functions identified in this study but absent in Brinton’s 
analysis tend to show low frequency. But softener of FTA is an exception because it 
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occurs at a fairly substantial frequency of 6% in this study. However, a similar 
function is mentioned in the previous studies. For instance, Coates (1998:143) points 
out that I mean, as an epistemic modal form, can be used to hedge assertions so as to 
protect both speaker and hearer’s faces.  
 
4.1.2.3 Speaker-oriented 
4.1.2.3.1 Transactional repair 
(4.38)  
125 B   I I look forward to <,> to working each week 
126 B   I mean I'd like to do it every day <,,> but you know such is life <,,>  
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
What B is doing in line 126 is correcting the wrong information given in line 125. I 
mean here can be interpreted as ‘no, what I meant to say was …’.  
 
4.1.2.3.2 Restart 
(4.39)  
57A    I would because to me <,> it seems 
58A    I mean I'd go to that and I'd go to the Palmer one if I was you 
   (S1A-005-ICE-GB) 
To identify this subfunction, the prior message has to be an incomplete one followed 
by another utterance prefaced by I mean. The incomplete utterance could either be 
the result of the speaker’s failure to organize his/her thoughts or the speaker’s 
decision to abort the current message.  
 
4.1.2.3.3 Hesitation marker 
In the data of this study, I mean is very rarely used as a hesitation marker. When it 
plays this function, it typically occurs with another pragmatic marker you know, 
which is more often used as a hesitation marker (for details see section 4.2.2.3.1) or 
co-occurs with another marker of hesitation repetition.  
(4.40)  
127A    And the physical contact out there is is the only<unclear-words>problem of being 
isolated in your <,> wheelchair  
128B    Uhm  
129B    Uh uh in a in a chair  
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130A    Uhm  
131B    I think so  
132B    Yes  
133B    I mean I think uhm space is you know I mean <,> you know just the obstacles 
that you have in a room 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
I mean here is coded as a hesitation marker because I mean, coupled with two you 
knows and one pause, actually helps the speaker stall for time to figure out how to 
define space.  
 
(4.41)  
101A    And for the future would you want to continue <,,> with this group  
102? 
103C    Yes  
104B    Well yes certainly  
105C    Uhm uhm  
106B    For <,,> however long it  
107B    Well we'll see what happens really  
108B    It's all I mean it's all very exciting really  
109B    We don't know <,> what will happen but <,> we can only sort of work and see 
what happens  
Example (4.41) is also considered as a case of hesitation marker because it occurs 
with repetition of ‘It’s all’. Unlike I mean in the category of restart where the speaker 
does not finish the prior message and restarts another one, the upcoming message 
prefaced by I mean in example (4.41) begins with the repetition of the incomplete 
previous message.  
 
4.2.3.4 Resumption  
(4.42)  
160A     Now that's why you shouldn't worry about Tamsin and Damian coming together 
cos from Rebecca's point of view <,> it would be a godsend  
161B     Oh it would uh it would be a great blessing if they can s they can speak for a half 
an hour or something  
162B     it would be  
163C     Oh good  
164A     Cos they can make her feel easier because I think she feels she's being rather an 
intrusion  
165C     <unclear-words>  
166C     Well will you tell her that you might save Rebecca from complete despair 
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because being exposed twice within a month would be rather awful for her  
167C    I mean who did you say you s found in Scotland  
168B    Yeah  
169B    I mean it would be nice <,,>  
170B    Just have somebody else to talk to really <,>  
171B    Have a game of table tennis or something  
    (S1A-021-ICE-GB) 
Resumption means the speaker picks up his/her topic which has been interrupted in 
the previous talk. Interpretation of this function usually needs a wider context 
covering a few turn exchanges as shown in example (4.42). Interestingly, in this 
example both speakers B and C use I mean to direct the conversation to their 
previously interrupted topics. In line 167, speaker C intends to continue a previous 
topic, which is about somebody B met in Scotland. Instead of carrying on C’s topic 
by telling C who he/she met in Scotland, in line 169 speaker B continues his/her own 
topic of line 162, which has been interrupted by C in line 163. 
 
4.1.2.3.5 Indicating speaker attitude 
In Brinton’s framework, I mean expresses three types of speaker attitudes as shown 
by Table 4.1. In this study, most cases fall into her second type of speaker attitude i.e. 
evaluation or judgment. In line with Brinton’s (2007:51) claim that when functioning 
in this speaker attitude I mean tends to occur in the context of an evaluative adjective, 
nearly half cases of this type speaker attitude in this study are expressed by an 
evaluative adjective. Examples (4.43) and (4.44) are two typical examples in which I 
mean signals that what follows is the speaker’s evaluation or judgment. Example 
(4.43) contains an evaluative adjective while example (4.44) does not. 
(4.43)  
105A    And I've got masses of vases I could have lent her  
106E    Yeah we used to buy Mum a vase every year for her birthday  
107A    Yes  
108E    So we got uh inundated with them  
109E    We never use any of them hardly  
110E    I mean it's just amazing  
(S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
In line 109, E tells the listener how he/she feels about the fact that they have got lots 
of vases but have never used any of them through the use of the adjective ‘amazing’.  
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(4.44)  
157B    and then hopefully <,> we will get some more pieces together <,> and uhm 
        then see where we can perform <,>  
158B    Uhm <,> personally I I would like to <,> to do that very much <,>  
159B    Uhm <,> I always keep saying I wish it had start  
160B    I wish I'd got involved <,> ten years earlier because you know <,> I 'm  
        getting old  
161B    <laugh> and uhm <,> you know I mean <,>  
162B    There you go 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
In line 162, B expresses his/her attitude that there is nothing people can do about the 
natural process of getting old.  
 
Instances of the other two types of speaker attitudes identified by Brinton are rather 
rare in this study. Example (4.45) is an occurrence of expressing emphasis while 
example (4.46) is a case of expressing sincerity.  
(4.45)  
290D    This looks delicious  
291A    Don't think makes that much difference <unclear-words>  
292D    Very on time <,,> 
293B    Well <,> one of us was  
294C    Mm  
295D    I mean <,> you were very on time  
296D    You were <,>  
297D    Absolutely on time 
    (S1A-022-ICE-GB) 
D’s repetition of ‘very on time’ prefaced by I mean and ‘absolutely in line 297 
contribute to the emphasis being expressed in example (4.45). 
 
(4.46)  
136B    I shall have the dry first liquid second  
137B    I I I shall try that  
138B    Have a go at this <,,> whi which has a kind of colour that I was born to  
         appreciate  
139B    I mean I love it  
(S1A-056-ICE-GB)  
I mean in this example can be paraphrased as ‘I’m serious when I say’. 
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In addition to signaling various speaker attitudes, I mean has also been observed to 
mark the peak of a series of comments made by the speaker in this study. In both 
examples (4.47) and (4.48), speakers are making positive comments. Speaker A in 
example (4.47) tells the addressee how good a school is while Speaker B in example 
(4.48) describes how wonderful the performance of the best singer he/she has ever 
seen. Both speakers make a series of comments on the same subject with the one 
prefaced by I mean more dramatic than all the other evaluations made in previous 
lines.   
(4.47)   
100A    Rugby <,,> the girls are just treated like a few honorary girls but they're not 
integrated  
101A    At King's Canterbury they are integrated but it isn't too free  
102A    it's still quite academic  
103A    Also the other thing is <,,> the school itself is so beautiful <,>  
104A    I mean it's such a wonderful ambience to be in and so that's quite nice uhm 
        <,,> 
(S1A-054-ICE-GB) 
(4.48)  
114B    The b The best singer is this Olaf Bergh that I've seen  
115B    There's actual  
116B    He has total concentration  
117B    He seems not to move a muscle in a whole evening <,> 
118B    And it's totally relaxed and concentrated  
119B    And I mean it it gets to the whole audience and the audience doesn't do all this 
coughing and spluttering that they do between songs  
(S1A-045-ICE-GB) 
 
Due to the composite meaning of I mean, it is natural that it frequently occurs in the 
context where it signals the speaker’s attitudes. Gerhardt and Stinson (1994) 
investigate this particular context where I mean functions to “convey the speaker’s 
attitudes and evaluative stance toward the content of the discourse” (Gerhardt and 
Stinson 1994:151) by analyzing therapeutic discourse where the patient gives 
accounts of the self. However, not all cases where I mean occurs in the context of 
expressing speaker’s attitude are put under this category in this study because 
identification of the pragmatic function depends on the relationship between the prior 
message and upcoming message. In example (4.49), it is clear that upcoming 
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message is about the speaker’s evaluation or stance towards “it” (here referring to 
someone’s marriage). But C’s attitude towards the marriage in lines 290 and 291 is 
used to justify why he/she agree with D who holds a skeptical view toward it. So I 
mean in example (4.49) is coded as justification rather than indicating speaker 
attitude. 
(4.49)  
284D    Well I hope it works  
285D    Wish them the best  
286B    Mm  
287D    I remain sceptical from my own personal experiences  
288C    Yeah yeah  
289C    I mean <,>  
290C    Just seems a little strange <,> sort of  
291C    It s uh pretty quick  
(S1A-071-ICE-GB) 
 
Brinton’s example of expressing evaluation or judgment, which was quoted as 
example (4.8) above (repeated here for convenience), may not be coded as indicating 
speaker attitude in this study because this example does not include the prior 
message although there is no doubt that the message prefaced by I mean is about how 
the speaker feels about “to be beaten by someone who doesn’t even walk properly”.  
(4.8) 
     I mean, it’s humiliating to be beaten by someone who doesn’t even walk properly. 
 
The above is the description of all the categories of the pragmatic functions of I mean 
identified in the native speaker data of this study, which will be used as the baseline 
for the following comparative study between native and non-native speakers. But 
before moving to the comparison section, it is important to bear in mind that 
identification of these categories is not always clear-cut because pragmatic markers 
may play more than one function in one situation. Both Erman (2001) and Müller 
(2005) propose that when a pragmatic marker fulfils several roles in one instance, the 
predominant one should be used to label the function of that marker. One example of 
exemplification in this study, which was quoted as example (4.19) above (repeated 
here for convenience), is a case where I mean could be argued to play two functions. 
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It is coded as exemplification because the upcoming message gives details of what 
they provide, but I mean here may also be considered as a hesitation marker because 
it co-occurs with repetition of ‘they’ and other markers of hesitation such as uhm and 
pause. The function of exemplification is treated as the more important one as Stubbe 
and Holmes claim that “At general level, pragmatic devices undoubtedly do provide 
verbal planning time for speakers, and they often have an important function at 
another level as hedges expressing epistemic modal meaning”(1995: 63). The other 
reason for treating this case as exemplification is that I mean in example (4.19) can 
be translated as ‘for instance’.  
(4.19)  
78B    D' you mean having the space there and uh  
79A    Yes  
80A    Absolutely  
81A    Uhm or whatever they provide  
82A    Uhm <,> well they I mean they they do <,> things like aerobics and <,> basketball 
<,> uhm and they have a a whe a wheelchair <,> team of basketball players uhm  
83A    But th I don't know <,> 
   (S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2 Functions of you know  
Like I mean, you know is also very frequently used in English conversation. But you 
know enjoys so much more freedom in terms of positioning than does I mean that it 
may seem that it can randomly appear anywhere in conversation, which probably 
gives an impression that it does not really play any roles in conversation and is only 
used “when one has nothing to say, or when one cannot, or will not bother to, find 
the proper words to express something” (Schourup, 1985). A letter quoted in Stubbe 
and Holmes (1995) shows how an ordinary native speaker perceives the use of you 
know.  
The phrase 'you know' is used with monotonous regularity when a person is being 
interviewed on TV or radio—to commence a sentence, be interspersed throughout, and 
even to conclude the same sentence. Let's hope 'you know' will soon die a natural death, 
although another exasperating expression will probably replace it—to ruin my listening 
enjoyment (New Zealand Listener, 16-22 April 1994). 
                                      (Stubbe and Holmes, 1995: 63) 
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Although you know is considered as a stigmatized linguistic expression by ordinary 
native speakers, it has attracted a lot of attention from researchers. Compared to the 
studies on I mean, you know is more thoroughly investigated in previous research. 
The majority of the previous studies on you know are either journal articles (e.g. 
Holmes, 1986; Huspek, 1989; Stubbe and Holmes, 1995; Erman, 2001) or 
book-length studies (e.g. Östman, 1981; Schourup, 1985; Schiffrin, 1987; Müller, 
2005). In addition to investigation of general roles that you know plays in 
conversation, researchers also show great interest in finding out how social variables 
such as gender (Östman, 1981; Holmes, 1986), age (Erman, 2001) and social class 
(Östman, 1981; Stubbe and Holmes, 1995) affect the use of you know. Due to the 
abundant previous research carried out on you know, it is not surprising that various 
functions and frameworks have been proposed. But as mentioned earlier this study 
aims to draw as delicate a picture of how you know is used in its chosen British data 
as possible, a direct application of a pre-existing framework will be avoided. Instead, 
the approach and framework of I mean in section 4.1 will be applied and findings of 
previous studies will be modified to fit in the analysis in the present study.  
 
This section will be organized as follows. Section 4.2.1 will explain how the 
identification of the pragmatic functions of you know in this study is influenced by 
studies of you know in the literature. Section 4.2.2 will present a detailed description 
of pragmatic functions of you know identified in this study.  
 
4.2.1 Functions of you know in the literature 
The abundant studies on you know provide a very good foundation for this study. 
First this study has adopted an approach from earlier studies (e.g. Östman, 1981; 
Schourup, 1985; Holmes, 1986) which not only identifies specific functions of you 
know but also proposes a core meaning of you know i.e. a general function that can 
be extracted from all instances of you know, because the combination of individual 
functions and their underlying unity of you know would contribute to a “balanced and 
complete account” (Schourup, 1985: 139) of you know. More importantly, the 
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extracted core meaning of you know will provide a clue as to why it is you know 
rather than another pragmatic marker that is used in a certain context (Schourup, 
1985: 139), since this study also aims to compare I mean and you know.  
 
Although several versions of the core meaning of you know are proposed, they 
roughly mean the same. Östman (1981: 17) defines the core meaning of you know as 
“The speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the 
propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge”. Schourup 
(1985:102) claims that you know “indicates that the speaker expects that there is no 
communicatively significant discrepancy between what is now in the private world 
and what is now in the other world, with respect to what is now in the shared world”. 
Schourup points out that his proposal is fairly close to a rough synonym ‘you know 
what I’m talking about’, which is suggested by Goldberg (1976: 42). Jucker and 
Smith (1998:194) claim that the general function of you know is to invite “the 
addressee to recognize both the relevance and the implications of the utterance 
marked with you know”. The key message shared by the above proposals is that you 
know indicates the speaker’s effort to get the addressee to participate in his/her talk. 
So it is not surprising that the function of appealing is most frequently mentioned by 
researchers (e.g. Östman, 1981; Edmonson, 1981; Jucker & Smith, 1998) although it 
is treated as one of the specific functions rather than as the general function of you 
know in some studies (e.g. Holmes, 1986; Erman 1992, 2001; Müller, 2005). The 
position that this study takes is to treat appealing as a general function of you know 
because it can be applied to all instances of you know and it will be helpful in 
accounting for not only cases where you know and I mean are not interchangeable 
but also cases where both you know and I mean can be applied.  
 
The other support that this study has obtained from previous studies is the description 
of specific functions of you know. The findings from more recent studies (e.g. Erman, 
2001; Müller, 2005) will be used as the main references for this study because they 
present a more detailed picture than the earlier studies. It seems that one important 
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reason that earlier studies come up with a rather sketchy picture of you know is 
because they tend to generalize the functions of you know on the basis of its 
intonation and utterance position. In Östman’s study (1981), the only two 
subfunctions identified are ‘as you know’ and ‘don’t you know’. As Östman points 
out, these two subfunctions can be easily predicted from the core meaning of you 
know, the different intonation contours that you know can have and the utterance 
position of you know (1981:21). The subfunction of ‘as you know’ is played by 
utterance initial you know, which tends to have a Declarative contour while the 
subfunction of ‘don’t you know’ is played by utterance final you know, which can 
have either a Declarative or an Interrogative contour. Östman thinks that the two 
different contour you knows in utterance final position have different readings. The 
Interrogative utterance final you know can be paraphrased as ‘ are you attending, ‘do 
you agree’, or ‘do you see what I mean’ while the Declarative utterance final you 
know can be read as ‘I’m not going to say anything more about this’, ‘don’t ask me 
anymore’, or even ‘it’s obvious’ ( 1981:23). But he decides to subsume these two 
interpretations under the same subfunction of ‘don’t you know’. The reason for this 
decision is they are not easily distinguishable because “the immediate response from 
the addressee is optional (though it gets more obligatory the more interrogative 
contour is)” (Östman, 1981:23).  
 
Following Östman’s study, Holmes (1986) presents a more detailed picture of you 
know, which is shown in Table 4.4. Like Östman, there is a distinction made between 
general function and subfunction of you know, but more than one general function is 
proposed. Holmes also keeps Östman’s two subfunctions as her two broad categories. 
The broad category of expressing certainty is correspondent to Östman’s subfunction 
of ‘as you know’ where you know is used to “express (presumed) certainty” (Östman, 
1981: 22). The other broad category of expressing uncertainty is correspondent to 
Östman’s other subfunction ‘don’t you know’ where you know “suggests more 
uncertainty on the part of the speaker” (Östman, 1981:23).   
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Table 4.4 Summary of Holmes’s (1986) findings  
General 
functions of you 
know 
a. serve an intratextual coherence function, tying participants' turns together 
in a variety of ways 
b. function as verbal fillers 
c. allude specifically to the relevant knowledge of the addressee in the 
context of utterance. 
Classification of subfunctions of you know 
Expressing 
certainty  
Conjoint 
knowledge 
introducing what the speaker regards as incontestable 
mutual knowledge and refers to the fact that the speaker 
knows the addressee already knows the information being 
asserted in the proposition. 
Emphatic emphasizing, intensifying, or boosting the strength of the 
speech act, to stress the speaker's confidence and hence 
reassuring the addressee concerning the validity of the 
proposition asserted. 
Attributive  expressing the speaker's certainty concerning the validity of 
the proposition and also express the speaker's confidence 
that the addressee knows 
Expressing 
uncertainty 
Appealing serving as an appeal for reassurance from the addressee  
Linguistic 
imprecision  
expressing the 
speaker's uncertainty 
concerning aspects of 
the linguistic 
expression of the 
proposition. 
signaling lexical imprecision  
introducing qualifying information 
indicating false start 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.4, subcategories are set up under each broad category. 
Unlike the establishment of the broad categories, the identification of those 
subcategories takes other contextual clues into account apart from intonation and 
utterance position of you know. Under the broad category of expressing certainty, 
Holmes further differentiates three subcategories by looking at whether the speaker is 
certain about the fact that the hearer knows the proposition or the speaker is certain 
about the validity of the proposition.  
 
Under the other broad category of expressing uncertainty, Holmes sets up two 
subcategories and further categorizes the subcategory of linguistic imprecision into 
three subfunctions. Interestingly, the context where you know plays the subfunction 
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of ‘indicating false start’ is termed ‘specific verbal environments or ‘parameters’ by 
Östman (1981: 72) when he investigates how gender influences the usage of you 
know. The following are the five verbal environments:    
a) use between obligatory constituents in an utterance 
b) use before optional elements, at transition-relevant places in an utterance 
c) use between repetitions of a word or a phrase 
d) use after false starts 
e) use as an attention-getting, or topic-changing device 
                                 (Östman, 1981: 72) 
 
As can be seen from Holmes’s examples of ‘indicating false start’ shown by 
examples (4.50) and (4.51), the function of you know in Östman’s verbal 
environment d) would be coded as ‘indicating false start’ in Holmes’s analysis.  
(4.50)  
Young man to friends at dinner party 
and I've been on this bloody speed reading course which is / you know so one / one notices 
(Holmes, 1986: 11) 
(4.51)  
Female radio interviewee 
but fortunately w- you know there's been more recent research 
(Holmes, 1986: 11) 
 
Obviously, to identify more specific functions of you know needs an in-depth 
investigation of the verbal environments of you know. For this study, these verbal 
environments are particularly important because the prosodic information is not 
available in the chosen data. In this study, you knows in Östman’s environments c), d) 
and e) would be coded as hesitation marker (for details see section 4.2.3.1), restart 
(for details see section 4.2.3.2) and ‘introducing a new topic’ (for details see section 
4.2..3.4) respectively while the two other verbal environments need to be further 
specified for the roles of you know to be identified.  
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Although Holmes’s model does produce a fairly comprehensive description of you 
know, some modifications need to be made so as to suit the aims of this study. Firstly, 
the identified subfunctions of you know will be classified on a scale of 
interactant-orientation, i.e. whether a subfunction is speaker-oriented or 
hearer-oriented instead of on a scale of speaker-certainty. Although both 
interactant-orientation (Östman, 198l; Edmonson, 1981; Holmes, 1986; Schiffrin, 
1987) and speaker-certainty are mentioned in the literature, interactant-orientation is 
the scale shared by I mean and you know due to their semantic meanings. Since the 
subfunctions of I mean were classified on the scale of interactant-orientation, to serve 
the purpose of a comparison between I mean and you know, the same scale needs to 
be applied to you know.  
 
Moreover, it seems that you know does not necessarily express the speaker’s certainty 
when it introduces a message that the speaker is sure that the hearer knows. Example 
(4.52) is cited by Holmes as an instance of you know where the speaker is very 
certain that the hearer knows the proposition introduced by you know because what 
you know introduces in example in (4.52) is “incontestable mutual 
knowledge”(Holmes, 1986: 8).  
(4.52)  
Woman to husband introducing a narrative at dinner party 
well you know we went to Sally's that night    
(Holmes, 1986: 8) 
 
For this study, to pin down what role you know plays here needs to know what has 
been said before you know. If this “incontestable mutual knowledge” introduced by 
you know in (4.52) is used to support the speaker’s view expressed by the prior 
message, it could be coded as justification (for details see section 4.2.2.1). Obviously, 
it would be easier for the speaker to win over the hearer to his/her side if his/her 
opinion is justified by shared knowledge or experience. Another function of bringing 
up something known to both the speaker and hearer in conversation is to claim 
common ground so that positive politeness can be achieved. But since Holmes does 
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not include the message prior to you know, it would be difficult to pin down the 
function played by you know in (4.52).  
 
Also, the three subfunctions under the subcategory of linguistic imprecision do not 
appear to indicate that the speaker is uncertain or unconfident about what he/she is 
going to say. When you know is used to signal lexical imprecision or indicate false 
start it appears to be more about accommodating the need of real time 
communication where the speaker needs to search for appropriate words or repair 
unsuccessful utterances. When you know is used to introduce qualifying information, 
it seems to be more about the speaker’s efforts to accommodate the hearer’s potential 
need of a “more precision or some clarification of the propositional content of the 
previous utterance” (Holmes, 1986: 11).  
 
The other subcategory of appealing under the broad category of expressing 
uncertainty is treated as a general function in this study because as mentioned earlier 
this core meaning of appealing can be applied to all instances of you know and its 
main function seems to be more about inviting the hearer to contribute to the 
speaker’s talk at least mentally if not verbally than signaling the speaker’s 
uncertainty and lack of confidence.  
 
With regard to the general functions of you know proposed by Holmes, ‘serve an 
intratextual coherence function, tying participants' turns together in a variety of 
ways’ and ‘function as verbal fillers’ can actually be seen as general features shared 
by pragmatic markers. So they would be too general to provide an answer to the 
question why it is you know rather than I mean that is used in certain contexts. 
Although the general function of ‘allude specifically to the relevant knowledge of the 
addressee in the context of utterance’ is more specific than the above two general 
functions, like Östman (1981) and Jucker & Smith (1998) this study assumes that by 
using you know the speaker appeals to the addressee to see the relevance or 
implication of the utterance marked by you know rather than only alludes to the 
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relevant knowledge of the addressee.  
 
Compared to Holmes’s study (1986), Erman (2001) and Müller (2005) give much 
more detailed descriptions of you know by focusing more on the specific verbal 
contexts of you know. As shown by Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, both studies come up 
with a rather long list of specific functions of you know, which provides a very good 
start for this study. In addition, most examples given in these two studies include 
wider contexts than those in Östman (1981) and Holmes (1986), which makes the 
application of them to the data analysis of this study more feasible.  
Table 4.5 Summary of Erman’s (2001) findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Textual monitors 
 
Clause 
 
1) mark/highlight certain elements in the thematic 
structure 
2) introduce a change of information content, 
frequently correcting or modifying previous discourse 
 
 
 
Discourse 
3) introduce propositions  
4) appear between the speaker’s position and backing 
up of it 
5) mark transition between states and events 
6) mark transitions between direct and reported speech 
7) mark inserts of parenthetic comments containing 
information that speaker assume the addressee needs to 
know in order to be able to follow  
Editing  8) hesitation marker 
9) repair 
 
Social monitors  
10) turn-taking  
11) turn-yielding  
12) comprehension-securing function 
 
Metalinguistic monitors  
13) emphatic function 
14) approximator 
15) appealing  
 
However, neither Erman (2001) nor Müller (2005) treats the function of appealing as 
the general function or core meaning of you know. Erman regards appealing as one of 
her  subfunctions although when she comments on the subfunction of approximator 
she points out that approximators “can be used with an appealing function, the 
speaker appealing to shared knowledge of the world, general truth or otherwise 
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controversial issues” (Erman, 2001: 1348). Also in her earlier study, she claims that 
when you know used in the subfunction of hesitation marker, the speaker uses it “as a 
staller for time and as an appeal to the listener to have patience” (Erman, 1987: 137). 
In Müller’s study, it seems that appealing is treated as a general function in her 
subfunctions at textual level because they are labeled with this general function being 
extracted i.e. they are mainly named after the specific contexts where you know 
occurs . However, her subfunctions at interactional level can actually be seen as the 
result of blending the appealing function into the specific contexts because they are 
various kinds of appealing identified in her study. According to Müller, in ‘imagine 
the scene’, ‘see the implication’ and ‘reference to the shared knowledge’ the appeal 
is made on behalf of the narrative while in ‘appeal for understanding’ and 
‘acknowledge that the speaker is right’ the appeal is made on behalf of the speaker 
(Müller, 2005: 181).  
Table 4.6 Summary of Müller’s(2005) findings  
Textual Level:  
1) marking lexical or content search 
2) marking false start and repair 
3) marking approximation  
4) introducing an explanation  
5) quotative  
Interactional Level 
6) imagine the scene 
7) see the implication  
8) reference to shared knowledge 
9) appealing for understanding  
10) acknowledge that the speaker is right 
Various functions (cases occur less than three times) 
   a) introduce relevant background information, in a parenthetic comment 
   b) introduce a new topic/digression  
   c) introduce general knowledge 
Unidentified cases 
 
Before moving to next section, which will present the subfunctions identified in this 
study, there is a need to have a brief discussion of the two subfunctions turn-taking 
and turn-yielding on Erman’s list (2001) because this turn management role of you 
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know is very frequently mentioned in the literature but there is not a consensus 
among the researchers as to whether this role should be listed separately or even 
whether you know plays this role or not. 
 
Like Erman (2001), Müller (2005) treats this turn-management role of you know as a 
separate function in her study. But it is recoded as ‘imagine the scene’ because of her 
corpus, which consists of movie narratives. According to Müller, when functioning in 
‘imagine the scene’, you know can be paraphrased as ‘you can imagine the scene, 
can’t you?’, ‘I’m sure you can imagine the scene’, or ‘Please imagine the scene!’, 
depending on the intonation contour” (Müller, 2005 :171).  
 
However, Östman (1981) claims that although utterance-initial you know can play a 
turn-taking function while utterance-final you know can serve a floor-yielding 
function, the turn-switching function should not treated as another function of you 
know because it can blend into the two subfunctions ‘as you know’ and ‘don’t you 
know’ and they can operate simultaneously within one and the same instance of you 
know.  
 
Schourup (1985) even proposes that you know cannot function in turn management. 
He claims that when Declarative you know occurs in turn-final position it should not 
be considered as a facilitator of turn-taking because it is not you know but the 
utterance coming to its terminating point. In addition, half instances of Interrogative 
turn final you know in his data are actually followed by backchannel responses rather 
than by a full change of turn. This study will take Schourup’s position because firstly 
it seems very difficult to prove that it is you know that leads to the turn-exchange. 
Secondly, identification of this role involves prosodic information of you know, 
which is not available in this study.  
 
To sum up, in order to achieve the most delicate possible picture of you know, the 
descriptions of specific functions of you know by Erman (2001) and Müller (2005) 
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will be used as the main references but their function lists will be, again, left open to 
allow new subfunctions emerge from the data from this study because different and 
bigger samples are used in this study. To present a better comparative picture of I 
mean and you know, the function of appealing will be extracted from all instances of 
you know as a general function and the identified subfunctions will be classified over 
the scale of interactant-orientation. Since prosodic information for you know is not 
available, the identification in this study will mainly rely on the verbal environments 
of you know.  
 
4.2.2 Functions of you know in this study 
As can be seen from Table 4.7 below, a larger number of specific functions of you 
know were identified in this study than in either Erman or Müller’s study. Although 
there is an overlap between the function list of this study and Erman and Müller’s 
lists, more than half of the subfunctions are only identified in this study. It is not 
surprising that the overlapping subfunctions tend to be those cases where the verbal 
environments of you know appear to have rather distinctive syntactic features and 
offer less room for alternative interpretation. For instance, when you know plays the 
role of being a hesitation marker (for details see section 4.2.2.3.1), it usually appears 
“after function words, within the phrase after a determiner, the speaker obviously 
doing lexical search, or after a con/disjunct at the beginning of the clause for the sake 
of planning the overall continuation of it” (Erman, 2001: 1344). When you know is 
coded as approximator (for details see section 4.2.2.3.3), it nearly invariably 
co-occurs with other approximators such as sort of or whatever. Quotative you know 
(for details see section 4.2.2.3.5) is usually found to co-occur with quotative verbs 
such as say and go. 
 
As to the newly identified subfunctions in this study, some of them are due to the fact 
that the data were interpreted from different angles. For instance, this study 
attempted to define the pragmatic functions of you know by the potential logical 
relationship between the messages linked by you know. Like I mean, you know was 
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also found to link messages which had a cause-effect relationship. Subfunctions of 
justification, reason and cause (for details see sections 4.2.2.2.1, 4.2.2.1.4 and 
4.2.2.1.3) were identified. By applying the paraphrase technique used in the analysis 
of I mean, you know in justification can be translated as ‘I’m saying this because…’ 
while you know in reason and cause can be interpreted as ‘X happens because of Y’. 
Subfunctions of result and conclusion (for details see sections 4.2.2.1.5 and 4.2.2.2.2) 
were set up because there was also a cause-effect relationship between the messages 
connected by you know but in a reversed order i.e. cause is followed by effect. You 
know in both cases can be paraphrased as ‘so’. 
Table 4.7 Classification of pragmatic functions of you know in this study 
Hearer-oriented  Interactant-relationship-oriented  Speaker-oriented 
1)   Assumption-correction 
2)   Introducing background 
information  
3)   Cause 
4)   Reason 
5)   Result 
6)   Explicitness  
7)   Reformulation  
8)   Exemplification  
9)   Seeking confirmation  
10)  Summarization  
11)  Quotative 
12)  Justification  
13)  Conclusion  
14)  Softener of FTA 
15)  Interactional repair  
16)  Indicating marked  
     expressions 
17)  Indicating the most likely 
     event 
18) Indicating the unspoken 
message to be completed by 
the hearer  
19)  Indicating the coming  
     message is meant to be 
evaluated  
20) Hesitation 
   marker 
21) Restart 
22) Approximator 
23) Introducing a 
   new  topic 
24) Indicating 
   speaker  
    attitude 
  
 
Like the analysis of I mean, this study also attempted to define the pragmatic 
functions of you know by the speech act with which it co-occurs. Softener of FTA 
(for details see section 4.2.2.2.3) was set up because you know was found to mark a 
number of face-threatening acts such as giving a suggestion, disagreeing and 
breaking bad news.  
 
Some new subfunctions are the result of further categorization of functions identified 
in previous studies. One of the most often mentioned function in the literature is that 
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you know is used to introduce modifying information (Crystal, 1998: 47; Holmes, 
1986: 1986:11; Erman, 2001: 1342; Müller, 2005: 164). In this study, this function 
was further categorized into exemplification, explicitness and reformulation (for 
details see sections 4.2.2.1.8, 4.2.2.1.6 and 4.2.2.1.7) because they actually specify 
the ways in which the previous discourse is modified. 
 
A few researchers (e.g. Östman, 1981; Schourup, 1985; Jucker & Smith, 1998) argue 
that you know can play the role of claiming common ground between the speaker and 
hearer so that intimacy can be achieved. In this study, two specific ways of claiming 
common ground were identified. In both ways you know is used to introduce shared 
knowledge or experience. One was termed ‘indicating the unspoken message to be 
completed by the hearer’ and the other was called ‘indicating the most likely event’. 
Both of them appeal to the shared experience or general knowledge. The difference 
between them is in the former case the speaker leaves the shared knowledge 
unfinished and invites the listener to complete it mentally while in the latter case the 
speaker spells out the shared knowledge.  
 
Holmes (1986) points out that the type of discourse could be a potential factor for the 
frequency of you know because she finds that in her corpus “you know seems to 
occur most frequently in sections of relatively sustained narrative or accounts of the 
speaker’ personal experiences intended to amuse, amaze, or, at least, retain the 
interest of the addressee” (Holmes, 1986: 15). The new subfunctions ‘indicating 
marked expressions’ (for details see section 4.2.2.2.5) and ‘indicating the coming 
message meant to be evaluated’ (for details see section 4.2.2.2.8) can actually explain 
how the speaker makes his/her talk more interesting and engaging to the hearer.  
 
Finally, the reason for the absence of subfunctions such as assumption correction and 
interactional repair in either Erman or Müller’s lists could be because they fail to be 
sampled in Erman and Müller’s studies due to their very low frequencies. There is a 
need to point out here that this study includes all identified subfunctions regardless of 
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their frequencies, while Müller (2005) puts those subfunctions which occur less than 
three times under the category of ‘various functions’ as shown by Table 4.6. For 
example, she further categorizes the function of ‘introducing an explanation’ into 
exemplification, clarification and amplification. But she decides not to include them 
on her function list. One of her reasons for this is that the three subtypes are too 
infrequent to form their own categories (Müller, 2005: 167).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the specific functions of you know in this study will be 
classified over the interactant-orientation scale, which was applied in the analysis of I 
mean, for the sake of a better comparison between I mean and you know. There are 
11 (out of 24) subfunctions of you know under the hearer-oriented category. They are 
classified as hearer-oriented because they are used to mainly serve the hearer’s needs 
by making the previous message easier to be understood. When playing the role of 
assumption correction, you know signals to the hearer that the coming message is the 
unintended interpretation of the prior message. When you know is used in cause, 
reason and result, it indicates to the hearer the cause-effect relationship between the 
linked messages. You know in subfunctions such as explicitness, reformulation and 
exemplification is used to introduce qualifying information which clarifies the 
previous messages. When functioning in ‘introducing background information’, you 
know introduces information which the speaker assumes the hearer needs to know so 
as to understand the prior message. You know in ‘seeking confirmation’ is used to 
ensure that the hearer “has correctly understood specific references in the text” 
(Erman, 2001: 1346). In summarization, you know introduces a summary of the 
previous talk so that the hearer can have a clearer idea about what has been said. 
Quotative you know signals to the hearer that the coming message is a quotation.  
 
Subfunctions under the interactant-relationship-oriented category share the role of 
smoothing the relationship between the speaker and hearer. For instance, a socially 
inappropriate message certainly needs to be repaired so as to maintain the 
interactant-relationship. What you know does in softener of FTA is to minimize the 
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face damage caused by the FTA that the speaker has to carry out in conversation. By 
justifying what has been said, the speaker would be more likely to win the hearer 
over. In addition, face-threatening speech acts such as giving commands and 
disagreeing need to be justified. ‘Indicating marked expressions’, and ‘indicating the 
coming message meant to be evaluated’ are considered interactant-relationship 
oriented because their overall function is to make the conversation more interesting 
and engaging so that the social interaction can be maintained. The reason for 
‘indicating the unspoken message to be completed by the hearer’ and ‘indicating the 
most likely event’ being classified as interactant-relationship-oriented is because they 
can bring interactants closer by claiming common ground between them.  
 
The subfunctions under the speaker-oriented category all mainly serve the speaker’ 
own purposes. For example, you know is used to indicate the speaker’s own attitude. 
With you know, the speaker manages to edit his/her online communication by 
restarting or stalling more time. When you know is used as an approximator, it 
indicates that the speaker cannot find the exact word(s) to describe what he/she is 
talking about at that point and asks the hearer to get on with the inaccurate language. 
When functioning in ‘introducing a new topic’, you know is used by the speaker to 
shift to another topic.  
 
In the following subsections, a detailed account of how the specific functions of you 
know were identified in this study will be presented with illustrations.  
 
4.2.2.1 Hearer-oriented 
4.2.2.1.1 Assumption-correction  
This subfunction was identified as one of the subtypes of repair done by I mean. As 
mentioned in section 3.2.1.1 this subfunction is called assumption-correction because 
what the speaker is trying to repair is the hearer’s potential assumptions derived from 
what he/she has just said. In example (4.53), speaker B recounts his unpleasant 
experience of working as a professional photographer. What speaker B is particularly 
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unhappy about is it is not the quality of the photo that matters. Although the record 
company could end up using his picture if he was willing to compromise himself, he 
simply thinks that it is not worth it. In line 164, speaker B says such a situation lasted 
about a few years in his life, which might well give the hearer the impression that the 
speaker is rather stubborn. Apparently, this is not the assumption that the speaker 
wants from the hearer. So, in the next line speaker B makes it very explicit that he is 
actually a person who is open to change.   
(4.53) 
143A:    Uhm so you shot a job that he did that they didn't like then  
144B:    They didn't like his pictures yeah but then I did the pictures  
145B:    but the record it was a record company  
146B:    and the record company said why're you doing it  
147B:    Terry O’Neill has done it you know 
148A:    Mmm oh you mean the pop group didn't like it  
149B:    No no they they didn't they did Terry O’Neill's session and it was such garbage 
they got him to reshoot  
150B:    But like the record company then refused to pay me without having seen the 
pictures  
151B:    They said Terry O’Neill's done it you know <,>  
152B:    As if that that would sort of uh  
153A:    So have they used your pictures in the end of the day <,>  
154B:    No they didn't actually <laughter> which is uh  
155B:    but don't mind that's uh that that's that that's a part  
156B:    that's part of  
157B:    I mean uh that that being a professional in that profession is like it's the  
         bottom  
158B:    It's the absolute  
159A:    They've used his picture yeah  
160C:    That was probably the company's decision  
161A:    It's not worth arse-licking all round  
162A:    I mean it's the big arse-lickers uhm  
163B:    It's  
164B:    I mean I I I realise that like in some respects it's the only way of quite a few years 
of my life  
165B:    but I mean <,> you know I 'm open to change  
166B:    and so that's  
167A:    Well you will  
168A:    How old are you  
169A:    you're not very old anyway  
(S1A-52-ICE-GB) 
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However, this subfunction seems to be only a minor role played by you know 
because example (4.53) is the only instance found in this study. In addition, this role 
is co-played by I mean, which rather frequently functions in assumption-correction 
on its own. But the extra work that you know does here is its appealing function. By 
using you know, B appeals to the hearer to acknowledge that he is actually 
open-minded.  
 
4.2.2.1.2 Introducing background information 
This is a subfunction which is identified by both Erman (2001) and Müller (2005) 
although Müller does not include it on her list because it occurs less than three times 
in her data. It is termed ‘introducing background information’ because you know is 
used to “mark inserts of parenthetic comments containing information that the 
speaker assumes the addressee needs to know in order to be able to follow” (Erman, 
2001: 1344).  
(4.54) 
254B:    It's a very weird psychological film <,,>  
255C:    Oh  
256A:    Yeah  
257B:    It's It's futuristic  
258B:    It's set in the future 
259C:    There was a very weird film about some stranger you know <,>  
260C:    I never saw it though  
261B:    Was there  
262B:    Mm  
263B:    It's very very good <,>  
264B:    Uh it's very difficult to understand  
265B:    You have to see it once and then you have to see it a second time separately to 
suss it out <,,>  
266B:    But I like I like uhm <,> I like him jumping and <,>  
267A:    Oh my God  
268C:    Oh there are the boys getting out as well  
269B:    No because they take like it's set in the year two thousand where the State 
controls  
270B:    It's rather like you know Nineteen Eighty-Four that the State controls everybody 
and they have spies everywhere <,>  
271B:    uhm and the information technology has grown so much <,,> that they 're ruled 
by information technology <,,>  
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272B:    And he works in the information technology 
(S1A-49-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.54), speaker B is explaining to A and C what is happening in a baffling 
film. By inserting the information of what ‘the State controlling’ is in line 270, B 
provides A and C with the information they need to know so as to better understand 
the background that the film is set in. With you know, B can trigger the listener’s 
memory of another film ‘Nineteen Eighty-four’. Instead of passively waiting for the 
speaker to provide further information about ‘the State controls’, the hearer would 
search for it in his/her memory at the same time.  
 
4.2.2.1.3 Cause 
In this subfunction you know is used to link messages which have a cause-effect 
relationship. The prior message is caused by the coming message marked by you 
know.  
(4.55) 
    181A    The other thing is uhm <,,> do you confide in her <,>  
182A    Does she feel excluded because you don't exactly confide in her  
183B    Well <,,> I don't  
184B    But then <,> uh I haven't  
185B    I mean I never have <,>  
186B    and I 'm I 'm rather scared that you know that would seem rather artificial to her 
and as an attempt to win her over  
187B    and of course <,> you know she's terribly alive to things like that <,,> uhm  
188A    But you could start slowly 
(S1A-031-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.6), A and B are talking about B’s teenage daughter from B’s previous 
marriage (who is referred as “her” or “she” here). B’s feeling of being scared that her 
daughter would think her confiding in her artificial because her daughter is very 
sensitive. You know here not only does the job of signaling the cause-effect 
relationship as I mean would do in the same context but also appeals to A to 
understand why she feels scared and perhaps even can win A’s sympathy. The 
semantic function of you know in this example could be performed by ‘because’. 
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4.2.2.1.4 Reason 
In this subfunction, you know is also used to connect messages which have a 
cause-effect relationship. What distinguishes this subfunction from the above 
function of cause is there is human volition involved here because the reason that C 
made the decision to hoover her bedroom was because she wanted to show Rosie a 
clean room. Like the above function of cause, this subfunction is also played by I 
mean. The extra work done by you know here, again, is that the speaker can appeal to 
the hearer to understand why she had the bedroom hoovered.  
(4.56) 
    262C    Well this was hoovered yesterday  
263C    I hoovered my bedroom cos Rosie was coming  
264C    I thought I show her a tidy room you know <,,>  
265B    Yeah I  
(S1A-048-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2.2.1.5 Result 
Like the above three subfunctions, this subfunction is also played by I mean. 
Although you know in this subfunction also appears in a cause-effect relationship, in 
contrast to the above two subfunctions of cause and reason the message marked by 
you know is the consequence of the prior message. 
(4.57) 
    132A    My brother-in-law's quite sweet  
133A    he sends one to a birthday or Christmas or something and once a year I need a 
great big vase you know  
134A    I I found this sort of thing I got from Habitat a square thing <,>  
135A    Like a tadpole tank really 
(S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
Speaker A’s brother-in-law sends her a big bunch of flowers (is referred by ‘one’ in 
line 133) for birthday or Christmas, so she needs a big vase every year. With you 
know, A appeals to the hearer to see that her need of a big vase every year is the 
result of the fact that her brother-in-law sends a big bunch of flowers every year.  
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The following three subfunctions show how the prior message is modified. I mean 
was also found to play these three roles. But with you know, the speaker not only 
clarifies or amplifies the prior message by giving more details, providing examples 
or rewording but also appeals to the hearer to accept that those details, examples and 
rephrasing are relevant.  
 
4.2.2.1.6 Explicitness  
(4.58) 
145B    Yeah  
146B    I mean for example there was one girl who I met at U who I interviewed at  
         UC L  
147B    there's the most striking example of it who was  
148B    she was black <,> really beautiful  
149B    She had her hair kind of <,> down in a kind of I don't know net  
150B    you know hardly any hair and close-cropped to her head <,> absolutely perfect 
features <,> and very thin and elegant 
(S1A-037-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.58), B is describing a girl’s hair style. In line 149, B said the girl’s hair 
was ‘down in a kind of I don’t know net’, which is rather vague. The hearer may 
need more details here to understand what B has described. The details given in the 
next line is certainly very helpful for the hearer to understand what exactly the girl’s 
hair looks like. You know in this example can be replaced by ‘that is’.  
 
4.2.2.1.7 Reformulation  
(4.59) 
182B:   and they just leave Nell a little bit behind so that she's always got something to 
aspire to uhm in terms of maturity  
183A    But she must be clever  
184B    uhm  
185A    uhm it's just they're more swotty  
186B    They're no They're slightly more mature <,>  
187B    they're a bit more into boys  
188B    and Nell isn't quite sure what all that's about yet  
189B    but I think she's getting inklings  
190B    and they sort of zipped her up on her dress I mean really you know took her out 
of herself and her rather old-fashioned ideas 
(S1A-054-ICE-GB) 
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In line 190, B describes the impact that the school had on Nell. Since the impact is 
put in a rather metaphorical way, to rephrase it in a relatively straightforward way 
will certainly make it easier for the hearer to understand the message. The use of 
‘sort of’ in line 190 indicates that the speaker is not very certain about the 
metaphorical expression, which could be another reason for the reformulation. You 
know in this case can be paraphrased as ‘in other words’.  
 
4.2.2.1.8 Exemplification  
(4.60)  
36A     Well you don't have a problem with that  
37A     artistic people don't  
38A     but people that have been in involved in sciences or <,> or a thing like that they 
just don't have creative minds  
39A     My sister for instance  
40A     She she just doesn't have any kind of a creative mind at all  
41A     And anything that's just not black and white facts you know scientific facts 
        or mathematic facts she can't get her head round it at all  
42B     Yes  
(S1A-037-ICE-GB) 
To give the hearer a better idea of what black and white facts are, speaker A gives 
some examples of black and white facts. You know here can be replaced by ‘for 
example’.  
 
4.2.2.1.9 Seeking confirmation 
This subfunction is also identified by Erman (2001), but termed as 
‘comprehension-securing’. According to Erman, when you know functions in this 
subcategory, it plays the role of “making sure that the listener has correctly 
understood specific references made in the text, usually to people but also to objects 
and other phenomena” (Erman, 2001: 1346). The following are the only two 
instances of this subfunction found in this study. As can be seen from both examples, 
the speaker repeats what has just been said to make sure that the hearer has correctly 
understood what ‘cockle’ or ‘Turkish’ is.  
(4.61) 
305B    Could be clams yes  
110 
 
306B    And uh  
307A    Uhm unless they were cockles although they don't <,>  
308A    you know cockles eh  
(S1A-009-ICE-GB) 
(4.62) 
160B    I mean is it complete nonsense or is it just a language <,>  
161A    Oh it seems just like Turkish or something like that  
162B    Uhm  
163A    Like Turkish or something you know  
164B    It's like Turkish  
(S1A-015-ICE-GB) 
 
However, it has been found that some examples of the subcategory of explicitness 
(for details see section 4.2.1.6 above) could also be seen as seeking confirmation if 
the prosodic information of you know was available. Example (4.63) can be coded as 
explicitness because the message marked by you know in line 61 gives additional 
information as to how grapefruit tastes like. But if you know here has an interrogative 
contour, it could be argued that the speaker’ motive to ensure that the listener knows 
what exactly the taste grapefruit has would be more obvious.  
(4.63) 
60A     Well I quite like that sort of quininey taste that grapefruit has  
61A     Slightly bitter taste you know 
62A     I find it more refreshing than those sweety things 
(S1A-009-ICE-GB) 
   
4.2.2.1.10 Summarization    
Like I mean, you know is also used to summarize the previous talk. In example (4.64), 
speaker B gives a very long and detailed account of the problems with the course she 
took. In order to give the listener a clearer idea of those problems, in line 86 B points 
out her main problem i.e. the course did not help her build up confidence that a 
counselor needed because it did not give the trainees enough practice.  
(4.64)  
61B     Oh well we didn't have enough practice I don't think on our course <,>  
62B     Uhm <,> but the reality of it was I could do I mean you know I I <.>c uh <,> I 
think I <,> I could do the counselling that I had to do there <,>  
63B     Probably  
64B     I mean I was I was pretty much advanced on the delegates  
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65A     Right  
66A     Mm  
67A     Right  
68B     I mean one of the one of the the the girls actually said  
69B     well she's experienced and then she sort of said  
70B     very experienced  
71B     I mean I 'm not very experienced but she's you know the one of the trainees <,> 
said said that <,>  
72B     So I think it sort of came across  
73B     I I felt <,> yes I could have done it a lot better but but I certainly could do what 
they were doing  
74B     I mean I was sort of going further than the stuff that they were they were  
        doing  
75B     So that was <,> I wasn't I mean you always learn don't you every time you see 
something but I but <,> uhm and I did did learn some oh bits on language  
76B     There were some bits in their uhm <,> uh a little bit on the on N L P  
77B     uhm but I'd read that and he didn't really use that  
78B     So I knew the <,> the the content of what he did but it wasn't actually used on 
the course  
79B     Nobody really did anything very much with that <,>  
80B     But uhm <.>th you know a few  
81B     But I I wouldn't have said that there was very much new <,>  
82B     Uh uh ninety-eight per cent of material <,> that was covered I knew <,> and <,> 
had <,> used <,> and could use <,>  
83B     Uhm but I would <,> uh I I 'm not an experienced counsellor that I could sit 
there and just counsel anybody through anything and so on  
84B     So if you had a demonstration if something came up you know there'd be things 
that I'd sort of go <,>  
85B     I don't know what to do here  
86B     you know so that 's what I 'm saying that I feel that I would need much more 
experience to be able to deliver the course and feel confident that I could 
demonstrate it or handle anything that came up anywhere  
87B     And I'd I’d feel you I I'd I need more <,> you know to be able to do that 
(SlA-060-ICE-GB) 
The co-occurring linguistic expressions ‘so’ and ‘that’s what I’m saying that’ help the 
identification of this subfunction. In addition to summarizing, you know here also 
appeals to the hearer to agree with the summary that the main problem was that the 
course did not offer enough practice given the details of the problems mentioned in 
the prior talk.  
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This subfunction is also reported in He & Lindsey’s (1998) study, which investigates 
you know in one-to-one academic counseling meetings. In their data, as much as 45% 
of you knows function in summarization. They think that the task of counseling is the 
main factor because with you know “counselors make explicit to the students that this 
is an important part of their advice to which they wish the students to orient” (He & 
Lindsey, 1998: 144).  
 
4.2.2.1.11 Quotative 
You know in this subfunction is used to mark quoted speech. Identification of it is 
rather straightforward because you know almost always co-occurs with reporting 
verbs such as say, go, think and tell. Although this subcategory is identified by a few 
researchers (He and Lindsey, 1998; Erman, 2001; Müller, 2005), different criteria are 
applied in their studies. He and Lindsey (1998: 143) include cases like example (4.65) 
and (4.66) where you know is followed by direct quotes and example (4.67) where 
you know is followed by indirect reported speech. In Erman’s analysis (2001), 
quotative you know can either be cases where you know is followed by quotes or 
cases where you know appears after quotes like example (4.68) because she thinks 
that quotative you know is used “to mark transitions between direct and reported 
speech, close in function to quotation marks in written text” (Erman, 2001:1344). But 
in Müller’s study (2005), quotative you know only includes examples where you 
know is followed by quoted speech. In this study, Müller’s criterion was applied.  
(4.65) 
232C    I mean she <,> she seems to be quite sort of  
233C    She said oh well you know if it doesn't work out it doesn't work out sort of  
        thing 
(S1A-071-ICE-GB) 
(4.66) 
115B    I mean I don't force myself to doing anything but I sort of think <,> you know 
<.>wh what's going on in your mind  
116B    What's the matter  
117B    What are you <,>  
118A    Mm  
119A    All this to yourself <,>  
120B    Yes 
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(S1A-050-ICE-GB) 
(4.67) 
163A    The Sport  
164D    The Daily Sport  
165C    So he was telling me you know what was in it  
166C    So I said well bring them home 
(S1A-027-ICE-GB) 
 
(4.68) 
194B    It would need to be definitely something which she'd not  
195B    She'd agree with somebody if <.>sh if they said that's done this to me    
196B    She'd go oh yes yes I know  
197B    I know what he's like  
198B    you know 
199B    But she wouldn't ever uh actually say anything bad about him <unclear-w 
(S1A-076-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2.2.2 Interactant-relationship-oriented 
4.2.2.2.1 Justification 
As mentioned earlier, when functioning in justification you know also occurs in a 
cause-effect relationship. As opposed to the subfunctions of cause and reason where 
you know can be interpreted as ‘X happens because Y’, you know in justification 
would be read as ‘I am saying this because...’. Like I mean, the three subtypes of 
justification played by you know are also epistemic justification, justification of 
evaluation and justification of speech act.  
(4.69) 
56A     It might I think it might make an awful lot of sense actually because then you 
know the sort of the unity <,> between the two operations would be <,> 
<unclear>  
57A     And really I mean you 're welcome to <,,> you 're welcome to sort of adopt the 
things that we've developed  
(S1A-029-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.69), you know is followed by the reason why A thinks it might make a 
lot of sense. So you know here is used in an epistemic justification.  
 
(4.70) 
320A    Zara's a Marks and Spencer’s person aren't you <,>  
321B    Well it's easy to buy clothes and rubbish like that <,,>  
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322C    They're all right then  
323B    I only buy my [ B indicates a bra] from there  
324C    Me too me too  
325A    Sorry  
326A    Did you catch that word  
327B    And the others <laugh>  
328B    Actually it's strange  
329B    you know so many people just don't bother to shop anywhere else for those  
330C    <laugh>  
(S1A-017-ICE-GB) 
Example (4.70) is an instance of justification of evaluation because the reason for B’s 
evaluation that it is very strange that so many people only shop at Marks and Spencer 
is that they don’t bother to shop anywhere else.   
 
(4.71) 
44B     Ah there's an ant  
45A     So what  
46B     Well catch it  
47C     Well put him outside  
48C     Let him go on to <unclear-word>  
49C     Look  
50C     he's on the toaster  
51C     Now put him outside nicely <,> then brush him out  
52C     He may be somebody else's ant you know <,,>  
53C     Well I remember killing an insect in that train in India  
(S1A-032-ICE-GB) 
You know in (4.71) is coded as justification of speech act because what is justified 
here is the command given in line 51.  
 
Although both you know and I mean can function in justification and both have three 
subtypes of justification, it has to be borne in mind that due to their semantic 
meanings, with I mean, the speaker can convey a message to the hearer that ‘This is 
just what I think. You do not have to agree with me’ while with you know, the 
speaker appeals to the hearer to agree with him/her.  
 
Although justification is not on Erman’s function list, she observes that you know 
will typically occur between speaker’s position and the backing up of it when it is 
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used in argumentative discourse (Erman, 2001: 1343). In particular, (4.72), which is 
cited to support her observation, can be treated as justification in this study because 
the detailed description that follows you know explains why the speaker says that 
they did it in ‘a slapstick farce way’.  
(4.72) 
/…/they did it in a completely, slapstick farce way, you know the the men who were 
dressed up supposed to be women had great big balloons and, had rosy red cheeks and 
wigs and things/…/ 
(Erman 2001:1343 cited as example (5)) 
 
4.2.2.2.2 Conclusion 
Like I mean, you know also plays the role of signaling conclusion. You know in (4.73) 
is coded as conclusion because in contrast to justification, the previous message in 
line 38 that B bought a big piece of fresh salmon for just about five pounds explains 
why B thinks it was very good value. You know here not only signals the cause-effect 
relationship between the two message linked by you know but also appeals to the 
hearer to agree with speaker B’s evaluation that buying that much salmon for just 
about five pounds was a real bargain. Again, you know here can be replaced by ‘so’.  
(4.73) 
34B     I've bought very good smoked salmon there too  
35A     Mm  
36A     Much cheaper than anybody else  
37A     Mm that's what I 'm talking about  
38B     Oh well I've also bought fresh salmon you know a piece <,> like that for that for 
about uhm four pounds <,> five pounds maybe <,,>  
39B     you know very very good value  
40B     But uhm <,,> the trouble is that uh you can't actually rely on what he have 
always 
(S1A-010-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2.2.2.3 Softener of FTA 
Like I mean, you know can also mitigate FTAs. As mentioned in section 3.2.2.4, I 
mean is used almost exclusively to mitigate one FTA, disagreeing while you know 
tends to soften more varieties of FTAs. Giving a suggestion and disagreeing, which 
are shown by (4.74) and (4.75) respectively, are the main FTAs mitigated by you 
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know. There is one case of breaking bad news shown by (4.76).  
 
(4.74) 
195A    Are you recording  
196A    Ah yeah you you're recording in C then  
197A    D' you normally record in C  
198B    I 've no idea  
199B    It 's the first time I 've done it <laugh>  
200A    No  
201A    It's just if you're doing phonetics analysis you know you should never record in 
Dolby <,,> 
(S1A-008-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.74), speaker A tells the hearer not to record in Dolby if he is doing 
phonetic analysis. With you know, the speaker not only softens the face threatening 
act of telling people what they should not do but also appeals to the hearer to take his 
advice.  
 
(4.75) 
221B    I had sardines once with a fly on it  
222B    I was just about to tuck into it and I noticed this great fly soaked in tomato 
         sauce  
223B    so I took it back to the kitchen <,> and they they tried to convince me that this 
fish had swallowed the fly before it died  
224B    I said  
225B    but they live under the sea you know 
226B    you can't have flies under water 
(S1A-055-ICE-GB) 
Speaker B is recounting one incident in her school canteen. B found a fly on her 
sardines but was told by the kitchen staff that it was because the fish had swallowed 
the fly, with which B could not agree. So in line 225, B argued that sardines live 
under the sea where no flies can live. With you know, B mitigated the disagreement 
and at the same time appealed to the hearer to acknowledge that she was right. This 
is an interesting case, because B is quoting what s/he said to the canteen staff; and 
s/he doesn’t just quote the content of what s/he said but dramatizes the negotiation 
with ‘you know’. This suggests that at some level B is aware that ‘you know’ 
mitigates the FTA - or at least is the kind of thing one says when disagreeing. 
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(4.76) 
35C     They came round on the third and I got my licence on the fifth  
36C     But basically they came round  
37C     and I didn't have one at the time  
38C     and I got that through this morning <,>  
39C     The other page is first actually <,,>  
40B     Right <,>  
41B     you know  
42B     the problem with that is they can fine up to twelve hundred pounds  
43C     Yeah <,> 
(S1A-078-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.76), speaker B, a university staff member has to tell C, a student who 
failed to buy a TV license on time, that her problem could cost her up to twelve 
hundred pounds. You know here can help alleviate the damaging impact made on 
both the speaker and listener’s face and at the same time appeal to the hearer to come 
to terms with the bad news.  
 
4.2.2.2.4 Interactional repair 
Interactional repair is another subfunction where you know seems only to play a 
supporting role because it only occurs twice and in both cases you know co-occurs 
with I mean, which is rather frequently used to function in this subfunction. As 
discussed in section 3.2.2.1, this subfunction is termed ‘interactional repair’ because 
what is repaired is the social inappropriateness that the message could convey. The 
following are the only two examples where you know plays the role of interactional 
repair found in the data of this study.  
(4.77) 
214B    The B B C were like this third party that kind of came in  
215B    and there were all sorts of dictates from above what they needed that year and 
uhm and what and what <,> the viewers wanted to see and uhm  
216B    and so what whatever kind of things have been important to your to your script 
were were trivialised really in them to get what they wanted to get  
217B    But uhm I mean you know there might be an element of sour grapes in in what I 
'm saying you know but I think uh I think that a lot of writers <,> have had that 
that experience with television  
218B    You end up by feeling quite compromised <,> 
     (S1A-058-ICE-GB) 
B, a screen play writer, is complaining about his experience of working with 
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television. It seems that some repair work is needed after the harsh comments on 
BBC are made in lines 215 and 216. Firstly, making negative comments is 
face-threatening. Secondly, the negative comments may sound unfair to BBC 
because B lately wrote a screen play for BBC but it has not been screened. To repair 
the inappropriateness, B admits that “there might be an element of sour grapes in 
what I’m saying” in line 217.  
 
Extract (4.27) was also quoted as an instance where I mean plays the role of 
interactional repair in section 4.1.2.2.1. As discussed in section 4.1.2.2.1, the 
statement made in line 96 is rather face-threatening because it sounds as if A is 
questioning what B has just said about dance therapy. In line 97, A turns the 
statement into a less face-threatening question, which invites B to give his/her 
opinion.   
(4.27) 
94B     and people now do things like art therapy and dance therapy <,> uh which is  
         great 
95B     It's very good work but I think <,> that art and dance actually include <,> the 
idea of therapy within them <,>  
96A     When you say recovering the whole person it suggests that there is  
         something lost  
97A     I mean you know is there something incomplete  
98A     I mean<,> uh what's <.>w what's what’s incomplete <unclear-words> <,>  
99B     Yeah 
(S1A-004-ICE-GB) 
The above four subfunctions under the interactant-relationship category are all 
played by both you know and I mean. But the following subfunctions under this 
category are only played by you know. 
 
4.2.2.2.5 Indicating marked expressions 
This subfunction is termed ‘indicating marked expressions’ because you know is used 
to signal to the hearer that the message marked by you know is expressed in a marked 
way i.e. the linguistic expressions chosen by the speaker are not what the hearer 
might expect. You know in this study is found to indicate mainly three types of 
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marked expressions - markedly formal or technical, markedly metaphorical and 
markedly exaggerating.  
 
(4.78) 
89A     You mean even if you and Bernard had stayed together  
90B     Even if we had stayed together there might have <,> you know had endless 
hormones and glands problems  
91A     No  
92A     Yes you might  
93A     It's quite true <,>  
94A     She might have been that kind of teenager anyway  
(S1A-031-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.78), A and B are talking about B’s teenage daughter (referred by ‘she’ 
in line 94) from B’s previous relationship. In line 90, instead of saying ‘lots of sexual 
problems’ the speaker chooses ‘hormones’ and ‘glands’, which are very technical.   
As these technical words would not be expected in this kind of daily conversation, 
with you know B can signal to A that the coming expressions are marked and at the 
same time appeal to A to accept them.  
 
The following two extracts are examples to show that the marked expressions are 
markedly metaphorical. In (4.79) the message marked by you know is expressed by 
personification while in (4.80) a simile is used.  
(4.79) 
134A    I I found this sort of thing I got from Habitat a square thing <,>  
135A    Like a tadpole tank really  
136A    Tall square tall sort of oblong thing <,>  
137A    And I have to and it sort of comes out about three times a year and the rest of the 
time it skulks somewhere you know  
138A    That's the trouble 
(S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
According to the Longman Online Dictionary, ‘skulk’ means ‘to hide or move about 
secretly, trying not to be noticed, especially when you are intending to do something 
bad’. So ‘skulk’ is a verb which should only apply to human beings or perhaps 
animals. In line 137, vase is treated as if it were a human by the speaker. You know 
here is used to indicate that ‘it skulks somewhere’ is marked and at the same time 
appeal to the hearer to appreciate the creativeness of this personification.   
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(4.80) 
228A     Actually he <.>w he he looked like a polished  
229B     And what kind of body would you like  
230B     Well about nine inches  
231A     No no no no no  
232A     I was just saying that checking who you meant  
233A     you know he looked like a polished conker  
234A     He was really He was shiny and absolutely smooth  
235A     Not a hair 
(S1A-080-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.80), you know prefaces a simile, which compares a human body to a 
polished conker. This simile certainly makes the description of a human body more 
interesting and vivid than does a more usual or unmarked description like ‘He was 
shiny and absolutely smooth’ (line 234). Again, you know here not only signals the 
markedness but also appeals to the hearer to appreciate the originality of the simile.  
 
(4.81) 
38B     Even more frightening than knowing they can understand what you're  
         saying  
39C     That's what I said  
40B     Oh I see I thought you said it was very frightening being able to understand what 
they were saying  
41D     Yes they they know too much about <unclear-words>  
42C     Yes  
43A     Uhm <,>  
44B     Yes the English are branded on their tongue as they say don't they so uh as soon 
as you speak you know they usually know what an idiot you are  
45A     So this one was <,> lower middle-class in that case  
(S1A-020-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.81), the message introduced by you know can be seen as a dramatic or 
joking way of saying ‘we can easily tell from which social class people come by their 
English accents’. Obviously, compared to the unmarked version, the exaggerating 
expression can make the conversation more interesting or entertaining. You know 
here not only indicates that the coming message will be put in a marked way but also 
urges the hearer to appreciate the joke.  
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You know used in this subfunction is also observed by other researchers. For instance, 
Le Lan (2007) observes that you know is often used with hyperbole (Le Lan, 
2007:110). Extract (4.82) is her example where you know is used with hyperbole.  
(4.82) 
     Um.. the ghastly thing was the …senior common-room conversation that one had to 
conduct..which was just frightful and the …absolutely grotesque ritual of high table formal 
dinner in the evening which started with sherry in the senior common room with 
the …president sitting there like God.. you know, talking absolute insanity on a very 
profound level (b and c laugh)  
     (CEC, 1.3.3.2.5460) (Le Lan, 2007: 109 cited as example (5), prosodic information 
      omitted)  
According to Le Lan, the speaker in (4.82) is talking about the formal dinner ritual 
she had in a women’s college. Clearly, exaggerating and formal expressions such as 
‘absolute insanity’ and ‘profound level’ help to present a rather entertaining 
description of her experience. With you know, the speaker urges the listener to 
appreciate the creative wording.  
 
Van Bogaert (2007: 16) also reports that you know is used to signal that the speaker is 
using figurative language or an unconventional turn of phrase and appealing to the 
hearer to accept his/her metaphor, comparison or imaginative use of language. 
Obviously her observation is very close to my description here. The main reason for 
this can be due to the fact that she also analyzes the spoken data of ICE-GB although 
mine only includes face-to-face conversations.  
 
In contrast to the subfunction of indicating marked expressions, in the following two 
subfunctions you know is used to signal to the hearer that there is nothing unexpected 
or unusual  in the coming message.  
 
4.2.2.2.6 Indicating the most likely event 
This subfunction is coded as ‘indicating the most likely event’ because the two 
messages linked by you know are about life routine, which is assumed to be shared 
by the speaker and hearer. With you know, the speaker urges the hearer to predict 
what the coming message is from the prior message by referring to the shared life 
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experience.  
 
(4.83) 
79A     How old is it <,>  
80B     Who  
81A     Baby  
82B     Eight months <,>  
83B     It's just crawling  
84A     Is it cute <,>  
85B     It’s very cute i 
86B     It's got a grin that's sort of like up to here I mean   
87B     It says mmm like this <,>  
88B     And they wanted to photograph it for some baby magazines  
89B     not my cousin's  
90B     But uhm they took it to a shop <,> you know to get some baby clothes and so on  
91B     and the woman in the shop said  
92B     oh  
93B     you must let me photograph your baby for my magazine 
(S1A-039-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.83), B is talking about her cousin’s baby who was very cute. From line 
90, B starts telling the story of how the baby magazine came to know the baby. The 
message ‘to get some baby clothes’ introduced by you know is one of the most likely 
reasons for taking a baby to a shop. In contrast, the encounter with a woman from a 
baby magazine who wanted to photograph the baby would be a low probability event. 
With you know, the hearer’s episodic memory of taking babies to shops can be 
activated. So instead of simply waiting to be told why B’s cousin took the baby to a 
shop, the hearer would search her memory to guess what could be the most likely 
reason.   
 
(4.84) 
83A     Can you describe to me if possible a typical day in your home when you were a 
boy of less than fourteen  
84B     Uhm <,,> uh typical a typical day uhm <,,>  
85B     Right  
86B     School day'd be a typical day yes  
87B     Uh we'd get get get up  
88B     you know then my sister'd get up and uh <,> uh have breakfast and then <,,> go  
to school 
(S1A-076-ICE-GB) 
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In example (4.84), B was asked to describe a typical day at home when he was a 
teenage boy. You know here is used to signal what most likely to happen after B got 
up in the morning. At the same time, you know appeals to the hearer’s knowledge 
about what a typical school day would be like. 
 
4.2.2.2.7 Indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer 
Like ‘indicating most likely event’, you know in this subfunction also indicates that 
there is nothing unexpected in the coming message. But the speaker chooses to leave 
the message introduced by you know to be completed by the hearer.  
(4.85) 
100A    I mean he be one of my my great mates you know you behind my back he was 
<,> slagging me  
101A    You see he told somebody I was weak <,,>  
102A    You see he was he tried to pull my mate's wife one night in Tramps  
103A    My my mate Peter is married to Cleo Goldsmith one of the Goldsmith family 
right and he says to  
104A    Terry pulled her aside and said why are you with these two  
105A    And I be one of his mates  
106A    And why are you with these two  
107A    they're both weak people <,>  
108A    And she came back and told her husband you see  
109A    She said you know 
110A    So anyway <,,> and then and then he rang me up and I wouldn't answer the 
phone and I picked it up and said you've been telling people I 'm fucking weak 
you know  
(S1A-052-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.85), B is telling a story of Terry, one of his mates, who was slagging 
him behind his back. In line 109 speaker B does not finish quoting what Cleo told her 
husband, Paul, another mate of B. Since the conversation between Terry and Cleo has 
just been mentioned in lines 104 to l07, the speaker does not need to complete the 
quotation because the listener should be able to work out what the unfinished 
message was. By doing so, the speaker can not only avoid unnecessary repetition but 
also make the conversation more engaging by inviting the hearer to mentally 
participate in the conversation. 
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4.2.2.2.8 Indicating the coming message is meant to be evaluated  
You know in this subfunction signals what the speaker is about to say is meant to be 
understood as evaluative and at the same time appeals to the hearer to see and agree 
with the evaluation.  
(4.86) 
147A    Local school but <unclear-words>  
148E    May even be better than boarding school if you <unclear-words>  
149C    Well they don't think like that  
150C    Our parents don't think like that  
151C    They think that if you pay it must by definition be better  
152E    Yeah  
153B    Yeah yeah <,>  
154E    Right  
155C    It's funny because much to my amusement some of them send their <.>s send 
their girls off to you know local fee-paying schools who are you know not nearly 
as good as we are 
(S1A-012-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.86), C is commenting on his parents’ idea that if a school needs to be 
paid, it must be better. With you know, C signals that ‘local fee-paying schools’ is not 
just a factual description of schools and appeals to his listeners to see and agree with 
his evaluation that ‘how silly it is to go to local fee-paying schools’.  
 
(4.87)  
57B     And so it's <,> totally accessible <,> for anybody <,>  
58B     Uhm it's linked to the Spinal Unit so that <,> patients from the Spinal Unit can 
<,> uhm associate with <,> the public and get back into <,> life all the more 
quicker because of the contact with <,> with people <,> instead of just you know 
the <,> the hospital staff and other patients <,> 
59B     Think it's a a vital <,> need <,,> 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.87), B is talking about how Mike Heafy centre (referred by “it” in line 
57) benefits patients from the Spinal Unit. Similar to example (4.37), the factual 
description ‘the hospital staff and other patients’ in line 58 marked by you know is 
meant to be evaluated. You know here appeals to the hearer to see and agree with the 
speaker’s opinion that only having contact with the hospital staff and other patients is 
not good for the recovery of patients from the Spinal Unit. 
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4.2.3 Speaker-oriented 
The first two subfunctions of you know in this category are relatively easier to 
identify because the verbal environments of you know in them are very specific and 
offer very little room for alternative interpretations. Although researchers do agree 
that you know can play these two subfunctions, there is not a consensus as to what 
terms should be used.  
 
4.2.3.1 Hesitation marker  
Both Erman (2001) and Müller (2005) identify this subfunction but label it in 
different terms. This study takes Erman’s term, hesitation marker, because you know 
in this subfunction is used to buy more time to think about what should be said next. 
Müller terms this subfunction ‘marking lexical or content search’ by following 
Östman’s description (1981) where the searching function of you know is further 
categorized into lexical search and content search. However, Müller does point out 
that “it is a bold move to maintain that the two types can (always) be distinguished” 
(2005: 158) because “the category ‘lexical or content search’ contains a continuum of 
instances with clear lexical search at one end, apparent content search at the other, 
and cases with elements of both in between” (2005: 160). 
 
Erman (2001) gives a very detailed account of the linguistic environments of you 
know as a hesitation marker. For instance, she observes that you know usually occurs 
after function words or after a determiner. Similar patterns are also identified in this 
study.  
(4.88) 
155B    I think she feels probably that uhm you know unless I need her for <,,>you know 
<.>mak making my life happy then I don't really want her  
156B    And clearly I've got what I need to make my life happy 
(S1A-031-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.88), both you knows are identified as hesitation markers. The first you 
know occurs after the complementizer that while the second you know appears after 
the preposition for. The two markers of hesitation uhm and pauses here clearly help 
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the speaker win more time. Example (4.89) is another instance of hesitation marker 
where you know occurs after a determiner and is prefaced by a pause. This example 
supports Östman’s observation that “if you know was used after an article, that article 
had to be repeated after you know” (Östman, 1981: 31). 
(4.89) 
127A    I did buy a <.>bu you know a bunch of roses but hardly ever a great big thing 
like like uh uh a ribbon and <unclear-words> sheet is it really 
128E    They're quite expensive nowadays  
S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
You know in hesitation marker can not only help the speaker win more time but also 
can appeal to the hearer for patience or even help. Example (4.90) is an instance of 
hesitation marker where the appealing function seems to work for the speaker 
because it is the listener who gives the answer before the speaker finishes her 
searching.  
(4.90) 
94A     She might have been that kind of teenager anyway  
95B     So  
96B     Mm  
97B     Quite likely I think  
98B     I was quite like that and <,> you know  
99A     Bolshie  
100B    Yes  
101B    And and also apt to take you know very completely irrational hates against 
people for what I think were probably sexual reasons  
102B    I mean<,> you know at the bottom it was sort <,> uh sexual problems 
(S1A-031-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2.2.3.2 Restart 
This subfunction is identified by a number of researchers (Goldberg, 1980; Schourup 
1985; Holmes, 1986; Erman, 2001; Müller, 2005) but is referred to by different terms. 
The following are examples of this subfunction cited in previous studies. It is clear 
that you knows in the following examples all share the same linguistic environment: 
the prior message is not finished and usually there is a syntactic change in the 
coming message. You know in this context is termed repair by most researchers 
(Goldberg, 1980; Schourup, 1985; Erman, 2001; Müller, 2005) because there is a 
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syntactic correction involved.  
(4.91) 
Well, it’s just none of their- you know, that’s really none of their business. 
(White House: 28-2-73:43) (Goldberg, 1980, quoted as example (70) in Schourup, 1985: 
123) 
(4.92) 
… they can get- you know they can get close (ta you)  
(RTS18t, 56) (Schourup: 1985 as example (91)) 
(4.93)  
The question is are you actually interested, attracted to her enough to want to, you know, 
what are you really interested in doing /…/   
(Erman, 2001: 1345 as example (13)) 
(4.94) 
     Young man to friends at dinner party 
     and I’ve been on this bloody speed reading course which is / you know so one/ one  
     notices  
     (Holmes, 1986: 11 as example (22)) 
However, example (4.91), according to Müller’s criteria, will be coded as marking 
false start rather than repair because no correction but repetition is made because 
repair in Müller’s study only applies to those cases where the coming message starts 
with a different sentence structure from the prior message.  
 
This study labels this subfunction as restart rather than repair because repair is used 
as a cover term in this study. In the analysis of I mean in section 4.1, four subtypes of 
repair were identified and restart was one of them. Example (3.39) is an instance of 
restart of I mean (quoted in section 4.1.2.3.2 and repeated here for convenience). As 
can be seen from example (4.39), there is also a syntactic correction involved.  
(4.39)  
57A     I would because to me <,> it seems  
58A     I mean I 'd go to that and I 'd go to the Palmer one if I was you 
(S1A-005-ICE-GB) 
 
Like Müller, this study also makes a distinction between whether a correction is 
made or not. Example (4.95) is treated as a case of restart because a syntactic change 
is made in the coming message. Example (4.96), where only repetition is made, is 
put under the above subcategory of hesitation marker because repetition is 
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considered as a marker of hesitation.   
(4.95) 
98D     Well it be handed in a week on Monday and I've been doing it for about three 
weeks now  
99D     And I just you know when you just can't be bothered it's so boring  
100D    It's on the National Curriculum  
(S1A-040-ICE-GB) 
(4.96) 
91B     Platform in a pond really just to a sort of walkway for kids to look up close 
because they 're always taking parties of kids around to have a look at the site 
<,>  
92B     It's you know it's a nature reserve 
(S1A-081-ICE-GB) 
 
4.2.3.3 Approximator 
This subfunction is termed approximator because you know is used to signal that the 
coming message is rather rough or vague. The reason for the imprecision could either 
be because the speaker could not find the right word at the time of communication or 
because the accuracy of the message may not be important. This subfunction is 
identified by both Erman (2001) and Müller (2005). Similar to Erman’s findings 
(2005), as an approximator you know is often found to work with other 
approximators in this study. Among them, sort of is the most frequent one, which 
supports Aijmer’s finding that there is a large number of examples of the collocation 
sort of you know (Aijmer, 2002: 189). Extract (4.97) is an instance where you know 
occurs with sort of while extract (4.98) is a case where you know co-works with 
another less frequent approximator whatever.  
(4.97)  
32B     were you lost in Richard 's seminar the other night  
33C     Yeah right  
34D     No I was super <,>  
35D     I really enjoyed it  
36B     Did you get the implications of everything then  
37D     No  
38B     Uhm cos Caroline was just asking what it was about the other night <,,>  
39D     Well it was he was you know sort of <,> dodging about <,> about family trees 
and about and about Deor and about <unclear-word> and about those things and 
it was interesting <,>  
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40D     I don't I don't suppose there was anything fantastically useful 
(S1A-090-ICE-GB) 
(4.98) 
85B     and it's based on your memory <,>  
86B     So even if you write it down as a script it 's still only going to be what you could 
in fact actually tell us <,,>  
87A     Yes  
88C     There are occasions where  
89A     Yes  
90B     So your your range of events or you know whatever it is for emphasis is going to 
be from you anyway <,>  
(S1A-064-ICE-GB) 
With you know, the speaker not only can warn the hearer that the coming message 
lacks precision but also appeal to the hearer to cope with the imprecision.  
 
4.2.3.4 Introducing a new topic 
You know in this subfunction plays the role of introducing a new topic. It is identified 
by Müller but is not included on her function list because it occurs less than three 
times. In this study, this subfunction occurs at moderately low frequency (14 out of 
692).  
(4.99) 
1A      Uhm <,> you can break into the pears if you want to or have a piece of  
         choccy  
2A      You've had plenty of veggies <,,>  
3B      A piece of choccy  
4B      What do you mean  
5A      Well you bought some and I bought some  
6B      Oh you bought some did you  
7B      Oh  
8A      I bought exactly the same thing only I bought the uh the Tobler version  
9B      Oh  
10B     I wouldn't mind uhm a pear  
11B     Just one  
12A     OK <,,>  
13A     you know Gerry actually talks refers to my mother's bedroom as the boudoir  
14A     She doesn't <laugh>  
15B     Seriously <,,>  
16B     When she answers the phone she says's residence 
(S1A-023-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.99) prior to you know, A and B are talking about food. In line 13, with 
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you know A switches to another topic, which is about Gerry who refers to A’s 
mother’s bedroom as the boudoir.  
 
However, Goldberg (1980, 1981) reports that you know is frequently used to preface 
a new topic in her data. She also points out that this topic changing function is 
face-threatening. Example (4.100) is one of her examples.  
(4.100)  
President Nixon is talking to John Dean. Dean has just entered the room 
P       Hi John, how are you? 
D       Good morning. Good morning. 
P       Sit down. Sit down. Trying to get my remarks ready to (unintelligible) the 
building trades. 
D       So I understand. 
P       Yes, indeed, yeah. You know, I was thinking we ought to get the odds and ends, 
uh (unintelligible) we talked, and, uh, it was confirmed that—you remember we 
talked about resignations and so forth and so on—that I should have in hand, 
not to be released. 
(White House: 16-4-73am:187) (Cit. in Goldberg, 1980:96) (Quoted as example (55) in 
Schourup, 1985: 107) 
As can be seen from (4.100), you know is used between phatic talk and the main 
theme of their talk. The reason that the topic transition in this example is interpreted 
as face-threatening could be because the new topic you know prefaces happens to be 
the face-threatening act of giving a command because President Nixon is telling John 
Dean what he should do. The topic change itself may not be inherently 
face-threatening as Goldberg claims (Goldberg, 1981:3). At least, the reading of the 
topic change in example (4.99) above does not sound face-threatening.  
 
4.2.3.5 Indicating speaker attitude 
Like I mean, you know is also used to mark speaker attitude. As discussed in section 
4.1.2.3.5, I mean can indicate three types of speaker attitude - expressing evaluation 
or judgment, expressing emphasis and expressing sincerity. As shown by following 
examples, you know is only used to indicate the first two speaker attitudes perhaps 
because the attitude of expressing sincerity is very closely related to the semantic 
meaning of I mean. I mean in the context of expressing sincerity can be translated as 
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‘I’m serious when I say’.  
(4.101) 
95C     Anyway anyway anyway Louis tell us some tell us more about her  
96A     I don't know much about her  
97A     I've got her phone number right here  
98A     The thing is what's the etiquette of this  
99A     You're then meant to wait a couple of days before you ring them up or else it 
appears uncool you know  
(S1A-021-ICE-GB) 
In line 99, A expresses his attitude towards the etiquette that you cannot phone the 
girl right after you have got her phone number by using the evaluative adjective 
‘uncool’. 
(4.102) 
124B    I I I really <,> love it  
125B    I I look forward to <,> to working each week  
126B    I mean I'd like to do it every day <,,> but you know such is life <,,>  
(S1A-003-ICE-GB)  
In line 126, B uses a statement ‘such is life’ to express his/her attitude that life would 
not allow you to do what you want.  
(4.103) 
277E    And yet uh I know everybody laughs about Barbara Cartland but they're 
fabulous to read  
278E    They're so <,> innocent  
279E    And it's so <.>honestly <.>the they  
280D    Yeah uhm  
281D    Yeah  
282D    They are  
283D    They're just so lovely <,>  
284D    So easy to read you know I mean and now they hers are all lords and ladies and 
all 
(S1A-016-ICE-GB) 
Example (4.103) is an instance of expressing emphasis. The adverb ‘so’ in line 284 
helps express the emphasis here. Again, you know is not only used to indicate 
speaker attitude but also appeal to the hearer’s agreement.  
 
You know used in the context of expressing emphasis is also observed in previous 
studies (Holmes, 1986; Erman, 2001). Extract (4.104) is quoted by Erman as an 
example of you know with emphatic function, “where the speaker urges the listener 
132 
 
to appreciate the force of the utterance as a whole” (Erman, 2001: 1347) 
(4.104) 
     <1>     I didn’t realize what I was doing. I dunno. 
     <2>     You’re so stupid! You know. 
     <1>     Yeah, yeah erm. 
             Melanie was talk … I was talking to Melanie about <unclear> and Melanie  
             goes  to me, <unclear> if you go out with him, and you realize that I’m  
             mad, and you your eyes out of your head! 
<2>      (laugh) 
(B133203, Erman, 2001: 1347 cited as example (18)) 
 
The above is the complete description of the pragmatic functions of you know 
identified in the native speaker data of this study. But identification of them is not 
always straightforward because like I mean, you know was also found to play more 
than one function in one context i.e. there were cases where decision had to be made 
as to which function was more typical. The following two examples show how such 
decisions were made.   
(4.105) 
244B    Uhm though at the weekends <,> I had because I was on this this silly residential 
course and things I kept having meals with this are you vegetarian or aren't you  
245B    and I wasn't allowed to say I was a whimsical vegetarian and fancied a 
vegetarian option  
246B    you know you there are only three vegetarian dinners here  
247B    Where are the vegetarians to give them the vegetarian dinner  
(S1A-011-ICE-GB) 
You know in example (4.105) was coded as quotative because it is followed by direct 
quoted speech, which is the typical context for quotative you know. However, it 
could be argued that the quote introduced by you know explains why ‘I wasn’t 
allowed to say I was a whimsical vegetarian and fancied a vegetarian option’. 
Therefore, you know could also be coded as reason. 
 
(4.106) 
107A    Yes well that's fifteenth century isn't it <,>  
108B    I think so  
109A    They’ve got a salt box haven't they over the near the fire you know sort of 
hollow beam where you keep the salt or used to keep the salt dry  
110A    Yes 
(S1A-009-ICE-GB) 
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Like example (4.105), you know in example (4.106) can also be seen to play two 
roles. But it is very difficult to tell which role is the primary one. The information 
introduced you know gives additional information about the salt box, so it can be 
seen as an instance of explicitness. But at the same time, you know can also be seen 
as a signal warning the hearer the upcoming description is not accurate and appealing 
to the hearer to get on with the imprecision because it co-occurs with an 
approximator sort of. This example was finally coded as explicitness because it 
seems that you know only plays a supporting role when functioning in approximator 
because it always co-occurs with markers of approximation such as sort of or 
whatever. On the contrary, explicitness can be seen as one of the main subfunctions 
played by you know because you know was rather frequently (46 out of 590) found to 
perform this role independently.  
 
4.3 Comparison of I mean and you know in the native speaker data 
Since a detailed description of I mean and you know in the native speaker data has 
been completed in the above two main sections, it is the right time to compare their 
behavior in English conversation because although they are compared in the 
literature the comparison is either very brief (David & Davy, 1974; Brown & 
Levinson, 1978; Edmonson, 1981; Östman, 1981; James, 1983; Schourup, 1985) or 
at a general level (Schiffrin, 1987; Fox Tree & Schrock, 2002). As can be seen from 
the above discussion, the analysis of I mean and you know was carried out not only in 
great depth but also under the same broad framework with the same translation 
technique. As a result, a more delicate and systematic comparison of you know and I 
mean is hoped to be achieved. Since the comparison between you know and I mean 
will be conducted from three aspects, this section will be further divided into three 
subsections. Section 4.3.1, will present the comparison in terms of their overall 
frequencies, degree of pragmatization, distributions of the specific functions. Section 
4.3.2 will then attempt to account for the similarities and differences revealed in 
section 4.3.3.The final section will compare them in terms of turn positions and 
propositions.  
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4.3.1 Quantitative findings of the comparison of the use of I mean and you know in 
the native speaker data 
Table 4.8 below shows the overall frequencies of you know and I mean in the 
face-to-face conversations chosen in this study followed by a chi square test of 
degree of pragmaticalization of the two markers. As can be seen from Table 4.8, both 
linguistic expressions are frequently used, with a slightly higher frequency of I mean. 
However, you know is less pragmatized than I mean, with about 10% more semantic 
cases. The subsequent chi-square test shows that I mean is significantly more 
pragmatized than you know.  
Table 4.8 Overall frequencies of I mean and you know in the native speaker data  
 Identified  Unidentified 
   
Total 
 Pragmatic  Non-pragmatic Total 
I mean  686 
(95.8%) 
30 
(4.2%) 
716 157 861 
you know 587 
(84.9%) 
104 
    (15.1%) 
691 132 823 
 
 pragmatic  non-pragmatic  Total  
I mean 686 30 716 
you know 587 104 691 
Total 1273 134 1407 
X
2
=48.136, df=1,p＜0.001 
 
The significance between I mean and you know in terms of their degree of being 
pragmatized appears to echo my observation that in my data for I mean the 
distinction between semantic and pragmatic cases seems clear-cut while you know 
seems to be still in the process of being pragmatized. Example (4.107) is a borderline 
case of you know where you know is used as one unit to replace the embarrassing 
words in line 168.  
(4.107) 
163A    The Sport  
164D    The Daily Sport  
165C    So he was telling me you know what was in it  
166C    So I said well bring them home  
167C    Let me have a look <,,>  
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168C    you know just for the sheer <,> you know of it  
169B    <laugh>  
(S1A-027-ICE-GB) 
Table 4.9 below shows the pragmatic functions of you know and I mean identified in 
the British speakers’ data and their distributions, followed by a chi-square test of the 
three main categories. As shown by Table 4.9, you know and I mean display similar 
pragmatic properties because more than half of the pragmatic functions (16 out of 26) 
are shared by them and the chi-square test shows that there is no significant 
difference between them in terms of the three main categories.   
Table 4.9 Pragmatic functions of I mean and you know identified in the native 
speaker data  
  I mean  
(686) 
you know 
 (587) 
Hearer-oriented  Assumption correction 73(10.6%) 1(0.2%) 
 Exemplification 48(7.0%) 40(6.8%) 
 Explicitness 42(6.1%) 46(7.8%) 
 Reformulation 16(2.3%) 13(2.2%) 
 Cause 8(1.2%) 7(1.2%) 
 Reason 24(3.5%) 16(2.7%) 
 Result 2(0.3%) 7(1.2%) 
 Summarization  10(1.5%) 11(1.9%) 
 Quotative 2(0.3%) 29(4.9%) 
 Introducing background 
information 
0(0.0%) 11(1.9%) 
 Seeking confirmation 0(0.0%) 2(0.3%) 
 Total  225(32.8%) 184(31.2%) 
Interactant-relationship-oriented Softener of FTA 39(5.7%) 13(2.2%) 
 Interactional repair 22(3.2%) 2(0.3%) 
 Justification  191(27.8%) 41(7.0%) 
 Conclusion 13(1.9%) 10(1.7%) 
 Indicating marked 
expression 
0(0.0%) 48(8.2%) 
 Indicating the most 
likely event 
0(0.0%) 19(3.2%) 
 Indicating the unspoken 
message to be 
completed by the hearer 
0(0.0%) 18(3.1%) 
 Indicating the coming 
message is meant to be 
evaluated 
0(0.0%) 67(11.4%) 
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 Total  265(38.6%) 218(37.1%) 
Speaker-oriented  Indicating speaker 
attitude 
51(7.4%) 76(12.9%) 
 Hesitation marker 9(1.3%) 44(7.5%) 
 Restart 90(13.1%) 39(6.6%) 
 Resumption  14(2.0%) 0(0.0%) 
 Transactional repair 32(8.5%) 0(0.0%) 
 Approximator  0(0.0%) 13(2.2%) 
 Introducing a new topic 0(0.0%) 14(2.4%) 
 Total  196(28.5%) 186(31.7%) 
 
 three broad categories 
Hearer-oriented Interactant-relationship-oriented speaker-oriented Total 
I mean 225 265 196 686 
you know 183 218 186 587 
Total 408 483 382 1273 
X
2
=1.469, df=2, p>0.47 
 
Under the hearer-oriented category, the British speakers use both I mean and you 
know to clarify the previous message and even use similar proportions of I mean and 
you know in the three specific ways of clarification i.e. giving examples, providing 
more detail and paraphrasing. They also use I mean and you know to link messages 
which have cause-effect relationship i.e. X happens because of Y or X happens, so Y 
happens. In addition, similar percentages of you know and I mean are used to 
summarize the previous talk.  
 
Under the interactant-relationship category, I mean and you know are both used to 
soften FTAs, which supports Brown & Levinson’s (1978) observation that I mean 
and you know are found to act as ‘hedges’ in politeness strategies when the speaker 
performs face-threatening acts. They are also used to signal that the upcoming 
message explains why the prior message has been said or that the upcoming message 
is the inference that can be drawn from the prior talk.  
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Under the speaker-oriented category, both I mean and you know are used to indicate 
the attitude of the speaker and help the speaker to edit his/her real time 
communicating by either stalling for more time or making syntactic repair.  
Under each broad category, there is one or two subfunctions where both I mean and 
you know can occur but there is a substantial gap between them in terms of their 
frequencies. Assumption correction and transactional repair are predominately played 
by I mean. You know seems to play just a minor role because it is very rarely used in 
these contexts and always co-occurs with I mean. Similarly, I mean seems to only 
play a supporting role in quotative and hesitation marker because it shows very low 
frequencies in both subfunctions as compared to that of you know and it almost 
always co-occurs with you know.  
 
To sum up, in the face-to-face conversations chosen in this study, both I mean and 
you know are frequently used pragmatic markers although I mean shows a slight 
higher frequency. They share over half of the subfunctions identified in this study 
and there is no significant difference between them in terms of the distributions of 
the three main broad categories.  
 
However, you know is more versatile than I mean with regard to the number of 
subfunctions they can play. The subfunctions played by you know is more evenly 
distributed than those played by I mean. For instance justification in I mean accounts 
for as high as 27.8% while the subfunction of ‘indicating the speaker attitude’, the 
most frequent subfunction of you know, only accounts for 12.9%. 
 
The similarities and differences between I mean and you know in terms of the 
specific functions they played can be summarized in five categories. The first 
category includes those subfunctions such as explicitness, reformulation, 
exemplification and summarization where I mean and you know show rather similar 
frequencies. The second category includes subfunctions such as assumption 
correction and interactional repair, which are predominantly played by I mean. The 
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third category includes subfunctions such as quotative and hesitation marker, which 
are predominantly played by you know. The fourth category is I-mean-only category 
which includes resumption and transactional repair. The final category is 
you-know-only category which includes subfunctions such as ‘introducing a new 
topic’, ‘indicating the coming message is meant to be evaluated’, ‘indicating marked 
expressions’ and ‘indicating the most likely event’. 
 
4.3.2 Accounting for the features of the use of I mean and you know in the native 
speaker data 
As shown in section 4.3.1 you know and I mean can occur in the same contexts 
because they “may actually accomplish the same interactive task” (Schiffrin, 1987: 
309), but it does not mean that they are identical in those overlapping subfunctions. It 
seems that their general functions or core meanings can help account for the 
difference between them. Both Edmondson (1981) and Schiffrin (1987) propose that 
the general functions of you know and I mean are complementary due to their 
semantic meanings. You know and I mean are both considered as fumbles in 
Edmondson’s study but put in two groups. You know belongs to a group called “the 
Cajoler” because it is used by the speaker “as an appeal for understanding i.e. 
through the Cajoler the speaker seeks to make his illocution more palatable to the 
hearer” (Edmondson, 1981: 154) while I mean is in a group named “the 
Let-me-explain” because it is used to “communicate the fact that I’m trying to 
communicate” (Edmondson, 1981: 155). For Schiffrin, I mean “focuses on the 
speaker’s own adjustments in the production of his/her own talk, you know proposes 
that a hearer adjust his/her orientation (specially knowledge and attention) toward the 
reception of another’s talk”(Schiffrin, 1987: 309). So for all the contexts where you 
know and I mean can both be applied, the complementary role that they play can be 
summarized as follows: with I mean the speaker spells out his/her own message and 
in the same time can diminish potential imposition on the hearer by suggesting ‘this 
is what I mean, so you do not have to agree with me’ while with you know the 
speaker not only spells out his/her message but in the same time appeals to the hearer 
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to understand, appreciate or agree to the spelt out message.  
 
Since in the shared contexts both you know and I mean can occur, it is not surprising 
to find that you know and I mean co-occur in nearly all shared subfunctions except 
cause, result and conclusion, which are all rather infrequent. The switch from you 
know to I mean or vice versa seems to suggest that the speaker keeps adjusting how 
much he/she wants the hearer to get involved in the conversation or assuming how 
much the hearer knows. It seems that such a switch is not random because the 
occurrence of I mean you know (24) is about two times that of you know I mean (10). 
However, it is not clear why the British speakers switched from I mean to you know 
more often than vice versa.  
 
It can be seen from the above discussion that in the subfunctions where both you 
know and I mean can occur, it is their general functions that tell one from the other 
i.e. apart from the same subfunctions they both play, with you know and I mean, the 
speaker can choose whether to invite the listener to participate or just focus on 
his/her own talk. As to the subfunctions where only one of them can fit, it is, again, 
their general functions that can help answer the question why only one of them 
works because as can be seen from the following discussion, in the you-know-only 
subfunctions the listener’s participation is essential while in the I-mean-only 
subfunctions the listener’s participation is least needed or even impossible.  
 
In the hearer-oriented category, the two subfunctions of ‘introducing background 
information’ and ‘seeking confirmation’ are only played by you know. As discussed 
in sections 4.2.2.1.2 and 4.2.2.1.9, when functioning in ‘indicating background 
information’, you know introduces background information that the speaker assumes 
the hearer needs to know so as to follow the talk while in the subfunction of ‘seeking 
confirmation’, with you know the speaker can make sure that the listener knows what 
exactly he/she refers to.  So in both subfunctions the hearer’s participation is crucial. 
I mean certainly would not be a preferred candidate here because it would discourage 
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the hearer’s involvement. Although quotative is a subfunction where both I mean and 
you know can work, it is predominately played by you know because I mean rarely 
occurs in this context and if it does, it co-occurs with you know. The reason that you 
know is preferred to I mean in this subfunction could be because when we quote 
something, there must be something worth reporting in that quote. We do not really 
just quote something for the sake of quoting it. So with you know, the speaker can 
indicate the coming message is a quote and in the same time appeal to the hearer to 
see something is being quoted. The reason why assumption correction and 
interactional repair in the interactant-relationship category are predominately played 
by I mean will be discussed later when it comes to the comparison of how you know 
and I mean do their repair in conversation.  
 
The appealing function, the general function of you know, again, is indispensable to 
you-know-only subfunctions in the interact-relationship category. In ‘indicating 
marked expression’, the speaker needs the hearer to appreciate his/her linguistic 
efforts of making the conversation more interesting. In ‘indicating the most likely 
event’ the speaker tries to claim a common ground between him/her and the hearer 
by appealing to the shared knowledge or experience. In ‘indicating the unspoken 
message to be completed by the hearer’ and ‘indicating the coming message is meant 
to be evaluated’, the speaker urges the hearer to complete the unspoken message and 
see the implication. It is self-evident that the general function of I mean would not fit 
in any of the above subfunctions.  
 
In the speaker-oriented category, there are two you-know-only subfunctions and two 
I-mean-only subfunctions. Both resumption and ‘introducing a new topic’ play the 
role of topic management. ‘Introducing a new topic’ is only played by you know 
because the speaker would certainly hope that the hearer would be interested in the 
new topic and be willing to participate. On the contrary, resumption is only played by 
I mean because what the speaker needs is to resume his/her topic, which is 
interrupted in the prior talk. Instead of inviting the hearer’s participation, the speaker 
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needs to focus on his/her own talk.  
 
As discussed in section 4.2.2.3.3, when you know functioning as approximator, it 
tends to co-occur with other approximators such as sort of and whatever, which 
means you know might only play a supporting role here. Only signaling to the hearer 
that the coming message is not put in an accurate way seems not enough. There is a 
need to appeal to the hearer to cope with the imprecision. Obviously, a 
self-involvement marker like I mean does not really suit this occasion.  
 
The fact that you know cannot be used in transactional repair is reported by Schourup 
(1985). According to Schourup, the reason that you know cannot appropriately used 
in transactional repair is because the repair is too radical. Example (4.108) is cited by 
Schourup to explain why you know cannot work in this context. He thinks that in 
example (4.108) “it is unlikely that the addressee could grasp the speaker’s intention 
(cat) from that speaker’s having said dog, without further context or foreknowledge” 
although I mean goes well in (4.108)(Schourup, 1985: 122). 
(4.108) 
     ? I got a dog YK cat for my birthday.  
     (Schourup, 1985: 122 cited as example (66)) 
 
As discussed in section 4.1, due to the semantic meaning of I mean, repair is one of 
the main jobs done by I mean. The five subtypes of repair identified in this study are 
hesitation marker, restart assumption correction, interactional repair, and 
transactional repair. As shown in Table 4.1 above, although you know was found to 
function in most of the repairing jobs, it was very infrequent and showed much lower 
frequencies than I mean except in hesitation marker. It can be argued that you know 
does not really contribute much in assumption correction or interactional repair 
because it occurred only one or two times and all co-occurred with I mean. The 
reason you know could occasionally occur in these two subtypes of repair is because 
there can be a potential need to appeal to the hearer to understand why an unwanted 
assumption needs to be corrected or why an inappropriate message needs to be 
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modified. But in transactional repair, what the speaker needs to correct is a piece of 
wrong information. Since the change involved in transactional repair is much more 
radical than that in either assumption correction or interactional repair, appealing to 
the hearer would not help because the hearer would not know the correct information. 
Only the speaker knows exactly what the information he/she has intended to provide. 
Therefore, it should be solely the speaker’s job to make the correction and I mean is 
certainly a perfect candidate for doing this radical repair.  
 
Apart from those subfunctions where both you know and I mean can play, there are a 
number of subfunctions where only one of them can work. The different general 
functions of you know and I mean seem to be able to account for why some 
subfunctions allow both pragmatic markers while others can only have one. In shared 
subfunctions such as clarifying previous message by being more specific, 
exemplifying and paraphrasing, the speaker can choose either to get the hearer 
involved by appealing to the relevance of the upcoming message or just keep the job 
to him/herself. Subfunctions such as ‘indicating marked expression’ and ‘indicating 
the coming message is meant to be evaluated’ are only played by you know because 
in those contexts the hearer’s participation is essential. In contrast, in those 
I-mean-only subfunctions such as resumption and transactional repair the hearer’s 
participation is least needed or even impossible. 
 
To sum up, the above comparison of the pragmatic functions of you know and I mean 
gives a clear view of how you know and I mean behave in face-to-face conversation 
by highlighting the similarities and differences between them. The general functions 
of I mean and you know adopted in this study have successfully accounted for 
contexts where both pragmatic markers occur with similar frequencies; contexts 
where one shows a much higher frequency than the other; and contexts where only 
one of the marker occurs. Therefore the comparison of I mean and you know made in 
this study does seem to support the claim (Schourup, 1985: Holmes, 1986) that the 
approach of general function plus specific function will not only result in a unified 
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account of a pragmatic marker but also help account for why it is A marker rather 
than B marker that works in a certain context. 
 
4.3.3 Comparison of turn positions and proposition positions between I mean and 
you know in the native speaker data 
Table 4.10 below shows the distribution of turn positions of I mean and you know in 
the chosen British data in this study followed by a chi-square test. As shown by Table 
4.10, for both pragmatic markers turn medial position is the preferred turn position 
for about 90% you know and I mean appear in this turn position. However, I mean 
very rarely occurs in turn final position while turn initial position is the least 
preferred one for you know. The chi-square test further shows that the difference 
between the two markers in terms of turn positions is significant. In other words, you 
know enjoys significantly more freedom than does I mean with regard to which turn 
position they can appear.  
Table 4.10 Distributions of turn positions of I mean and you know in the native 
speaker data 
 turn position 
turn initial turn medial turn final Total 
I mean 60(8.7%) 623(90.8%) 3(0.4%) 686 
you know 20(3.4%) 525(89.4%) 42(7.2%) 587 
Total  80 1148 45 1273 
X
2
=54.798, df=2, p<0.001 
     
 
Table 4.11 below presents the distribution of proposition positions of I mean and you 
know followed by a chi-square test. As can be seen from Table 4.11, although 
proposition initial position is preferred by both pragmatic markers, the difference 
between them is significant according to the chi-square test.   
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Table 4.11 Distributions of proposition positions of I mean and you know in the 
native speaker data 
 Proposition position 
proposition initial proposition medial proposition final Total 
I mean 674(98.3%) 9(1.3%) 3(0.4%) 686 
You know 319(54.3%) 114(19.3%) 154(26.2%) 587 
Total  993 123 157 1273 
X
2
=356.232, df=2, p<0.001 
 
In contrast to I mean, which is predominantly used in proposition initial position and 
very restricted in the other two proposition positions, you know is more evenly 
distributed over the three positions, which can explain the general impression that 
you know seems to turn up anywhere in a conversation.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, when I mean and you know appear in proposition medial 
position they can occur in the positions of either ‘within a constituent’ or ‘between 
constituents’. In this study, I mean very rarely occurs within a constituent and if it 
does, it co-occurs with you know. Among the nine cases of proposition medial I 
means, only two occur within a constituent while the other seven occur between 
constituents. Example (4.109) is an instance where I mean occurs within the 
prepositional phrase ‘for three months’. In example (4.110), I mean occurs between 
subject ‘the boat’ and its predicate ‘sleeps’.  
(4.109)  
269B    And Nell Nell's breast-feeding only lasted for you know I mean three months 
drying up kind of thing <,>  
     (S1A-056-ICE-GB) 
 (4.110) 
64C     The boat seats uh I mean sleeps fifteen hundred you see 
(S1A-021-ICE-GB) 
 
In contrast, you know enjoys much more freedom in proposition medial position. 
About 40% (43 out of 114) proposition medial you knows appear within a constituent 
although more than half of them occur between constituents. Example (4.111) is an 
145 
 
instance where you know appears between verb ‘take’ and its complement ‘hates’. 
Example (4.112) is a case where you know occurs within a constituent. But note in 
this example that you know actually occurs between auxiliary verb ‘have’ and finite 
verb ‘done’, which further supports the impression that you know seems to be 
virtually everywhere.    
(4.111) 
101B    And and also apt to take you know very completely irrational hates against 
people for what I think were probably sexual reasons 
(SlA-031-ICE-GB) 
(4.112) 
152B    I think we should have you know done a bit of digging at that point sort of you 
know make her feel particularly special and find out if she was feeling at all 
bothered about it or whether she thought she had to be nice to this child because 
again she was earning her place 
(S1A-031-GB) 
 
The proposition final position is where you know and I mean show the biggest gap. 
Only three (out of 686) I means are proposition final while about one in four you 
knows appears in this position. But it has to point out here that the proposition final 
you know include cases like example (4.113) where the position of you know can be 
more accurately coded as incomplete proposition final. In example (4.113), you know 
is used to introduce a message which is left unspoken and expected to be completed 
by the hearer. B leaves out what Alice says because A can easily figure it out given 
what has just been said in line 117.  
(4.113)  
112A    we do all different kinds of ones this winter  
113Z    It's basically Surrey  
114B    Mmm  
115A    Yeah <,> up to Dorking  
116 A    From Leatherhead up to Dorking that area  
117B    Yeah we go back <,> you know when we're needed you know  
118B    My friend Alice who lives opposite <,> she organises the task  
119B    She rings up the wardens <,> and says you know 
120A    Yeah  
     (S1A-081-ICE-GB) 
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To sum up, for both pragmatic markers turn medial and proposition initial are the 
most preferred positions. But overall you know enjoys more freedom to appear in any 
of the positions while I mean is particularly restricted in turn final, proposition 
medial and proposition final positions.  
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Chapter Five 
Uses of I mean and you know in the non-native speaker data 
This chapter consists of two main sections, which will display how I mean and you 
know are used by the Chinese EFL learners as compared to the native British 
speakers respectively. The comparison of each marker between the native speaker 
data and non-native speaker data will be carried out in terms of overall frequencies, 
distributions of specific functions, distributions of turn positions and distributions of 
proposition positions. So under each main section, there are four subsections.  
 
Before moving on to the description of I mean and you know in the learners' data, it 
is important to note that this study holds a neutral view towards the differences 
between the learners and the native speakers: i.e. the differences do not necessarily 
indicate the learners' deviant or wrong uses of the two markers. Therefore, neutral 
terms such as over-representation or under-representation rather than terms like 
overuse or underuse are used. 
 
5.1 Uses of I mean in the non-native speaker data 
5.1.1 Overall frequencies of I mean in the non-native speaker data and the native 
speaker data 
Table 5.1 shows the overall frequencies of I mean in the British speakers’ data and 
the Chinese EFL learners’ data followed by the chi-square result of the distributions 
of pragmatic and non-pragmatic cases of the identified cases.  
Table 5.1 Overall frequencies of I mean in the British speakers’ data and the Chinese 
EFL learners’ data 
 Identified  Unidentified 
   
Total 
 Pragmatic  Non-pragmatic Total 
British data 
(ICE-GB)  
686  30 
 
716 157 861 
Chinese EFL data 
(SECCL 1.0& 2.0) 
82 
 
13 
 
95 4 99 
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 Identified cases  
Total Non-pragmatic Pragmatic 
British data (ICE-GB) 
Chinese EFL data (SECCL 1.0 & 2.0) 
686(95.8%) 30(4.2%) 716 
82(86.3%) 13(13.7%) 95 
Total 768 43 811 
X
2
=15.057, df=1, p<0.001 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.1 (above), the overall frequency of I mean in the 
speakers’ data is nearly 9 times that of I mean in the Chinese EFL learners’ data. As 
to the identified cases, not only do the Chinese students use I mean much less but the 
proportion of non-pragmatic uses is statistically much higher. Romero Trillo’s (2002) 
study, where Spanish EFL learners and British speakers are compared, also shows 
that I mean is more frequent in native speaker data than in learners’ data, but the 
frequency of I mean in his adult native data ( London-Lund Corpus, 50,000 words) is 
only about 2 times that of I mean in his adult learners’ data (spoken production of 3rd 
and 4
th
 year English Philology students at  Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
Corpus, abbreviated as UAM-Corpus, 19,614 words). In contrast to the Chinese EFL 
learners’ data where I mean is underpragmatized with only 86% pragmatic cases, I 
mean in UAM-Corpus is overpragmatized with 100% pragmatization given that the 
pragmatizated rate of I mean in the baseline data of both this study and Romeo 
Trillo’s is about 95%.  
 
The reason that I mean in the Chinese EFL learners’ data is less pragmatized might 
be that I mean tends to be represented as two separate lexical items in the learners’ 
mind while I mean in the native speakers’ mind is more treated as a whole unit. For 
instance, the Chinese learners tend to preface their answers to questions like ‘what do 
you mean’ or ‘you mean X?’ with I mean while the native speakers tend to give their 
answers to either question without I mean. Examples (5.1) and (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) 
show how the Chinese learners and native speakers answer the question ‘you mean 
X?’ and ‘what do you mean?’ respectively.  
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(5.1) 
A       But you know, he asked me for my advice, I think he should go. It's a good 
chance ... good opportunity. He can learn ... he can learn everything ... eh ... not 
everything ... but he can learn a lot of things ... which can not be learnt <learn> 
in here ... 
B       In China ... you mean? 
A       I mean in China. 
(01-099-16-SECCL) 
(5.2)  
188C    Oh with Ramsey you mean  
189A    Yeah  
(SLA-048-ICE-GB) 
(5.3)  
A       Some, some students still, still feel very puzzled about how to, about social 
contact.' 
B       Social contact? 
A       Yes. 
B       What did you mean? 
A       Eh ...I mean some students when they are about study they are interested by 
others. Because others want to. 
(00-074-26-SECCL) 
(5.4) 
1A      Uhm <,> you can break into the pears if you want to or have a piece of choccy  
2A      You 've had plenty of veggies <,,>  
3B      A piece of choccy  
4B      What do you mean  
5A      Well you bought some and I bought some 
(SLA-023-ICE-GB) 
 
Even when I mean is used in non-pragmatic cases in the native speaker data, it tends 
to occur in fixed expressions such as you see what I mean, you know what I mean 
and that’s what I mean. There are only a very small number of cases like “I think I 
mean that everybody did” (ICE-GB-014-126) where I mean is used semantically. In 
contrast, there are very few cases where I mean is part of fixed expressions in the 
learners’ data.  
 
For the learners who are of intermediate level in this study, it seems that their 
language proficiency has just reached a developmental stage where the 
pragmatization process of I mean has not been completed because borderline cases 
 
 
150 
like example (5.5) occur in the learners’ data while I mean in the native speaker data 
is clearly used either pragmatically or semantically. In example (5.5), I mean could 
be argued to play the role of reformulating but can also be seen as a case of semantic 
use of I mean.  
(5.5)  
A       Well, in my opinion, I think uh the more uh you know the more available uh 
method for us to to gain our experience I mean for the preparation for our future 
careers is to touch more new things I mean to get in touch with more new 
things. I think the security social work is a good opportunity for us to to be a 
member of it and to get in touch with a lot of people and learn from them I 
mean do some meaningful and significant things for the society.  
(06-001-23-SECCL) 
 
The pragmatic cases of I mean in the learners’ data of this study include not only 
borderline cases like example (5.5), but also cases of a deviant use in which I mean 
plays a pragmatic role but is followed by the complementizer that. The reason for 
including the deviant cases is because the complementizer seems to be optional in the 
learners’ mind because it does not have any semantic meaning and there is no 
grammatical equivalent of it in Chinese EFL learners’ L1. Therefore, the learners’ 
production of I mean as a pragmatic marker with or without the complementizer that 
might just be a random choice. Presumably, adding that to I mean may buy the 
speaker a bit more time to organize his/her online communication. Extracts (5.6) and 
(5.7) are two examples of disagreeing, one without that and the other one with that. 
Speakers in both example(5.6) and (5.7) use the same strategy to disagree with the 
hearer by admitting that what has been said by the hearer is right before giving 
his/her own opinion prefaced by but and I mean.   
(5.6)  
B       Yeah, but, er, to gain some money to support your tuition. I think we can, maybe 
you can study hard and to gain the scholarship. I think that is also a good way. 
A       Er. What you said I think is right, but I mean just, er, er, for parents they just 
have responsibility to pay tuition for us, as our Chinese, China is a very 
traditional country and everyone just says that parents have responsibility. 
(04-199-08-SECCL) 
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(5.7)  
A       But the main task for student is study, right? 
B       Yes, but I...  I mean that in my... in our spare time and they also will practise 
our work ability. 
(04-199-18-SECCL) 
 
5.1.2 Distributions of the pragmatic functions played by I mean in the non-native 
speaker data and the native speaker data 
Table 5.2 shows the distributions of the pragmatic functions of I mean in the British 
speakers’ data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data followed by the chi-square result 
of the distributions of the three main categories of I mean.  
Table 5.2 Distributions of the pragmatic functions of I mean in the British speakers’ 
data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 Pragmatic functions of I 
mean 
The British 
speakers 
(686) 
The Chinese EFL 
learners 
(82) 
 
 
 
 
Hearer-oriented 
Assumption-correction 73 10.6% 3 3.7% 
Cause  8 1.2% 1 1.2% 
Exemplification  48 7.0% 1 1.2% 
Explicitness 42 6.1% 13 15.9% 
Reason  24 3.5% 1 1.2% 
Reformulation  16 2.3% 9 11% 
Result  2 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Quotative 2 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Summarization  10 1.5% 2 2.4% 
Total  225 32.8% 30 36.6% 
 
 
Interactant-relationship- 
oriented  
Softener of FTA 39 5.7% 12 14.6% 
Justification  191 27.8% 14 17.1% 
Interactional repair 22 3.2% 3 3.7% 
Conclusion  13 1.9% 4 4.9% 
Total  265 38.6% 33 40.2% 
 
Speaker-oriented  
Hesitation marker 9 1.3% 5 6.1% 
Restart  90 13.1% 7 8.5% 
Resumption  14 2.0% 0 0.0% 
Indicating speaker 
attitude  
51 7.4% 0 0.0% 
Transactional repair 32  4.7% 7 8.5% 
Total  196 28.5% 19 23.2% 
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The three main categories 
hearer-oriented 
interactant-relationship-
oriented speaker-oriented Total 
The British speakers’ data 225(32.8%) 265(38.6%) 196(28.5%) 686 
The Chinese EFL learners’ 
data 
30(36.6%) 33(40.2%) 19(23.2%) 82 
Total 255 298 209 768 
X
2
=1.129, df=2, p>0.56 
 
As shown by Table 5.2, both groups display a roughly even distribution in terms of 
the three main categories and the chi square test indicates that the difference between 
them is not significant. In both corpora, the category of 
interactant-relationship-oriented has the highest frequency and the category of 
speaker-oriented has the lowest frequency. They also show similar frequencies in 
subfunctions such as cause and interactional repair.  
 
However, there are more differences between the native speakers and the learners 
regarding the frequencies of individual subfunctions. In the hearer-oriented category, 
the native speakers show much higher frequencies in correcting potential unintended 
interpretations and giving examples while the learners use much more of their I 
means to give more details and reformulate messages. Low frequency subfunctions, 
result and quotative, in the native speaker data are absent from the learners’ function 
list.  
 
In the interactant-relationship-oriented category, the British speakers use 10% more 
of their I means to justify what has just been said than do the Chinese EFL learners 
although justification shows the highest frequency in both corpora. But the learners 
use more I means in softener of FTA and conclusion.  
 
In the hearer-oriented category, the biggest gap between the two groups is found in 
indicating speaker attitude, which is rather frequently used in the native speaker data 
but absent from the learners’ data. The other subfunction that the native speakers use 
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more often is restart while hesitation marker and transactional repair are preferred by 
the learners. The low frequency subfunction of resumption in the native speaker data 
is absent from the non-native speaker data.  
 
Although there are obvious differences between these two groups in terms of 
distributions of the individual subfunctions, the question that whether the difference 
between them is significant or not cannot be answered here because chi-square test 
cannot be used due to the low frequencies of subfunctions such as result, quotative, 
and indicating speaker attitude.  
 
To sum up, as compared to I mean in the native speaker data, I mean is markedly 
under-represented in the Chinese EFL learners’ data. In addition, I mean in the 
non-native speaker data is significantly less pragmatized. As to the specific functions 
of I mean, there is no significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
distribution of the three main categories. I mean in the non-native speaker data 
occurs in slightly more restricted contexts because only 14 out of 18 subfunctions of 
I mean identified in the native speaker data are used by the Chinese EFL learners. 
However, there are quite a few subfunctions of I mean which are either 
over-represented or under-represented in the non-native speaker data. The 
subfunctions that are absent in the non-native speaker data are mainly the low 
frequency subfunctions in the native speaker data except ‘indicating speaker attitude’, 
which is frequently used.    
 
5.1.3 Distributions of turn positions of I mean in the non-native speaker data and the 
native speaker data 
As explained in section 3.5, I mean occurs in three turn positions i.e. turn initial, turn 
medial and turn final. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of these three categories.  
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Table 5.3.Distributions of turn positions of I mean in the British speakers’ data and 
the Chinese EFL learners’ data  
 turn position 
turn initial turn medial turn final Total 
The British speakers’ data 60(8.8%) 623(90.8%) 3(0.4%) 686 
the Chinese EFL learners’ 
data 
8(9.8%) 71(86.6%) 3(3.7%) 82 
As shown by Table 5.3, more similarities than differences are shown between the two 
groups. For instance, the preferred turn position for both groups is turn medial 
position. Similar proportion of I means are used in turn initial position and turn final 
position is least used in both corpora. Since the frequencies of turn final position are 
too low, turn initial position and turn final position are conflated as non-medial 
position so that a chi-square test of medial position and non medial position can be 
run instead. As can be seen from Table 5.4 below, the difference between the native 
speakers and the learners in terms of medial and non-medial positions is not 
significant.  
 
Table 5.4 Distributions of medial and non-medial positions of I mean in the  
British speakers’ data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 turn position  
 Medial non-medial Total 
The British speakers’ data 623(90.8%) 63(9.2%) 686 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data 71(86.6%) 11(13.5%) 82 
Total 686 82 768 
X
2
=1.506, df=1, p>0.21 
 
However, at a more delicate level of analysis, differences emerge. 42% (25 out of 60) 
turn initial I means in the British speakers’ data co-occur with other linkers and they 
are predominately used as post-linkers as in example (5.8).  
(5.8) 
148B    I 'm not  
149B    I 'm I 'm  
150B    I 'm I 'm not very happy with that because uh that is uh that is how the Russians 
powered uh the  
151A    Well I mean they're putting chunks of plutonium up there which in fact they are  
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152A    then that plutonium is going to shatter and disintegrate over quite a large area of 
the country 
(S1A-088-ICE-GB) 
There are only four cases (out of 25) where I mean is used either as a pre-linker as 
shown in example (5.9) or as a medial-linker in example (5.10). 
(5.9)  
90B     when you're working with someone whether they're disabled or able-bodied 
you're still <,> it's still new to work with them and to learn to trust them and 
learn to <,> sort of have contact with them <,>  
91C     Uhm  
92B     I mean I I suppose that is awkward but then that that is awkward anyway <,>  
(S1A-002-ICE-GB) 
(5.10)  
157C    What do they do  
158C    I don't know I mean 
159B    Well I mean say eighteenth century uhm relationships between men and women 
were very different because if it was a low class woman 
(S1A-020-ICE-GB) 
Among the co-occurring linkers, pragmatic marker well and marker of hesitation 
uhm are the most frequent ones. Others include but, and, because and yeah. 
 
In contrast, nearly all I means appearing in turn initial position in the learners’ data 
are on their own as in example (5.11). 
(5.11) 
A       but you are college student, right? And You know a lot of things, a lot of 
knowledge, and so if you are a bellboy, and you can do a well a good bellboy. 
and other people maybe he just graduate from the primary school, he also can 
can do, a good job as a bellboy, so what is the difference between a college 
graduate and er, another kinds of people ? 
B       I mean college doesn't mean much in a job if you are a capable person, and  
(05-023-11B-SECCL) 
There is only one case (out of 8) where I mean is used as a post-linker as shown in 
example (5.12). 
(5.12) 
A       ... eh ..., I see you mean we can leave something from them and learn to 
cooperate with others, right? 
B       Um, yeah. 
A       But ... eh ... I mean I still have another question, I am afraid if I cannot do as 
good as I was in senior school, I mean the score on others things ... eh ... I will 
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feel ... I will feel very ... unconfident. How can I adjust my attitude? 
(00-058-07-SECCL) 
In example (5.12), I mean occurs in the turn initial position but prefaced by “but” and 
“eh”.  
 
Although I mean very rarely appears in turn final position in both corpora, the 
Chinese learners have less restriction in this position because the frequency of I mean 
occurring in this position in the learners’ data is about 9 times of that of I mean in the 
native speaker data (although still very low in raw frequency). Also, the turn final I 
mean plays different roles in the native speaker data and the learners’ data. Two out 
of the three instances of turn final I means in the native speaker data are used to 
giving details as shown by example (5.13) where speaker A specifies what food she 
wants to ask for. One of them is used in transactional repair as shown by example 
(5.14) where speaker C tells the hearer what he/she meant to say is adult story-tale 
tapes rather than good story-tale tapes.  
(5.13)  
119A    And uh <,> <.>sh she showed me some  
120A    Oh quite nice that <,>  
121A    Good mm  
122A    What was the grub like <,,>  
123A    In France I mean  
124B    Well we had uhm <,>  
125B    The people we were staying with they <,,> uh cooked us a traditional Normandy 
dinner <,,> 
(SLA-009-ICE-GB) 
(5.14)  
115C    Thank God thank God must do the same must do the same this year and get you 
some good story-tale tapes and maybe some more adult story-tale tapes I mean  
116B    <laugh>  
(SLA-011-ICE-GB) 
 
On the other hand, in the learners’ data, two of the turn final I means are functioning 
as conclusion as shown by example (5.15) where the speakers are arguing if 
university students should take the job of being a bellboy with a good salary.  
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(5.15)  
B       Yeah, I know what you mean, you mean er the position maybe er er a not en a 
high one. You mean serve <So> as a bell boy (A: Yeah) does not may not take 
er take full use of your... knowledge <knowledeg> in the university. But in my 
opinion, you should en work <word> from the bottoms of you job then you 
may... en know all the setters <settlers> in the hotel. And in that case can you... 
just en you you can work as a higher position, I mean. 
A       Do you know what how <do> they <you> work? 
(05-010-14B-SECCL) 
It seems that B thinks that with experience of working from the bottom as a bellboy, 
which is an opportunity to know how a hotel works, a university graduate can be 
promoted to a higher position although it is not clear what ‘know all the setters 
<settlers> in the hotel’ means here. So the message that ‘you can work as a higher 
position’ followed by I mean is the inference that the speaker makes from the 
condition that if you know very well about how a hotel works by being a bellboy.  
 
One of them is used in reformulation as shown by example (5.16) where “train 
station” in the previous message is reformulated by its synonym “railway station”.  
(5.16)  
B       Yes, but if the terrorism can attack the plane, why can't they attack the train next 
time? And compare with a compare with the er the train, yeah, the plane can er 
has still have much er advantages. Like example is er a softer, you know, and 
when you get into the em station, it it it won't be as crowded as in a train station. 
Have you ever been to a train station? Railway station, I mean. 
A       Yeah yeah I've been there. I've been enter it. But em you know that em in my 
point of view for my point of view, I think the terrorist to terrorist the railway 
station is less attractive than an airplane, you know that. 
(03-160-25B-SECCL) 
 
To sum up, I mean in both data sets shows rather similar features in terms of turn 
positions. For both groups turn medial position is the dominant position and turn 
final position is the least preferred although I mean in the non-native speaker data 
has less restriction in turn final position.  
 
 
 
 
 
158 
5.1.4 Distributions of proposition positions of I mean in the non-native speaker data 
and the native speaker data  
As discussed in section 3.5,the three proposition positions that I mean occurs are 
proposition initial, proposition medial and proposition final. The investigation of 
proposition position is particularly helpful for depicting a more detailed picture of 
the turn medial positioning of I mean because it can appear in any of the three 
proposition positions while turn initial I mean would also be proposition initial and 
turn final I mean would also be proposition final. All cases of proposition final I 
means in the native speaker data turn out to be turn final but there is one case in the 
Chinese learners’ data where the proposition final I mean appears in turn medial 
position, which is shown in example (5.17).  
(5.17) 
B       Um ... yeah, you're right. Um and what what do you think about the high school 
graduates um-um go overseas for their college education? 
A       I know the-the education system abroad is better than in China. You know 
they're related to the British culture, Australia, I mean. And the teating the 
teachers their teating method are more suitable I think for everyone to develop 
their own characters. 
(01-100-31- SECCL) 
 
Table 5.5 below shows the distribution of proposition positions of I mean in the 
British speakers’ data and the Chinese learners’ data. As can be seen from Table 5.5, 
proposition initial is the predominant position for both groups. But compared to the 
British speakers, the Chinese EFL learners show less restriction in the other two 
positions. However, whether the difference between them is significant or not can not 
be tested here because of the low frequencies in proposition medial and proposition 
final positions. The frequencies of I mean in proposition medial position and 
proposition final position are so low that the difference between the two groups in 
terms of initial position and non-initial position (i.e. the conflation of medial and 
final positions) cannot be tested either.  
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Table 5.5 Distributions of proposition positions of I mean in the British speakers’ 
data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 Proposition position 
 proposition initial proposition medial proposition final Total 
The British speakers’ data 673(98.1%) 10(1.5%) 3(0.4%) 686 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data 74(90.2%) 4(4.9%) 4(4.9%) 82 
 
Despite the fact that both groups show very high frequency in proposition initial 
position, one third of I means in the British speakers’ data co-occur with other linkers 
while only one fifth of I means in the learners data co-occur with other linkers. In 
both data I mean in proposition initial position is mainly used as a post-linker and 
least as a medial-linker. But the co-occurring linkers in the British speakers’ data 
cover a wider range of expressions than those in the Chinese learners’ data. The 
linkers that co-occur with I mean in the British speakers’ data can be classified into 
the following groups : pragmatic markers such as well, yeah, like, you know and you 
see; stance adverbs (Powell: 1992) such as actually, basically, honestly, obviously, 
probably, really and certainly; epistemic expressions like I suppose, I think, I guess 
and I presume; conjunctive items such as cos, because, but, and, so and on the other 
hand; hedges such as in a sense, to some extent and more or less; and marks of 
hesitation like uhm. Of these, the most frequent co-occurring linkers are but, uhm, 
well, you know, and, I think, so, because, yeah, like, so and obviously. The picture of 
the co-occurring linkers in the Chinese learners’ data is much simpler. Unlike the 
British speakers, the Chinese learners use a very limited number of linkers. There are 
only 8 linkers found in their conversations. They are but, er, you know, because, so, 
and, yeah and actually. Among them but, er, and you know are the most frequent 
ones.  
 
When I mean occurs in proposition medial position, it will either appear between 
constituents or within a constituent. In both corpora, I mean is found both between 
constituents and within a constituent although cases where I mean is inside a 
constituent are very rare. Example (5.18) is an instance where I mean occurs between 
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constituents while example (5.19) is a case of within a constituent.  
(5.18)  
278B    Well <,> it was sent to her home and then it was sent I mean to her own home 
uh and she 'd moved from there of course and was in the nursing home and they 
sent it there 
     (S1A-007-ICE-GB) 
(5.19) 
A       But it's really a chance for for me to have a ... a ... a ... I mean explanation. 
     (01-008-25-SECCL) 
 
To sum up, like I mean in the native speaker data, I mean in the Chinese EFL 
learners’ data predominantly occurs in proposition initial position. However, it enjoys 
more freedom in proposition medial and proposition final positions. In terms of 
co-occurring linkers, overall I mean in the non-native speaker data tends to be a lot 
more independent and co-occurs with a much smaller number of other linkers.  
 
5.2 Uses of you know in the non-native speaker data 
5.2.1 Overall frequencies of you know in the non-native speaker data and the native 
speaker data 
Table 5.6 shows the overall frequencies of you know in the British speakers’ data and 
the Chinese EFL learners’ data, followed by the results of the chi-square test of the 
distribution of identified cases.  
Table 5.6 Overall frequencies of you know in the British speakers’ data and the 
Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 Identified  Unidentified 
   
Total 
 Pragmatic  Non-pragmatic Total 
British data 
(ICE-GB)  
587 
(84.9%) 
104 
(15.1%) 
691 132 823 
Chinese EFL 
data (SECCL 
1.0& 2.0) 
1080 
(91%) 
110 
(9%) 
1190 60 1250 
 
 Identified  
Pragmatic Non-pragmatic Total 
The British speakers’ data 587 104 691 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data 1080 110 1190 
Total 1667 214 1881 
X
2
=14.620, df=1, p<0.001 
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As can be seen from Table 5.6, overall the Chinese EFL learners use more you know 
than do the British speakers. In addition, the chi-square test shows that the proportion 
of pragmatic uses in the Chinese EFL data is significantly higher. Romero Trillo 
(2002) reports a different statistic finding in comparing adult British and Spanish 
EFL data. In his data, not only do the Spanish learners use markedly less you know 
but their you knows are about 10% less pragmatized (the British data 90.9% and the 
Spanish data 81.8%, respectively). Müller’s (2005) investigation of you know used 
by German advanced EFL learners shows a similar pattern to Romero Trillo’s (2002) 
study. The German learners in her data use 75% less you knows than do the American 
native speakers.  
 
However, it should be pointed out here that like I mean the pragmatic uses of you 
know in the learner’s data also include cases of a deviant use where you know is used 
pragmatically but followed by the complementizer that. As discussed in section 5.5.1, 
the compelmentizer that seems to be just a random choice to the Chinese speakers as 
examples of the same pragmatic function either with or without that are present. In 
the following two examples, A is asking B’s advice as to which of the two job offers 
should be taken. Both of them were coded as ‘introducing a new topic’ although in 
example (5.21) you know is followed by the complementizer that because as can be 
seen from (5.20) and (5.21), the two you knows are used in exactly the same context 
i.e. with you know the speaker moves from the phatic talk to the main theme of the 
talk.  
(5.20) 
A       Hello, Mary. 
B       Hello. 
A       You know we have, I have the chance to work in the government or um ... in the 
joint venture. But I was confused to choose what one to choose. Can you give 
me some suggestions? 
(99-035-19-SECCL 1.0&2.0) 
(5.21) 
A       Eh ... Hi, Umily. 
B       Hi, Alice. 
A       Eh ... You know that it has already take me a long time to look for a job and I 
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have just been offer two, just at the same time. 
B       Oh, is that <that's> real? 
(99-035-07-SECCL 1.0&2.0) 
 
The deviant use of I mean and you know – i.e. both expressions are used 
pragmatically but followed by the complementizer that in this study – seems to be 
the first report of deviant or wrong use of pragmatic markers in L2 English because 
there have been no such cases of learners’ errors  reported in most of the previous 
studies (Hays, 1992; Nikula, 1996; Demirci & Kleiner, 1997; Romero Trillo, 2002; 
Fuller, 2003; Fung & Carter, 2007; Müller, 2005) on learners’ use of pragmatic 
markers in L2 English. Fuller (2003: 203) explicitly points out that in her data “none 
of the individual instances of y’know could be labeled as ‘incorrect’”.  
 
5.2.2 Distributions of the pragmatic functions played by you know in the non-native 
speaker data and the native speaker data 
Table 5.7 shows the distributions of the pragmatic functions of you know in the 
British speakers’ data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data followed by the chi-square 
results of the distributions of the three main categories.  
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Table 5.7 Distributions of the pragmatic functions of you know in the British 
speakers’ data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data  
 Pragmatic functions of you 
know 
The British 
speakers 
 (587) 
The Chinese 
EFL learners 
(1080) 
Hearer-oriented  Assumption correction 1(0.2%) 0(0%) 
Exemplification 40(6.8%) 47(4.4%) 
Explicitness 46(7.8.%) 15(1.4%) 
Reformulation 13(2.2%) 3(0.3%) 
Cause 7(1.2%) 28(2.6%) 
Reason 16(2.7%) 24(2.2%) 
Result 7(1.2%) 3(0.3%) 
Summarization  11(1.9%) 1(0.1%) 
Quotative 29(4.9%) 0(0.0%) 
Introducing background 
information 
11(1.9%) 6(0.6%) 
Seeking confirmation 2(0.3%) 8(0.7%) 
Total  183(31.2%) 135 (12.5%) 
Interactant-relationship-
oriented 
Softener of FTA 13(2.2%) 368(34.1%) 
Interactional repair 2(0.3%) 0(0.0%) 
Justification  41(7.0%) 295(27.3%) 
Conclusion 10(1.7%) 14(1.3%) 
Indicating marked expression 48(8.2%) 2(0.2%) 
Indicating the most likely 
event 
19(3.2%) 2(0.2%) 
Indicating the unspoken 
message to be completed by 
the hearer 
18(3.1%) 0(0.0%) 
Indicating the coming 
message is meant to be 
evaluated 
67(11.4%) 44(4.1%) 
Total  218(37.1%) 725(67.1%) 
Speaker-oriented  Indicating speaker attitude 76(12.9%) 82(7.6%) 
Hesitation marker 44(7.5%) 33(3.1%) 
Restart 39(6.6%) 32(3.0%) 
Approximator  13(2.2%) 0(0.0%) 
Introducing a new topic 14(2.4%) 73(6.8%) 
Total  186(31.7%) 220(20.4%) 
 
 The three main categories 
hearer-oriented 
interactant-relationship-
oriented speaker-oriented Total 
The British speakers’ data 183 218 186 587 
The Chinese EFL learners’ 
data 
136 752 220 1108 
Total 319 970 406 1695 
X
2
= 158.588, df=2, p<0.00l 
As shown by Table 5.7, there are obvious differences between the native speakers 
and the learners in terms of the distributions of individual functions and the results of 
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the chi-square test show that there is a significant difference between them in terms 
of the distribution of the three main categories.  
 
First of all, you know in the learners’ data plays a narrower range of pragmatic 
functions. Instances of quotative, ‘indicating the unspoken message to be completed 
by the hearer’, approximator, assumption correction and interactional repair have not 
been found in the learners’ data.  
 
Secondly, the Chinese learners use the majority of their you knows in a very limited 
number of subfunctions while the subfunctions in the native speaker data are much 
more evenly distributed. Strikingly high proportions of you knows are used to soften 
face-threatening acts (34.1%) and explain why something has been said (27.3%) by 
the Chinese students. There are only two subfunctions ‘indicating speaker attitude’ 
(7.6%) and ‘introducing a new topic’ (6.8%), which are moderately used. The 
remaining subfunctions all show very low frequencies. In contrast, the most frequent 
subfunctions ‘indicating speaker attitude’ and ‘indicating the coming message is 
meant to be evaluated’ in the native speaker data only account for 12.9% and 11.4% 
respectively. There are a number of subfunctions such as ‘indicating marked 
expression’ (8.1%), explicitness (7.8%), hesitation marker (7.5%), justification (7.0%) 
and exemplification (6.8%), which show moderate frequencies.  
 
To sum up, you know in the Chinese EFL learners’ data shows a very different pattern 
from you know in the British speakers’ data. Firstly, you know is markedly 
over-represented and is significantly more pragmatized in the native speaker data. 
Secondly, there is a significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
distribution of the specific functions. Thirdly, the Chinese EFL learners use you know 
in more restricted contexts. 5 (out of 26) subfunctions are absent from the learners’ 
function list. Finally, the Chinese EFL learners tend to use majority of their you 
knows in a very limited number of individual functions while the subfunctions of you 
know in the native speaker data are more evenly distributed. Softener of FTA and 
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justification account for as high as 34.1% and 27.3% respectively in the non-native 
speaker data while the most frequent subfunction in the native speaker data, 
‘indicating speaker attitude’, only accounts for 12.9%.    
 
5.2.3 Distributions of turn positions of you know in non-native speaker data and the 
native speaker data  
Like I mean, you know also occurs in turn initial, turn medial and turn final positions. 
Table 5.8 below shows the distribution of these three positions in the two data sets, 
followed by the chi-square results of the distributions of the three positions. 
Table 5.8 Distributions of turn positions of you know in the British speakers’ data and 
the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 turn positions 
Turn initial turn medial turn final Total 
The British speakers’ data 20(3.4%) 525(89.4%) 42(7.2%) 587 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data 266(24.6%) 753(69.7%) 61(5.6%) 1080 
Total  286 1278 103 1667 
X
2
=120.516, df=2, p<0.00l 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.8 there are some similarities between the native speaker 
data and non-native speaker data. Firstly, both groups show their preference in turn 
medial position. Secondly, both groups use similar proportion of you knows in turn 
final position. In addition, the comparison of co-occurring linkers of turn final you 
knows in the two data sets shows that turn final you knows in both groups tend not to 
work with other linkers. The only exceptions are the 4 cases in the native speaker 
data where you know is used to indicate the unspoken message to be completed by 
the hearer. All these 4 turn final you knows co-occur with so. Example (5.22) is such 
an example. 
(5.22) 
288B    well look the thing is that it's I can tell you now it's highly unlikely to take more 
than fifty pounds  
289B    We're having a few bottles but that's all  
290B    But they're not an alcoholic lot so you know 
291A    More than fifty quid yeah  
(S1A-008-ICE-GB) 
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However, the results of the test show that there is a significant difference between the 
two groups. According to Table 5.8 there is a substantial gap between the two data 
sets in turn initial position. Nearly one in four you knows in the learners’ data is turn 
initial while in the native speaker data turn initial you know only accounts for 3.4%. 
The higher proportion of turn initial you know in the learners’ data is mainly caused 
by the high frequency of the subfunction of softener of FTA where 161 out of 368 
you knows are turn initial.  
 
In addition, as high as 70% (188 out of 266) of turn initial you know in the 
non-native speaker data co-occurs with other linkers compared to 30% (6 out of 20) 
in the native speaker data, which is, again, contributed by the learners’ frequent use 
of softener of FTA where you know is predominantly used as a post-linker 
co-occurring with but. Extract (5.23) is an example of this typical use. In example 
(5.23), A, a first year university student, is asking B’s advice about how to lead a 
better university life. With but and you know, A softens his/her disagreement with 
what B has said about university life and appeals to B to understand why he/she 
disagrees.  
(5.23) 
A       Oh, then you are a sophomore of our department, but I am a freshman, and I feel 
afraid <fraid> in this university, you know, I feel very lonely and I left all my 
friends behind. 
B       Oh, eh ... , don't ... don't be so discouraged. And you know the university life is 
very colorful and eh ... , wonderful life. And I hope that in the time to come, you 
can enjoy <enjoin> your college life. 
A       But you know in my senior middle school, all my teachers and classmates like 
me very much and they care for me. But here all the people around me are 
strangers. I feel much afraid and when my ... when I lay on my bed, I just think 
of my parents, think of my warm home.  
     (00-065-14 SECCL 1.0& 2.0) 
 
The turn initial you know in the learners’ data also co-occurs with a wider range of 
linkers than does that in the native speaker data. Apart from the most frequent linker 
of but, markers of hesitation such as um, eh, er are also frequently used. Other 
moderately used linkers include well, and, oh, because, I think and yeah. 
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Co-occurring items such as in my opinion, maybe, personally, on the other hand, 
firstly and first are very infrequent. In contrast, there are only 6 (out of 20) turn initial 
you knows that have co-occurring linkers in the native speaker data, which include 
well, right, oh, ok, I mean, so, and uh.  
 
The same gap between the two groups is found in turn medial position. The native 
speakers use 20% more of their you knows in turn medial position than do the 
Chinese learners despite the fact that this position is preferred by both of them.  
 
To sum up, there is a significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
three turn positions. Although both groups show the highest frequency in turn medial 
position and a similar frequency in turn final position, the Chinese EFL learners use 
20% more of their you knows in turn initial position and 20% less of them in turn 
medial position.  
 
5.2.4 Distributions of proposition positions of you know in the non-native speaker 
data and the native speaker data  
Like I mean, you know also occurs in the three proposition positions of propositional 
initial, proposition medial and propositional final. Table 5.9 shows the distributions 
of proposition positions of you know in the two data sets, followed by the chi-square 
results of the distributions of the three positions. For both groups, proposition initial 
position shows the highest frequency and proposition medial position shows the 
lowest frequency.  
 
However, the results of the chi-square test show that the two groups show significant 
difference in terms of the distribution of the three proposition positions. You know in 
the native speaker data is more evenly distributed over the three categories than that 
in the learners’ data. So you know in the native speaker data enjoys more freedom as 
to which proposition position it can appear in, while you know in the learners’ data is 
predominantly proposition initial and is particularly restricted in proposition medial 
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position. 
Table 5.9 Distributions of proposition positions of you know in the British speakers’ 
data and the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
 Proposition positions 
proposition initial Proposition medial proposition final Total 
The British speakers’ data 319(54.3%) 114(19.4%) 154(26.2%) 587 
The Chinese EFL learners’ data 913(84.5%) 38(4.5%) 129(11.9%) 1080 
Total  1232 152 283 1667 
X
2
=198.130, df=2, p<0.001 
 
As mentioned earlier, proposition medial position can be further classified into two 
positions, namely ‘between constituents’ and ‘within a constituent’. A comparison of 
these two positions will give a finer description of how the two groups differ in 
proposition medial position. Despite the fact that you know in both corpora prefers to 
appear between constituents, you know is much more evenly distributed over the two 
positions in the native speaker data than in the non-native speaker data. About 40% 
(43 out of 114) proposition medial you knows occur within a constituent in the native 
speakers’ corpus while only 10% (4 out of 38) proposition medial you knows occur 
within a constituent in the learners’ corpus. The following four extracts are examples 
of the two proposition medial positions from the Chinese learners’ data and the 
British speakers’ data respectively. Extract (5.24) is an example where you know 
appears inside the noun phrase ‘English skills’ while extract (5.25) is an example 
where you know occurs inside the noun phrase ‘this image’.   
(5.24) 
B       Oh, I don't think so, using, en, u, u, en, the, the famous <famars> hotel must 
have some forein, foreigners. You see, my, our major were English. There must 
many foreigners <foreigner>, you can practice your English with them. You can 
gain, en, en, gain many en, speaking or en, or other English you know skill, 
skills. 
(05-015-08B-SECLL 1.0& 2.0) 
(5.25) 
248B    And uhm I realise how heavy going they were <,> and partic it wasn’t the right 
thing to be reading at all to her 
249B    And I had sort of had this you know image of how I remembered  
(SLA-013-ICE-GB) 
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In both examples (5.26) and (5.27), you know appears between a copula and its 
complement.  
(5.26) 
A       Oh, you know nowadays many er foreign companies they still pay attention... 
pay very... er... pay a kind of... er special attention on the students' ... er 
voluntary work experience. They will think that this kind of students they will 
willing to help others without payment and this quality is... you know... kind of 
virtue, so this kind of foreign's <foreign> corporation still pay attention to the 
students' this kind of qualities. 
(06-001-19A-SECLL 1.0 & 2.0)  
(5.27) 
        259A     Where whereabouts was it 
        260B     It was just by the market <,> just down some steps 
        261B     It was just you know the market in Cambridge it was yeah  
        (SLA-015-ICE-GB) 
 
These two groups also show great difference in terms of the frequency of 
co-occurring linkers of you know. 44% (476 out of 1080) you knows are used with 
other linkers by the learners while only 22% (131 out of 590) you knows co-occur 
with other linkers in the native speaker data. You know as a medial-linker is least 
used by the native speakers while you know as a pre-linker is the least frequent in the 
learners’ data. However, for both groups you know is most frequently used as a 
post-linker. The following three extracts from the Chinese learners’ data are 
examples of you know as pre-linker, medial-linker and post-linker respectively.  
(5.28) 
B      Yes. The study is the main task in college, but not the whole things. You know 
because en became en tutor or the other kinds of part-time job can accu accurate 
the experience. En and an helpful for them to en enter the society. 
A      I know em you mean you mean that we can go en non a lot from taking a 
part-time job. 
(04-128-24B-SECLL 1.0& 2.0) 
(5.29) 
A      yes, but the life is the most important element, don't you think so? I I I still is a 
little bit afraid about the possibility to meet across the air crash you know. 
B      oh yes, but you know I think um people to people choose to take plane um is 
polite than those who choose to train. 
(03-168-02A-SECLL 1.0& 2.0) 
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(5.30) 
B      Perhaps you are right. But after all, you know it too really depends on the 
decision of their parents. But asked for me, I will try my best to convince Jim the 
fact that he <she> should finish his college education and wait. 
(01-067-30-SECLL 1.0& 2.0) 
 
The two groups also share most of the co-occurring linkers. Among them, but, uhm, 
and, because, well, I think, so and oh are the most frequent ones that co-occur with 
you know in both corpora. Less frequent items for both groups include actually, 
maybe, ok, yeah, and just. However, co-occurring linkers which play textual function 
such as first and firstly only appear in the learners’ data. Sort of, a moderately 
frequent co-occurring linker in the native speaker data, is absent in the learners’ data. 
I mean, the second frequent linker, next to the marker of hesitation uhm in the native 
speaker data rarely occurs in the learners’ data.  
 
To sum up, you know in the native speaker data enjoys much more freedom in 
proposition positions while you know in the Chinese learners’ data is predominately 
proposition initial and very restricted in proposition medial position and very rarely 
occurs within a constituent. Although you knows in both data sets share most of the 
linkers, about 20% more you knows in the learners’ data co-occur with other linkers 
than those in the native speaker data.  
 
In this chapter, I have described how I mean and you know are used by the Chinese 
EFL learners as compared to the British speakers in terms of specific functions they 
play and their positioning. The features of the uses of I mean and you know in the 
learners’ data as compared to the native speaker data are summarized as follows: 
1) In terms of overall frequency, I mean is markedly under-represented and 
significantly less pragmatized in the learners’ data. In contrast, you know is 
markedly over-represented in the Chinese EFL learners’ data and is significantly 
more pragmatized.   
2) In terms of number of subfunctions, both I mean and you know are used in more 
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restricted contexts, which echoes Fung & Carter’s (2007) observation that native 
speakers tend to use pragmatic markers in a wider variety of contexts.  
3) In terms of the distribution of the three main categories, hearer-oriented, 
interactant-relationship-oriented and speaker-oriented, you know in the Chinese 
learners’ data shows significant difference from you know in the native speaker 
data while I mean in the non-native speaker data does not.  
4) With regard to the distribution of individual functions, the learners’ you know 
heavily depends on a very small number of subfunctions while the subfunctions 
of I mean in the learners’ data are more evenly distributed. 
5) As to turn positions, similar to the native speakers, the Chinese learners tend to 
use I mean in turn medial position although they show a less restriction on turn 
final position. Although the Chinese learners also prefer to use you know in turn 
medial position like the British speakers, they show higher frequency in turn 
initial position.  
6) As to proposition positions, like I mean in the native speaker data, I mean in the 
Chinese EFL learners’ data predominantly occurs in proposition initial position, 
but enjoys more freedom in proposition medial and proposition final positions. In 
contrast, you know in the Chinese learners’ data is predominately proposition 
initial and very restricted in proposition medial position and very rarely occurs 
within a constituent. 
7) As to the co-occurring linkers, overall I mean in the non-native speaker data 
tends to be a lot more independent and co-occurs with a much smaller number of 
other linkers than I mean in the native speaker data. In contrast, 20% more you 
knows in the learners’ data co-occur with other linkers than those in the native 
speaker data. 
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Chapter Six  
Accounting for the uses of I mean and you know in the non-native 
speaker data 
This chapter will attempt to account for the characteristics of how I mean and you 
know are used by the Chinese EFL learners as compared to the British speakers. As 
pragmatic markers I mean and you know are very unlikely to be taught in the 
classroom, the accounting for their features in the Chinese learners’ data will be 
approached from the perspective of second language acquisition (SLA). Since L2 
acquisition is highly complex, it is not surprising that previous research in SLA 
shows that there are many variables that can affect learners’ L2 performance. Among 
them, L1 influence and universal constraints and processes are two most widely 
studied variables. So section 6.1 will review major findings revealed by previous 
studies on how these two factors may influence L2 production. Section 6.2 will, then, 
discuss how to establish the role of L1 influences on the Chinese EFL learners’ use of 
I mean and you know. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 will discuss the features of I mean and 
you know in the learners’ data respectively. Finally, section 6.5 will summarize the 
major findings of this chapter.  
 
6.1 Major findings of previous studies on how L1 influence and universal constraints 
and processes may affect L2 acquisition  
L1 influence is one of the most widely studied variables in SLA. There is a good 
reason for assuming that L1 can play a role in L2 acquisition because as Ringbom 
(2007: 1) points out any learning activity, including language learning, is built upon 
prior knowledge. So when people learn a second language, their L1 knowledge 
naturally becomes the prior knowledge they can draw upon. Assumption of how L1 
affects L2 acquisition in 1950s and 1960 is rather straightforward. Researchers 
believed that differences between L1 and L2 should be responsible for L2 learning 
difficulties and a systematic comparison between L1 and L2 would be able to predict 
what errors will be made by L2 learners with a particular L1 background. However, 
subsequent research shows a much more complicated picture of how L1 can affect 
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L2 acquisition.  
 
Firstly, it turns out that differences between L1 and L2 may not lead to L1-induced 
errors. Hyltenstam’s (1977) investigation of negation of 160 beginners who learn 
Swedish as a second language shows that they show the same patterns of negation 
regardless of their L1 backgrounds. In the same time, similarities do not seem to be 
helpful. Some of the Turkish-speaking learners in his study show an initial preference 
for pre-verbal negation although both Turkish and Swedish are post-verbal negation 
languages. Instead, researchers have found that it is those L1-L2 similarities or 
differences perceived by L2 learners rather than those revealed by systematic L1-L2 
comparisons done in Contrastive Analysis that have an impact on L1 transfer i.e. for 
L1 transfer to occur learners need to make “the judgment that something in the native 
language and something in the target language are similar” (Odlin, 2003: 454). 
Singleton’s (1987) case study of a beginner learner of L2 French provides such 
evidence. His data suggest that his subject might be aware that the L2 solutions he 
came up with might not be right because one-third of his transfer errors co-occurred 
with indications of uncertainty such as hesitation and interrogative intonation. When 
he was asked to listen to his own errors, he commented “I knew that it probably 
wasn’t right, but it was the nearest I could get to something that might be right” 
(Singleton, 1987: 335).  
 
Secondly, comparison between L1 acquisition and L2 acquisition shows that there 
are universal developmental forces which constrain both L1 acquisition and L2 
acquisition i.e.. L1 acquisition and L2 acquisition actually follow the same natural 
developmental paths. For instance, as Ortega (2009: 34) points out L1 English 
children will make errors such as runned or the car was crashed also appear before 
they arrive at the final competence. The same errors are also found in the speech and 
writing of adult learners of English with different L1 backgrounds.  
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Another universal force which can control both L1 and L2 is markedness, which 
refers to “ a closed set of possibilities within a linguistic system, where the given 
possibilities rank from simplest and most frequent across languages of the world, or 
unmarked, to most complex and most rare, or marked” (Ortega, 2009: 37). For 
example, voiced stops are considered as marked as compared to voiceless stops. /b/, 
/d/ and /g/ in tab, seed and bag are voiced stops while /p/, /t/ and /k/ in tap, seat, and 
back are voiceless stops. According to Ortega (2009:37) voiced finals are considered 
marked because all languages have some voiceless stops while only some languages 
have both voiced and voiceless stops, and there is no language which has voiced 
stops without also having voiceless ones. She goes on to point out that children 
whose L1 has both voiced and voiceless stops will acquire the unmarked form, 
voiceless stops, first. The same acquisition order also applies to L2 learners.  
 
Although L1 influence cannot override the natural developmental path of L2 
acquisition, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that L1 influence can affect the 
rate of learners’ progress of acquisition i.e. L1 influence can either delay or facilitate 
the progress of L1 acquisition. Spada and Lightbown’s (1999) study provides 
evidence for the negative impact that L1 influence can impose on L2 acquisition. 
Their study shows that L1 French learners’ acquisition of formation of English 
questions is delayed by the way that French questions are formed.  
 
However, compared to the negative effects that L1 influence may have, the 
facilitative effects of L1 knowledge can easily be ignored because L1-induced errors 
against the norm of target language (TL) are easier to spot while L1 facilitating 
learning is much more difficult to notice (Ringbom, 2007: 2). Ringbom (2007) 
studies how English as a L2 is acquired in Finland, which he believes is an ideal 
place to investigate how language proximity i.e. similarities between L1 and L2 can 
facilitate L2 acquisition because there are two co-existing groups of learners i.e. L1 
Finnish and L1 Swedish EFL learners in Finland. Swedish is very close to English 
because they both belong to Germanic languages while Finnish can be seen as a 
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language unrelated to English because Finnish is an agglutinative language. 
Ringbom’s (2007) investigation shows that Swedes overall show great advantage 
over Finns in learning English. Wayland and Guion’s (2004) experiment reports 
similar findings. In their experiment, both native speakers of English and native 
speakers of Chinese were taught Thai high and low tones. After training they were 
asked to identify these two tones. The result shows that the native speakers of 
Chinese outperformed the native speakers of English. The better performance of the 
Chinese speakers can be due to the fact that the Chinese language, like Thai, is also a 
tonal language while English is more distant to Thai.  
 
To sum up, previous research in SLA shows that L1 influence can be a factor that 
affects L2 acquisition, but it cannot override universal developmental processes in 
acquisition of all human languages such as developmental sequences and 
markednesss. However, as Ortega (2009: 51) points out “to ascribe all interlanguage 
forms attested in a given data set to either the L1 or universal influence may be a 
futile enterprise. There are too many variables that affect the amount of L1 transfer 
that materializes for a given learner”. Following this idea, this study assumes that L2 
production can be seen as the result of the interaction of all potential factors and the 
importance of a certain factor varies from one L2 phenomenon to another. As will be 
seen in the following discussion, in addition to universal developmental processes 
and L1 influence, other potential variables that have been identified in this study 
include discourse types, learners’ L2 proficiency and even the co-occurring linguistic 
elements of pragmatic markers.  
 
6.2 Method of establishing the role of L1 influence on the Chinese EFL learners’ uses 
of I mean and you know 
To establish the role of L1 influences in L2 acquisition, one method is to compare the 
particular structure in the native language, the target language and the interlanguage 
(Odlin, 2003: 445). Selinker (1969) has successfully used this approach. By 
comparing a number of structures in Hebrew children’s L2 English, their native 
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speech and native English data, Selinker finds that the interlanguage data resemble 
the word order of Hebrew significantly more than the word order of the target 
language. But for this study, such a comparison cannot be made because there is no 
parallel L1 data available. However, to have a rough idea of how the learners’ L1 
might affect their uses of I mean and you know, a general picture of how the Chinese 
equivalents of these two markers, wode yisi shi (my meaning is) and ni zhidao (you 
know), are used in the Chinese language is needed. Unfortunately, there are very few 
studies of wode yisi shi and ni zhidao available in Chinese studies. As a result, to 
obtain a crude picture of them I decided to carry out a small-scale study of them. 
Since I did not have access to face to face conversations in Chinese, a corpus of 
Chinese scripts of films and TV dramas from a script trading website, 
http://www.juben.cn, was used instead. Therefore, any findings of potential L1 
influences here are only suggestive.  
 
The Chinese corpus of scripts consists of about one million characters. It has to be 
pointed out here that the size of the Chinese corpus is counted on the basis of number 
of characters rather than words because unlike English there is no space between 
words in the Chinese language and a word can have one character or more. Wode yisi 
shi consists of five characters or three words while ni zhidao consists of three 
characters or two words. Therefore, instead of a direct comparison between the 
frequency of I mean in English and that of wode yisi shi in Chinese, frequencies of 
the other pragmatic marker in this study you know and its Chinese equivalent ni 
zhidao need to be used as references and vice versa.  
 
The presentation of Chinese examples in this study follows the conventions set up by 
Li & Thompson (1981). Each Chinese sentence has two lines of English below. For 
the sake of easier reading, the Chinese sentence is transcribed in Pinyin (used in 
Mainland China) without tone markers rather than in Chinese characters. The first 
line of English translation consists of the most literal English equivalents of each 
Chinese element while the second line offers a proper English translation which 
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attempts to retain the meaning of the Chinese sentence as much as it can. Since this 
study only focuses on pragmatic functions of wode yisi shi and ni zhidao, only a 
couple of abbreviated terms are used in the transcription to represent those Chinese 
monosyllabic words which do not have direct English translations; these do not have 
semantic meanings; but carry grammatical meanings or pragmatic meanings. The 
abbreviated terms are NEG, CL and PRT, which stand for negation, classifier and 
particle respectively.  
 
6.3 Accounting for the uses of I mean in the non-native speaker data  
For the learners in this study, one developmental universal process that could 
influence the learners’ acquisition of I mean is the congruence between the semantic 
meaning and the pragmatic function of I mean i.e. those pragmatic functions which 
can be easily derived from the semantic meaning of I mean should be easier for the 
learners to acquire because the more transparent the pragmatic meaning is the less 
difficult the learning task is.  
 
The notion ‘congruence’ here is borrowed from studies done on the development of 
L2 morphology. Ortega (2009) cites studies done on L2 English to support the 
Aspect Hypothesis formulated by Andersen and Shirai (1996), which predicts that 
“the developmental pathway of emergence of tense and aspect will reflect 
prototypical pairings, that is, combinations where the semantics of the verb 
morphology is congruent with the semantics of the meaning of the verb to which the 
morphology is attached” (Ortega, 2009: 127). For instance, it is found that in L2 
English, the combination of imperfective marking -ing, which has a prototypical 
durative meaning, with verbs depicting events that imply duration, such as run, walk, 
sing or watch, emerges first in interlanguage.  
 
In order to show how congruence affects the learners’ production of I mean, all the 
subfunctions of I mean are regrouped on the basis of the congruence between the 
pragmatic meaning and the semantic meaning of I mean. Table 6.1 below is the 
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reclassification, which is made over a continuum of congruence rather than a 
dichotomy because as Schiffrin (1987) points out the literal meaning of I mean not 
only influences its function of marking a speaker’s upcoming modification of the 
meaning of his/her own prior talk but also is responsible for its use with self repair 
(Schiffrin, 1987: 296, 300).  
Table 6.1 Reclassification of the pragmatic functions of I mean on the basis of 
congruence between pragmatic meaning and semantic meaning of I mean  
 The British data 
(686) 
The Chinese EFL 
data 
(82) 
More congruent: overall total 371 54% 59 72% 
 
 
 
 
Repair 
Message 
correction 
Assumption correction 73 10.6% 3 3.7% 
Interactional repair 22 3.2% 3 3.7% 
Transactional repair 32 4.7% 7 8.5% 
Total Correction 127 18.5% 13 15.9% 
Discourse 
Editing 
Hesitation marker 9 1.3% 5 6.1% 
Restart 90 13.1% 7 8.5% 
Total Editing 99 14.4% 12 14.6% 
Total Repair 226 32.9% 24 30.5% 
Expansion of ideas  Explicitness 42 6.1% 13 15.9% 
Exemplification  48 7.0% 1 1.2% 
Reformulation  16 2.3% 9 11% 
Total Expansion 106 15.4% 23 28.1% 
Softener of FTA 39 5.7% 12 14.6% 
Less congruent : overall total 315 46% 23 28% 
Because Reason 24 3.5% 1 1.2% 
Cause 8 1.2% 1 1.2% 
Justification 191 27.8% 14 17.1% 
  223 32.5% 16 19.5% 
So/thus Result 2 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Conclusion 13 1.9% 4 4.9% 
Summarization  10 1.5% 2 2.4% 
 25 3.7% 6 7.3% 
Indicating speaker attitude 51 7.4% 0 0.0 
Quotative  2 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Resumption  14 2.0% 0 0.0% 
 
The reason that repair and expansion of ideas, which correspond to Brinton’s 
category of  appositional meanings are considered as more congruent is because 
they are the closest to the literal meaning of I mean (Brinton, 2007: 45). Softener of 
FTA is put under the same category because it can be seen as a kind of reformulation 
at the level of speech act rather than the content. The last three subfunctions, 
‘indicating speaker attitude’, quotative and resumption, in the less congruent 
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category can be seen as the least congruent because they seem to have the least link 
with either modification of upcoming talk or repair.  
 
The general picture of the acquisition of I mean seems to support the prediction that 
the more congruent pragmatic functions of I mean should be easier for the learners to 
acquire. As shown by Table 6.1 the learners use about 20% more of their I means in 
the more congruent category and 20% less in the less congruent category. The only 
four subfunctions that did not appear in the learners’ data are all under the less 
congruent category.  
 
The above discussion seems to suggest that the universal constraint i.e. the 
congruence between the pragmatic meaning and semantic meaning of I mean does 
have an impact on the Chinese EFL learners’ acquisition of the specific functions of I 
mean. But it appears that the congruence cannot account for why I mean is markedly 
under-represented and significantly less pragmatized in the learners’ data. The 
following comparison of I mean in the L1 English data, I mean in the L2 English 
data and wode yisi shi in the L1 Chinese data seems to indicate that the learners’ L1 
influence can be responsible for the Chinese EFL learners’ avoidance of I mean.  
 
Table 6.2 below shows frequencies of I mean and you know in the learners’ 
conversations and frequencies of wode yisi shi and ni zhidao in the Chinese data. As 
can be seen from table 6.2, like I mean in the L2 English data, wode yisi shi shows a 
very low frequency in the L1 Chinese data as compared to ni zhidao.  
Table 6.2 Frequencies of I mean and you know in the Chinese EFL learner’s data 
and frequencies of wode yisi shi and ni zhidao in the native Chinese data  
Pragmatic 
markers 
The Chinese 
EFL learners’ 
data 
Chinese equivalents  The Chinese 
data 
I mean 99 wode yisi shi  26 
You know 1247 Ni zhidao 413 
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A closer look at how wode yisi shi is used in the L1 Chinese data seems to suggest 
that wode yisi shi is not typically used as a pragmatic marker in Chinese, which, 
again, could inhibit the learners from using I mean in their L2 English and also 
explain why I mean is less pragmatized in the learners’ data. In order to get a better 
picture of how wode yisi shi is used, Webcorp was used to search the same script 
trading site, http//www.juben.cn, so as to generate more examples of wode yisi shi. 
With the help of Webcorp, another 27 instances of wode yisi shi were extracted. 
Among the 53 cases of wode yisi shi, 38 (72%) were found to be used semantically 
i.e. wode yisi shi is literally used to specify the speaker’s meaning. Example (6.1) is a 
typical case where wode yisi shi comes in the response to an unintended 
interpretation of what the other person has just said.  
(6.1) 
     A    konglong!  ni   shi  zhege  sheshui   de   konglong! 
          Dinosaur!  you  be   this   society  PRT  dinosaur!  
          Dinosaur!  You are the dinosaur in this society! 
     B      ni   zhe  shi  shenme  yisi ? 
            You  this  be   what   meaning  
            What do you mean by this? 
     A      Oh!  Wode  yisi    shi…xianzai xiang  ni  zhiyang  de     
            Oh!   my  meaning  be   now   like  you  such   PRT 
nühaizi  zhengshi  tai  shangyou  le  
girl       really   too  rare     PRT 
Oh! I mean people can hardly see girls like you nowadays!  
( http//www.juben.cn)  
Example (6.1) is a conversation between A, a young man and B, a young woman. By 
saying that A is a dinosaur, B means that A is an exceptionally good girl. But 
apparently B does not take it as a compliment but asks A to clarify why she is being 
called a dinosaur. So here wode yisi shi is used to specify the speaker’s meaning.  
 
Example (6.2) is the only example of wode yisi shi cited in Wang and Ge’s study 
(2004) on Chinese discourse markers, the only one that I have found to discuss wode 
yisi shi in Chinese studies. As can be seen from example (6.2), wode yisi shi, again, is 
used to specify the speaker’s meaning. Instead of directly answering whether he/she 
will go to the library, M3 uses a marker of hesitation to indicate that he/she does not 
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understand why M1 asks the question. With wode yisi shi, M1 explains why the 
question is asked.  
(6.2) 
     M1      ni    xiaowu    qu  tushuguan  ma? 
              you  afternoon   go  library    PRT 
              Are you going to the library this afternoon? 
     M3      En… 
              Er… 
              Er… 
     M1      wode  yisi    shi,   ni  ruguo qu  tushuguan,  jiu   shunbian  
              My  meaning  be   you  if   go  library     just  by the way 
bang  wo  xuejie  yi   xia   ka   shang   de    shu 
help  me  renew  one  CL   card   on    PRT  book 
I mean if you go to the library, I’d like to ask you to renew the books on 
the card for me 
(Wang and Ge, 2004: 120) 
However, example (6.2) is treated as a case of pragmatic use of wode yisi shi in their 
study where wode yisi shi seems to be regarded as a discourse marker in Chinese 
simply because its English equivalent is a discourse marker. There is no discussion as 
to how to distinguish the semantic use of wode yisi shi from its pragmatic use in their 
study.  
 
The typical context of wode yisi shi shown by the above examples (6.1) and (6.2) 
actually reveals the key difference between wode yisi shi in L1 Chinese and I mean 
in L1 English i.e. I mean tends to occurs in self-initiated self-repair while wode yisi 
shi is more likely to occur in other-initiated self-repair. According to Schegloff et al. 
(1977) self-initiated self-repair is the most preferred and most common repair in 
conversation, which means in L1 English the speaker can use I mean whenever 
he/she needs to make a correction. In contrast, the speaker in L1 Chinese will not use 
wode yisi shi until he/she is told/hinted by the hearer that some clarification is needed. 
So this could be the reason for the low frequency of wode yisi shi in L1 Chinese, 
which in turn, can be seen as a factor that prevents wode yisi shi from further being 
pragmatized.  
 
 
 
182 
When wode yisi shi behaves more like a pragmatic marker, it is not used to respond 
to what the other speaker has said and it typically occurs in turn medial position and 
between two propositions. Example (6.3) is such a case where wode yisi shi is very 
similar to its English equivalent.  
(6.3) 
     A     zhe zhong shiqing zenme  bu    fen        bici?  
           This kind  thing   how  NEG distinguish  each other 
           How can we share this?  
           Xiaoshang  ke   shi  ge   ren   a    ! 
           Name    PRT  be  CL  man  PRT 
           Xiaoshang  is a man (as opposed to an object)! 
     B     ni xianzai hai mei  dui ta  biaoshi, Xiaoshang  ye  mei biaoxian chu  
           You now still NEG  to him express,  Name   either NEG show  PRT 
           You haven’t expressed to him yet, Xiaoshang hasn’t shown who he prefers  
dui  shui  you   haogan.  
to   who  have  preference 
either.  
Wode  yisi   shi,  women gongping jingzheng  ba ? 
My  meaning  be   we   fair     compete  PRT? 
I mean let’s have a fair competition, shall we?  
(http//www.juben.cn) 
Both A and B are female and they are friends. They fall in love with the same man 
Xiaoshang. B thinks it would be fair to have a competition between them because A 
has not told Xiaoshang that she likes him and Xiaoshang has not explicitly said who 
he prefers either. B’s suggestion of having a competition is a conclusion drawn from 
her previous message. So this example can be coded as a case of conclusion.  
 
Apart from the developmental force i.e. the congruence between semantic meaning 
and pragmatic meaning of I mean and the L1 influences, there are other potential 
variables which could contribute to the learners’ pattern of I mean. As can be seen 
from Table 6.1 above, the higher use of the more congruent category is mainly 
contributed by the higher use of expansion of ideas and softener of FTA. The learners 
use a higher proportion of their I means in expanding their ideas than do the British 
speakers. But the subfunction of expanding ideas by giving further examples is 
substantially underproduced. One possible reason for the avoidance of this 
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subfunction could be because of the co-occurring linkers of I mean. When 
functioning in exemplification in the British data, I mean is found to work with other 
linkers in 44% of cases (21 out of 48) and the most frequent linkers are conjunctives 
such as for example, say and like whose main function is to introduce examples. 
Compared to I mean, these conjunctives can be seen as more transparent markers. As 
the previous studies (Hays, 1992; Nikula, 1996; Fung & Carter, 2007) of learners’ 
use of pragmatic markers show that learners tend to use more transparent markers, 
the Chinese learners would be more likely to use for example rather than I mean, 
either on its own or in combination when they need to introduce examples. In 
contrast, when functioning in explicitness and reformulation, I mean in the native 
speaker data is more independent. There are only 21% (9 out of 42) cases of 
explicitness and 19% (3 out of 16) cases of reformulation where I mean co-occurs 
with other linkers. Therefore, the factor of co-occurring linkers would be less likely 
to discourage the learners from using I mean in the more congruent subfunctions of 
explicitness and reformulation.   
 
The learners show a proportionally higher use of the subfunction of softener of FTA 
than the British speakers. Apart from the fact that this subfunction is rather close to 
the semantic meaning of I mean, its over-representation could also be due to the tasks 
that the Chinese EFL learners were asked to do in the oral exams. As can be seen 
from Table 6.3 below, which shows the list of tasks in the learners’ data, the students 
were asked to perform three types of tasks, asking for advice, discussing or arguing 
with their partners. In most of the topics the students were made to take opposite 
views. For instance, in 2001 task if one student said he/she believed that high school 
graduates should study abroad then his/her partner would have to argue against it. As 
a result, the learners had to perform more FTAs such as disagreeing or turning down 
suggestions.  
 
Although the learners and the British speakers use a similar percentage of I means in 
editing their on-line production, the learners’ editing is rather evenly divided between 
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hesitation marker and restart while the native speakers edit their talk mainly through 
restart. One possible reason for the over-representation of hesitation marker could be 
relevant to the learners’ proficiency level. As intermediate learners, apparently they 
need to hesitate more when speaking in a foreign language during an exam.  
Table 6.3 Topics of role-plays in the Chinese EFL learners’ data  
Year Topic of the role play 
1996 Discuss with your partner if second-year students should apply take part-time jobs.  
1997 Ask your friend for advice on whether to attend an English speech contest  
1999 Ask your friend for advice on how to make decision between two job offers. 
2000 Being a new student, you ask a second-year student for advice on how to live your 
university life 
2001 You and your friend are discussing if high school graduates should study abroad. 
2002 You argue with your friend on the issue that if the geology department should 
admit 30 male and 5 female while the overall scores of female students are higher. 
2003 You ask your friend for advice on whether you should travel by air or by train. 
2004 Discuss with your partner who should pay university tuition fee, students or their 
parents. 
2005 Argue with your partner if university student should apply for a bellboy of a 
famous hotel, which offers 3000RMB salary. 
2006 Discuss with your friend whether to work for money or do some voluntary work in 
the coming summer vacation. 
 
Another reason for the over-representation I mean as a hesitation marker might be 
that I mean in the learners’ data plays the role on its own because it rarely co-occurs 
with other linkers. In contrast, I mean in the native speaker data seems only playing a 
supporting role, because in over half of the cases it co-occurs with other linkers. 
Among them the most frequent one is you know, one of whose main functions is 
being a hesitation marker (for details see section 4.2.2.3.1).The following two 
examples are typical ones from the native speaker data and the learners’ data which 
were quoted above as examples (4.40) and (5.19) (repeated here for convenience) 
respectively. 
(4.40)  
127A    And the physical contact out there is is the only<unclear-words>problem of being 
isolated in your <,> wheelchair  
128B    Uhm  
129B    Uh uh in a in a chair s  
130A    Uhm  
131B    I think so  
132B    Yes  
133B    I mean I think uhm space is you know I mean <,> you know just the obstacles 
that you have in a room 
 
 
185 
(S1A-003-ICE-GB) 
(5.19)  
A       But it’s really a chance for for me to have a….a….a… I mean explanation. 
 (01-008-25-SECLL) 
 
As mentioned earlier, all the four subfunctions that have not been transferred are 
under the less congruent category. But unlike result, quotative, and resumption, 
which all show very low frequency in the native speaker data, indicating speaker 
attitude is rather frequently used by the native speakers. One reason that learners’ 
data fails to display an instance of this may be because the learners would not see 
any need for this subfunction due to the fact that I mean is simply used as an 
indicator and the speaker attitude is actually expressed by the upcoming message 
itself. As discussed in section 4.1.2.3.5, there are three types of speaker attitudes 
prefaced by I mean. The following are examples of the three speaker attitudes 
identified in the native speaker data, which were quoted above as example (4.43), 
(4.45), (4.46) respectively (repeated here for convenience).  
(4.43)  
105A    And I've got masses of vases I could have lent her  
106E    Yeah we used to buy Mum a vase every year for her birthday  
107A    Yes  
108E    So we got uh inundated with them  
109E    We never use any of them hardly  
110E    I mean it's just amazing  
(S1A-019-ICE-GB) 
(4.45) 
290D    This looks delicious  
291A    Don't think makes that much difference <unclear-words>  
292D    Very on time <,,> 
293B    Well <,> one of us was  
294C    Mm  
295D    I mean <,> you were very on time  
296D    You were <,>  
297D    Absolutely on time 
(S1A-022-ICE-GB) 
(4.46)  
136B    I shall have the dry first liquid second   
137B    I I I shall try that  
138B    Have a go at this <,,> whi which has a kind of colour that I was born to appreciate  
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139B    I mean I love it  
(S1A-056-ICE-GB)  
Example (4.43) is an instance of signaling speaker’s evaluation or judgment, the 
most common speaker attitude identified in this study. Speaker E’s attitude is clearly 
expressed by the adjective ‘amazing’ and the adverb ‘just’, which is “never 
semantically neutral but has an evaluative overlay” (Aijmer, 2002: 158). In example 
(4.45), the speaker attitude indicated by I mean is expressing emphasis. The 
emphasis is explicitly expressed by repetition of ‘very on time’ and adverb 
‘absolutely’ in lines 295 and 296. So in both examples, the learners could perceive I 
mean as a superfluous expression.  
 
Example (4.46) is an instance where I mean prefaces the attitude of sincerity, which 
is very rarely found in the native speaker data. I mean here can be translated as ‘I’m 
serious when I say it’. So this is a subfunction where the pragmatic meaning of I 
mean derives from the sense of ‘mean’, ‘to be serious about what the speaker is 
saying or writing’. But yisi in wode yisi shi, the Chinese equivalent of ‘mean’ does 
not cover this sense. In other words, to express the same meaning of ‘I mean I love it’ 
in Chinese, different lexical entities rather than wode yishi need to be used instead. 
So this might prevent the Chinese learners from using I mean to indicate sincerity in 
L2 English.  
 
In sum, the above discussion of the uses of I mean in the non-native speaker data 
suggests that the pattern of the Chinese learners’ I mean is shaped by the interaction 
of various factors. Firstly, it seems that the congruence between pragmatic meaning 
and semantic meaning of I mean plays the key role. Since most subfunctions of I 
mean are influenced by its semantic meaning, 14 out of 18 subfunctions have been 
successfully transferred, although at a much lower level of overall frequency than in 
the British speakers’ data. The more congruent category is proportionally 
over-represented while the less congruent category is under-represented. The four 
subfunctions that have not emerged in the learners’ conversations are all under the 
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less congruent category. Three of them can be seen as the least congruent ones 
because the connection between the pragmatic function and semantic meaning is 
almost opaque.  
 
Secondly, the influence of the learners’ L1 seems to be responsible for the marked 
overall under-representation of I mean in the learners’ data because the small scale 
study of wode yisi shi, the Chinese equivalent of I mean shows that wode yisi shi is 
also very infrequent in the native Chinese data. In addition, the analysis of how it is 
used seems to suggest that it may not (yet) qualify as a pragmatic marker in the 
Chinese language because it shows very low frequency and it is used semantically in 
over 70% of cases.  
 
Thirdly, there are also a few other variables which could account for 
under-representation or over-representation of certain subfunctions. For instance, the 
learners’ L2 proficiency level could potentially lead to the over-representation of I 
mean as a hesitation marker. The fact that the learners’ data is predominately 
argumentative could cause the over-representation of softener of FTA. The 
co-occurring linkers of I mean could be the reason why the learners avoid using I 
mean in exemplification.  
   
6.3 Accounting for the uses of you know in the non-native speaker data  
As argued in section 6.2 above the congruence between pragmatic meaning and 
semantic meaning of I mean can be seen as one major factor that shapes the learners’ 
uses of I mean, but the accounting for the uses of you know will consider L1 
influence as a major factor instead. This is because firstly it seems that this universal 
constraint may not apply to you know because as mentioned earlier the appealing 
function of you know, which can be easily derived from the semantic meaning of you 
know, can be extracted from all the specific pragmatic functions of you know. In 
other words, all the subfunctions of you know can be seen as equally congruent to the 
semantic meaning of you know. Secondly, it seems that L1 influence may play a 
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more important role in shaping the learners’ uses of you know than those of I mean 
because in contrast to I mean, which cannot be literally translated into Chinese and 
whose Chinese equivalent may not even be considered as a pragmatic marker in the 
Chinese language, nizhidao, the Chinese equivalent and also the literal translation of 
you know, is a frequently used pragmatic marker in Chinese (Tao, 2003; Liu, 2005; 
Yang, 2007).  
 
As will be seen in the following comparison between you know in the learners’ L2 
English and ni zhidao in the native Chinese data, striking similarities between them 
emerge, which may indicate that L1 influence does play a very important role in 
shaping the Chinese learners’ uses of you know.  
 
The first striking feature of you know in the learners’ data revealed in section 5.2 is 
that it is markedly over-represented. Similarly, according to Table 6.2 (repeated here 
for convenience) below, ni zhidao is also very frequently used as compared to wode 
yisi shi in the native Chinese data.  
Table 6.2 Frequencies of I mean and you know in the learner’s data and 
frequencies of wode yisi shi and ni zhidao in the Chinese data  
Pragmatic 
markers 
The Chinese EFL 
learners’ data 
Chinese equivalents  The Chinese data 
I mean 99 wode yisi shi  26 
You know 1247 Ni zhidao 413 
Secondly, you know is significantly more pragmatized in the Chinese EFL learners’ 
data. Although as shown by Table 6.4, which shows the distribution of pragmatic 
cases and non-pragmatic cases of ni zhidao in the native Chinese data, ni zhidao is 
much less pragmatized than you know in the learners’ L2 English or you know in the 
L1 English data (nizhidao 24%, you know in L2 English, 91% and you know in L1 
English, 85%, respectively), a further analysis of non-pragmatic cases of nizhidao 
seems to suggest that the lower percentage of pragmatic use of ni zhidao could well 
be caused by discourse type. 
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Table 6.4 Distribution of pragmatic cases and non-pragmatic cases of ni zhidao in the 
native Chinese data  
Pragmatic cases Non-pragmatic cases Total  
99 (24%) 314(76%) 413 
 Rhetorical 
question 
Yes-no question 
and wh-question 
Statements  
75 (24%) 158(50%) 81(26%) 314 
Rhetorical questions, like example (6.4) accounting for 24% in the semantic use of 
nizhidao, would be very unlikely to occur in the learners’ conversation where the 
Chinese students are asked to argue with each other most of the time.  
(6.4) 
Ni zhidao wo  duome     xiang  ni ma?   Ni  zhidao  wo  duome    nanguo ma? 
You know  I   how much  miss  you PAR? You  know   I  how much  upset PAR? 
Do you know how much I miss you? Do you know how upset I am?  
                                                  (http://www. juben.cn)  
Again, half of the semantic cases of nizhidao are either yes-no questions like 
example (6.5) or (6.6) or wh-questions like example (6.7), which would be more 
frequent in more narrative discourse than the learners’ conversation.  
(6.5) 
Ni   zhidao   tade  guoqu ma? 
You  know    his   past  PRT? 
Do you know his past?  
                          (http://www. juben.cn)   
(6.6) 
     Zhe   ni zhidao  ma? 
     This  you know  PRT? 
     Do you know this?  
                               (http://www. juben.cn) 
(6.7) 
     Ni   zhidao  ta  zhu    naer  ma? 
     You  know   he  live  where  PRT? 
     Do you know where he lives? 
                               (http://www. juben.cn) 
Although Tao (2003: 298) claims that nizhidao, the Chinese equivalent of you know, 
is used as a pragmatic marker like you know in English, but is less pragmatized than 
you know, he does not provide the distribution of pragmatic cases and non-pragmatic 
cases in his study. Nor do other studies on nizhidao (Liu, 2005; Yang, 2007).  
 
Another distinctive feature of how you know is used by the Chinese learners is that 
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vast majority of their you knows are used for just a small number of subfunctions, 
which actually roughly matches the picture of nizhidao described by Liu(2005) or the 
analysis of this study. As shown by Table 5.7 in section 5.2.2, you know in the 
learners’ data is mainly used in softener of FTA, justification, indicating speaker 
attitude and introducing a new topic among the 24 identified subfunctions. Liu (2005) 
gives a rather detailed corpus-based account of nizhidao in her PhD thesis. Her data 
consists of recorded face-to-face conversations, telephone conversations, TV 
interviews, TV dramas and dialogues from novels. But her corpus is counted by size 
of the audio files rather than the number of characters. There are three main 
pragmatic functions of nizhidao identified in her study. The first function is to get the 
hearer’s attention, which is similar to the subfunction of introducing a new topic in 
this study given her cited examples. Example (6.8) is one of them.  
(6.8) 
(Liu, Gao and Huang used to be postgraduate students of master in the same university. Although 
they studied different subjects, they were acquaintances because they had attended the same 
English class.) 
    Gao1     zenmeyang,  du    bo   lei  bu   lei? 
             How       read  PhD  tired NEG tired? 
             How about you? Is it tiring to do a PhD? 
    Liu1     lei,     tebie    lei,  erqie  yali      tebie da  
             Tired,   very   tired,  and  pressure   very big 
             Yes, I’m very tired and also under great pressure. 
    Gao2     ei  ni zhidao ma,   Huang  si  le 
              Oh, you know PRT,  Huang  die PRT 
              Oh, you know Huang has died.   
    Liu1      a?      zenme keneng,   ta bu   shi  kaoshang boshi  le   ma? 
              What?   How  possible  he NEG  be  qualify  PhD  PRT  PRT? 
              What? How come? He has just been admitted into the PhD program, hasn’t he?  
                              (Liu, 2005: 109, cited as example (135)) 
In example (6.8), Gao moves from asking about Liu’s PhD study to a new topic 
about Huang who has just died.  
 
In both her second and third functions, the message introduced by nizhidao serves 
the purpose of giving further explanation so that it would be easier for the hearer to 
understand the prior message. But under her second category, a distinction is made as 
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to whether the information marked by nizhidao is likely to be known by the hearer or 
not while in her third category the information marked by nizhidao is shared by the 
speaker and hearer. As mentioned earlier, the analysis in this study is more concerned 
about the potential logical relationship between the linked messages than whether the 
upcoming message is known by the hearer or shared by interactants or not. Given the 
examples cited under her last two categories, most nizhidaos are used in cause-effect 
relationship and can be classified under the subfunction of justification in this study. 
Example (6.9) and (6.10) are quoted in her second category. They would be coded as 
reason and justification respectively.  
(6.9)  
( Li is telling his wife the story of a group of people who he met on a plane.) 
   Li   tamen haoxiang  shi  diyi  ci   zuo feiji ,  mei ge  ren   dou  zi    bei    
        They  seem    be   first  CL  sit plane  each CL person  all  self  prepare 
        It seemed that it’s the first time for them to take a flight. Each of them bought his own 
        de    kuangquan shui,  xiangchang  shenme de.  
        PRT  mineral water    sausage     so on  PRT 
        mineral water, sausage and so on 
        ….. zhe    shi    fuwuyuan  songcan  lai   le,  
        ….. This  time    steward   serve meal PRT PRT 
           Then the stewards started to serve meal  
         tamen  ke   langbei  le,      yi  ren   nan  yi ge kuanquanshui  pingzi,  
         they  very embarrassed PRT   each person hold one CL mineral water  bottle 
         they were very embarrassed, each of them held a bottle of mineral water 
 mei difang  fang  nizhidao ba.  
         no  place  put  you know PRT 
         There was no place for them to put their bottles you know.  
In example (6.9), the message marked by nizhiao explains why they had to hold their 
mineral water bottles. So nizhidao in this example would be coded as reason.  
(6.10) 
(Wang is on a diet) 
     Child    baba, wo ma  zuo  de  shaoniurou  ke  haochi  le,   ni chang yi kou ba.  
             Dad, my mum cook PRT stewed beef very delicious PRT you  try one CL PRT 
             Dad, the stewed beef cooked by mum is so delicious. Why not have a taste of it? 
     Wang   qu qu qu  bie duan  zhe  wan  zai wo yan   qian  huang.  
             Go go go NEG hold PRT bowl  in my eyes  front  move  
             Go away. Don’t let me see the bowl.   
wo kan  zhe  fang     ni zhidao ba. 
              I  see  PRT annoyed  you know PRT 
              It is very annoying to see it you know.  
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             ganjin qu chi qu,   chiwang  le  jiu  qu  zuo gongke    qu,   kuai qu. 
             Hurry go eat PRT   eat up  PRT then  go  do homework  go   quick go  
             Go and eat it quickly. Do your homework after you finish eating. Hurry up.  
Nizhidao in this example is used to justify why Wang told his child to leave him 
alone.  
 
Extract (6.11) is an example from her third category and can be recoded as 
justification.   
(6.11) 
(At a teacher’s office) 
Teacher     wo renwei shouxian   yao   zuo  de  shi, xiang ba zhe liang haizi chaisan,  
       I   think  first    should   do  PRT  be first PRT this two kid  separate  
       I think what we should do first is to separate these two kids  
       bu   xu   tamen  gao  dao   yiqi  
       NEG allow  them  play PRT   together   
       and stop them from playing together.  
Parent      wo hen  ganxie xuexiao  de peihe,      dashi  yao  wo  xiaminglin  
       I very   thank  school PRT cooperation,  but  ask   me  give an order  
       I am very grateful for the cooperation of the school, but if you ask me to stop  
       bu  xu   tamen  jiezhu,  zuihao hai  you yixie shishizaizaide zhengming  
       Neg allow  them  contact  best  PRT have some  real         proof     
       them from seeing each other, you’d better have some convincing proof that  
       ta gen Tiejun hun  zaiyiqi queshi  mei   haochu   de    zhengju  
       he with Tiejun play together indeed  NEG advantage PRT   proof 
       can prove playing with Tiejun is, indeed, bad.  
       nizhidao  xianzai de    haizi, ni  nao     bu chu  youshuofuli de dongxi  
       you know  now  PRT  kid, you produce NEG PRT convincing PRT stuff  
       You know nowadays if you can’t give convincing evidence,  
        ta  jiu   bu    ting   nide    
        he PRT  NEG  listen  your  
        kids wouldn’t listen to you at all.  
The message followed by nizhidao in this example explains why the parent does not 
think that he/she can easily stop his/her son from playing with Tiejun unless there is 
some convincing proof to prove that playing with Tiejun is bad for his/her son. So 
nizhidao here would be coded as justification.  
 
To sum up, given the examples cited in her three categories, it seems that nizhidao in 
her data typically occurs in contexts where it is used to justify what has just been said 
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or introduce a new topic.   
As can be seen from Table 6.5 below, which shows the distribution of pragmatic 
functions of nizhidao in the corpus of scripts in this study, the two main functions of 
nizhidao identified in Liu’s study (2005) are also among the frequently used 
subfunctions identified in this study. The most frequent subfunctions of nizhidao, 
justification, ‘indicating speaker attitude’, ‘introducing a new topic’ and softener of 
FTA, are also the most frequently used subfunctions of you know in the learners’ data 
(see Table 5.7 in section 5.2.2 above). The conflation of these four subfunctions 
accounts for a strikingly high frequency in both the L1 Chinese data and the L2 
English data (nizhidao, 70%, and you know, 75%, respectively).  
Table 6.5 Distribution of subfunctions of nizhidao identified in the native Chinese 
data 
Subfunctions (99) Frequency  
Justification  32 (32%)  
Indicating speaker attitude  15 (15%) 
Introducing a new topic 12 (12%) 
Softener of FTA  10 (10%) 
Indicating the coming message is meant to be evaluated  8 (8%) 
Indicating marked expression  6 (6%) 
Reason  5 (5%) 
Exemplification  5 (5%) 
Cause  4 (4%) 
Result  2 (2%) 
Finally, you know in the L2 English data and ni zhidao in the native Chinese data 
even show some similarities in terms of their turn positions and proposition positions. 
Table 6.6 shows the distributions of turn positions of you know in the learners’ data 
and nizhidao in the native Chinese data. As shown in Table 6.6, both you know and 
nizhidao show the highest frequency in turn medial position and lowest frequency in 
turn final position.  
Table 6.6 Distribution of turn positions of you know in the Chinese EFL learners’ 
data and nizhidao in the native Chinese data 
 Turn initial  Turn medial  Turn final  Total 
The Chinese EFL 
data  
266 (24.6%) 753(69.7%) 61(5.6%) 1080 
The native 
Chinese data  
16 (16.2%) 70 (70.7%) 13(13.1%) 99 
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With regard to proposition position you know and nizhidao also show a similar 
pattern because as can be seen from Table 6.7, which shows the distribution of 
proposition of you know in the learners’ data and ni zhidao in the native Chinese data 
both of them show the highest frequency in proposition initial position and the lowest 
frequency in proposition medial position.  
Table 6.7 Distribution of proposition of you know in the Chinese EFL learners’ data 
and nizhidao in the native Chinese data  
 Proposition  initial  Proposition medial  Proposition  final  Total 
The Chinese EFL 
data  
 913(84.5%) 38 (4.5%) 129 (11.9%) 1080 
The native 
Chinese data  
72(72.7%) 3(3.0%) 24 (24.2%) 99 
As discussed in section 3.5, proposition medial position can be further distinguished 
into two positions ‘between constituents’ and ‘within a constituent’. You know in the 
learners’ data not only rarely occurs in proposition medial but rarely occurs between 
a constituent, which matches the picture of proposition medial nizhidao. But it 
should be pointed out here that in the Chinese data when nizhidao occurs in 
proposition medial position, it only occurs between topic and comment, which 
corresponds to the position of ‘between constituents’ (Chinese is a topic-comment 
language as opposed to English, which is a subject-predicate language). So nizhidao 
would not occur within a constituent like you know does in English. This could 
discourage the learners from using you know in this position. Extract (6.12) is an 
example where nizhidao occurs between topic and comment i.e. between 
constituents.  
(6.12) 
     Lingshan      xiaozhang,  xuexiao  bu  neng  jiejue  yixie  ma?  
                   headmaster  school  NEG can   solve  some  PRT 
                  Headmaster, can’t our school give a bit financial help?  
     Jingzhao       xuexiao  de  jingfei   nizhidao  jiu shi na dian bangong  jinfei 
                   school  PRT  funding  you know just be that bit stationery funding 
                   The funding of our school you know is just for stationery, cannot even  
                   liang zhe  qiche de  you  qian   dou jiejue bu  liao,   shizai shi  
                   even this  car  PRT petrol money PRT solve NEG PRT  indeed be 
                   cover the petrol of this car. Honestly…  
                                                  (http://www. juben.cn) 
nizhidao in this example occurs between the topic ‘the funding of our school’ and the 
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comment ‘is just for stationery and cannot even cover the petrol of this car’. The 
message marked by nizhidao is used by the headmaster to turn down Lingshan’s 
application for some financial support. 
 
In addition to L 1 influence, other potential variables which might contribute to the 
over-representation or under-representation of certain individual functions of you 
know in the learners’ data also include discourse type and proficiency. The 
subfunction of softener of FTA is substantially over-represented in the L2 English. It 
accounts for 34% as compared to 10% in the native Chinese data or 2.2% in the 
British speakers’ data. Apart from the fact that nizhidao is frequently used in this 
subfunction in learners’ L1, another important contributing factor for the 
overproduction seems to be the tasks that the Chinese students were asked to perform. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main tasks performed by the Chinese students was 
to argue with their partners about certain issues. Like I mean in the British speakers’ 
data, you know in the learners’ L2 is almost exclusively used to soften one fact FTA 
disagreeing. There are only a few cases where you know is used in speech acts of 
giving suggestion and refusing. The following three examples are instances of 
disagreeing, giving suggesting and refusing respectively.  
(6.13) 
A       Really? I think it. It is not worthy to do, to do that. We can to do many other 
things contribute control our society. Not only to gain the money, you know. 
B       And, but you know every position servicing need people to the poor bill and 
that's. 
A       Yes, but you know, I, I think this kind of job is for the lower educated people. 
you know. For example, the senior highschool <should> graduate or something 
likes <like> them. 
     (05-030-15A-SECLL 1.0 & 2.0) 
In example (6.13) A and B are arguing if university students should apply for the job 
of being a bellboy in a five-star hotel. Following but and you know, B states his/her 
opinion that every job has its own value no matter how trivial it is, which disagrees 
with A’s idea that being a bellboy is worthless. In return, with but and you know, A 
argues that bellboy is only a job for people with less education than university 
students such as high school graduates. You know here not only makes disagreeing 
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less face-threatening but also appeals to the hearer to agree with the speaker.  
 
(6.14) 
B       You should take it easy. 
A       Take it easy. But I ... Someone gives ... give me a lot of advice, but I can't be 
calm because you know it's a first time for me to attend and English speech 
contest. 
B       You know the first before it you should prepared <prepare> for it very well. 
Then you can have confidence.  
A       Yes. But I don't know how to prepare. I, I want to have a good speech. But I 
can't find some ... um ... satisfactory materials. 
B       But you know you should read some short stories, and read some materials about 
oral English. 
(97-011-08- SECLL 1.0 & 2.0) 
In example (6.14), A is asking for B’s advice as to how to prepare an English speech 
contest. The two pieces of advice given by B are all prefaced by you know. You know 
here again play a dual role, softening the FTA of telling what people should do and 
appealing to the hearer to take the speaker’s advice.  
(6.15) 
A       While why not why not go with me. I think we can cooperate with with each 
other very well. 
B       Well, thank you for your invitation. But my parents also hope me to do some 
voluntary <volunteery> work, you know. Er, and thank you. Thank you all the 
same. Er, well, I must be leaving off now or I'll be late for the class. 
(06-004-03A-SECLL 1.0 & 2.0) 
In example (6.15), the message marked by you know is used to turn down A’s 
invitation indirectly. With you know, the refusal would sound less unpleasant to A 
and in the same time can appeal to A to understand why speaker B has to turn down 
the invitation.  
 
Like softener of FTA, justification is another subfunction which is markedly 
over-represented in the learners’ data. As mentioned above, the fact that nizhidao is 
frequently used in justification could encourage the overproduction of justification in 
the learners’ L2 English. Another possible factor that could contribute to the 
over-representation might be again to do with the tasks that performed by the 
learners because apart from the task of arguing, where the speaker needs to justify 
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his/her opinion, another main task that the learners were asked to perform was to ask 
for advice, which is a speech act that needs to be justified. Extract (6.16) is such an 
example.   
(6.16)  
A       Hi, Stone. I haven't see <seen> you for ages. How thing's going? 
B       Me too. I'm fine. How about you? 
A       Oh, it's really bad. 
B       What's the matter with you? 
A       Um ... because you know, I ... I'm a freshman and ... eh ... it's the first time I step 
into university ... Eh ... <a click of tongue>. Everything is so different from my ... 
life in my middle school. So, ... mm ... I just feel in lost and can you give some ... 
suggestion to me? 
B       Um ... as a matter of fact ... maybe ... I've walked a long ... longer journey than 
you. So maybe I'd like to give you some advice <adwice> <advice>. 
A       <simultaneous with B> Oh, thank you very much. 
(00-011-05-SECCL 1.0 & 2.0) 
In example (6.16), A, a first-year-student asks B’s advice as to how to handle 
university life. This example shows a rather frequent pattern of discourse which only 
occurs in the learners’ data. Instead of answering B’s question ‘What’s matter with 
you?’ directly and then explaining why, A begins with giving the background 
information why he/she needs to ask for help before he/she actually performs the 
action of asking for suggestion.  
 
As a frequently used subfunction in the learners’ L1, ‘introducing a new topic’ is 
over-represented in the learners’ L2 English. A more delicate analysis of ‘introducing 
a new topic’ in the learners’ data reveals a very distinctive pattern. In 80% (60 out 73) 
cases, you know occurs in the beginning of the conversation and is used to direct the 
conversation from greetings to the main talk i.e. the task that the learners were asked 
to perform. Extract (6.17) is such an example.   
(6.17) 
A       Hi. 
B       Hi. 
A       I wonder you are sophomore here. 
B       Yes. 
A       Ah, I'm Any. How do you do? 
B       How do you do? Nice to meet you. 
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A       You know I'm a freshman in this university. I was very happy to enter the 
university 
B       Congratulations. 
A       Thank you. I heard that university life is very wonderful. 
B       Yeah. 
A       But to be honest, I'm a little bit lost and afraid of the coming life. Can you help 
me? 
(00-082-19-SECCL 1.0 & 2.0) 
As can be seen from example (6.17), both speakers are very nervous, which is 
understandable because as strangers they have to converse in a foreign language in 
an exam. After greeting each other, A attempts to direct the conversation to the topic 
they are supposed to talk about by asking B if he/she is a sophomore and expects B 
to ask back about him/her so that their conversation can move forward. But 
unfortunately, B gives up his/her floor immediately by saying ‘yes’. Then A restarts 
the conversation by greeting and reattempts to lead the conversation onto the right 
track.  
 
With you know, B has successfully made the transition from the phatic talk to the 
main talk. The reason for you know being used repeatedly in this context could be 
that you know in the learners’ data not only can function in introducing a new topic 
but also play a role of helping the speaker get out of an awkward point of a 
conversation and then move on. This extra job done by you know in the learners’ data 
seems to echo the way that nizhiao functions in introducing a new topic. Like you 
know in the L2 English, nizhidao is not only used in context where the topic is 
changed because the prior topic naturally comes to its end, but also used to switch to 
a new topic because of the awkwardness of the previous topic. Extract (6.18) is an 
example where nizhidao is used to introduce a new topic because the prior topic is 
too awkward to be continued.  
(6.18) 
Caomei    Shitouge,    ni  zenme  lian      zijide  shengri  ye  bu     jide.  
          Stone brother you  how   including  own   birthday too  NEG remember 
          Stone, how come you can’t even remember your own birthday?  
Stone      ji         ta gan shenme ?  wode  fumu  zao  bu   zai  le.  
          remember  it  do  what ?    my  parents early NEG alive  PRT 
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          What’s the point of remembering it? My parents died long time ago. 
          wo xianzai weiyi  de  qingren,  zhi  you   yi  ge meimei 
          I   now  only  PRT  relative  only have  one CL younger sister 
          Now the only relative I have is my younger sister.  
          ke   ta  ye   chujia  le  
          but  she also  marry  PRT 
          but she has already got married.  
(Caomei does not know what to say) 
Caomei    Stonege.     Nizhidao  ma   qishi    jintian dui wo  lai  shuo, 
          Stone brother. You know  PRT  actually  today for me  come say 
          Stone. You know for me today is actually also a very important day.  
ye   shi  ge   zhongyaode  rizi  
too  be   CL  important    day 
In example (6.18), Caomei is a girl, who fancies Stone. When Stone tells why he 
can’t even remember his own birthday, as the script suggests Caomei is shocked by 
the sad story and does not know what to say. Obviously their conversation comes to a 
point where it cannot be carried on. With you know, Caomei stops the topic about 
Stone and starts to talk about herself.  
 
One important group of subfunctions of you know are either under-represented or 
absent in the learners’ data. Their overall function is to make the conversation more 
interesting and engaging. They include indicating marked expression, indicating the 
most likely event, indicating the unspoken message to be completed by the hearer 
and indicating the coming message is meant to be evaluated. One reason for the 
under-representation or absence of them could be due to the fact that the learners’ 
data is less narrative than the native speaker data because most of the time the 
learners have to think about how to win their argument rather than make their 
conversation more entertaining and engaging.  
 
The under-representation of ‘indicating marked language’ can also be relevant to the 
learners’ L2 proficiency. Since the learners in this study are only at intermediate level, 
they have not reached a point where they can appreciate stylistic differences in 
English. It would be very difficult for them produce examples like (4.78), which was 
quoted in section 4.2.2.2.5 (repeated here for convenience)  
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(4.78) 
89A     You mean even if you and Bernard had stayed together  
90B     Even if we had stayed together there might have <,> you know had endless 
hormones and glands problems  
91A     No  
92A     Yes you might  
93A     It's quite true <,>  
94A     She might have been that kind of teenager anyway  
(S1A-031-ICE-GB) 
In example (4.78), B uses two very technical words, hormones and glands. In the 
same context, the learners would be more likely to go for a much simpler expression 
‘sexual problems’.  
 
However, the absence of the subfunction quotative which is moderately frequent in 
the British data seems very unlikely to be caused by the learners’ proficiency level 
because the advanced German EFL learners in Müller’s (2005:170) study did not use 
you know in quotative at all. Müller (2005) explains that the German learners 
apparently did not know about this function. For the Chinese learners in this study 
the absence of quotative of you know could be due to the fact that ni zhidao in their 
L1 does not have this subfunction.  
 
To sum up, L1 influence seems to play a major role in the Chinese learners’ uses of 
you know because there are striking similarities shown between the pattern of you 
know in the learners’ data and ni zhidao in the native Chinese data. For instance, 
previous studies on ni zhidao and the small-scale study of this expression conducted 
in this study all show that ni zhidao is also a frequently used pragmatic marker in 
Chinese. This prior knowledge of L1 could prime the learners to overproduce you 
know in their L2 English. In addition, the analysis of ni zhidao shows that it is only 
used in very restricted contexts in Chinese, which echoes another striking feature of 
you know in the learners’ data i.e. the majority of you knows are only used in a very 
small number of subfunctions among 24 identified subfunctions of you know. Even 
the positioning of ni zhidao seems to influence that of you know in the non-native 
speaker data because they show similar patterns in both turn positions and 
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proposition positions. In addition to L1 influence, other variables such as discourse 
type and proficiency may also play a role in the over-representation or 
under-representation of certain subfunctions in the learners’ data. For instance, the 
overproduction of the subfunction softener of FTA could also be caused by the tasks 
given in the exams, many of which involved performance of the speech act of 
disagreeing. The under-representation of indicating marked expression could be due 
to the learners’ proficiency because as intermediate learners they may not be able to 
appreciate the stylistic differences in English.  
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter addressed the question why the Chinese EFL learners’ uses of I mean 
and you know show those features revealed by chapter 5. To account for those 
features, the approach that L2 production should be viewed as the result of the 
interaction of all potential factors, among which universal developmental processes 
and L1 influence are the most widely considered, was adopted. In accounting for the 
features of the learners’ uses of I mean, it was hypothesized that the learners’ 
acquisition of I mean might be influenced by the congruence between the pragmatic 
meaning and semantic meaning of I mean because the more congruent the pragmatic 
meaning is the easier to be acquired. The result of the analysis seemed to support this 
assumption because the more congruent category was over-represented while the less 
congruent category was under-represented and all the subfunctions that the learners 
failed to acquire were under the less congruent category.  
 
In addition to this universal constraint, the comparison between wode yisi shi in the 
native Chinese data and I mean in the non-native speaker data seemed to suggest that 
L1 influence could be responsible for the marked under-representation of I mean 
because wode yisis shi showed a very low frequency and was not typically used as a 
pragmatic marker in the Chinese data. Other variables such as discourse type, 
proficiency and co-occurring linkers of I mean also appeared to contribute to the 
over-representation or under-represenation of certain functions of I mean in the 
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learners’ data. For instance the over-representation of softener of FTA could be 
because of the tasks that the Chinese students were asked to do in the exams while 
the over-representation of hesitation markers could by caused by the learner’ 
proficiency level.  
 
Since the congruence between the pragmatic meaning and semantic meaning of 
pragmatic markers does not seem to apply to you know, the accounting for the 
features of you know in the learners’ data started with L1 influence. The comparison 
between ni zhidao in the Chinese data and you know in the L2 English data seemed 
to suggest that L1 influence played a very important role in the way that the Chinese 
EFL learners used you know. The analysis of ni zhidao showed that it was very 
frequently used as a pragmatic marker in the native Chinese data. So the learners’ 
overproduction of you know in the learners’ data could be encouraged by the frequent 
use of ni zhidao in their L1. In addition, ni zhidao in the native Chinese data occurred 
in much more restricted contexts than did you know in the British data, which might 
be the reason why most of you knows in the learners’ data were only confined to just 
a few subfunctions.  
 
In addition to L1 influence, other factors such as discourse type and proficiency, 
again, seemed to play a role in over-representation or under-representation of certain 
functions of you know in the learners’ data. For instance like I mean the tasks that the 
students did in the exams could also be responsible for the over-representation of 
softener of FTA while proficiency might be the reason for the under-representation of 
‘indicating the marked expression’.  
     
  
203 
Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
This chapter aims to summarize the major findings of this thesis and then make 
recommendations for further research. The summarization will be organized by 
reviewing how each of the four research questions (repeated here for convenience) 
proposed in Chapter 1 was addressed.  
1) What pragmatic functions do I mean and you know play in L1 
English conversation?  
2) What are the similarities and differences between I mean and you 
know with regard to their pragmatic functions and why? What are 
the similarities and differences between them in terms of 
distributions and positioning?  
3) What are the characteristics of the Chinese EFL learners’ use of I 
mean as compared to the native speakers of English? What are the 
potential factors that could contribute to the similarities and 
differences between them and why?  
4) What are the characteristics of the Chinese EFL learners’ use of you 
know as compared to the native speakers of English? What are the 
potential factors that could contribute to the similarities and 
differences between them and why? 
 
This chapter will be subdivided into 4 sections. Section 7.1 will outline the patterns 
of I mean and you know in the native speaker data chosen by this study. Section 7.2 
will highlight the similarities and differences between the patterns of I mean and you 
know mentioned in section 7.1 and then the proposal as to what could account for 
those similarities and differences between them. Section 7.3 will present both the 
patterns of I mean and you know in the Chinese EFL learners’ data as compared to 
their uses in the native speaker data and discuss possible factors which might play a 
role in shaping the features of I mean and you know in the non-native speaker data. 
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Finally, in section 7.4 suggestions for further research will be made.  
 
7.1 Patterns of I mean and you know in the L1 English data   
Given the fact the chosen sample of spoken data produced by British speakers in this 
study is not only bigger but also involves a wider range of topics, age groups and 
speakers than the data used in the previous studies (e.g. Goldberg 1980; Östman 
1981; Schourup 1985; Holmes 1986; Schiffrin 1987; Müller 2005), a finer picture of 
two of the most evasive pragmatic markers, I mean and you know, than descriptions 
of them offered in previous research was hoped for. To achieve the best possible 
description of I mean and you know the following measures were taken in this study. 
Firstly, instead of being confined to one single model or theory, the identification of 
the pragmatic functions of the two markers in question was open to all plausible 
interpretations. Secondly, to ensure the consistency of data coding, a guiding 
principle of giving priority to coherence relations was followed in the process of 
setting up my own categories. Thirdly, a polysemous approach was adopted so that 
the analysis in this study not only zoomed in on the specific contexts where the 
markers occurred but also zoomed out to the general function or core meaning of 
each marker.   
 
The above measures proved to be effective because a finer picture of the two markers 
than previous descriptions of them did emerge out of my analysis. For instance, the 
analysis of I mean in this study came up with a much longer function list than 
Brinton’s (2007) corpus-based description of I mean, which was the most detailed 
account available when this study began. As shown by Table 7.1, which compares 
Brinton’s (2007) function list and my function list of I mean, one group of the newly 
identified functions of I mean in my analysis were the result of further categorization 
of Brinton’s (2007) categories.  
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Table 7.1 Function lists of I mean in Brinton’s (2007) study and this study 
• Brinton’s (2007) function list of 
I mean
• 1. repair
• 2. cause 
• 3. explicitness
• 4. reformulation 
• 5. exemplification 
• 6. speaker attitude 
• Function list of I mean in this 
study 
• 1. assumption correction
• 2. transactional repair
• 3. interactional repair
• 4. hesitation marker
• 5. restart
• 6. reason
• 7. cause
• 8. justification 
• 9. explicitness
• 10. reformulation
• 11. exemplification 
• 12. indicating speaker attitude
• 13.conclusion
• 14. result
• 15. summarization 
• 16 softener of FTA
• 17. resumption 
• 18. quotative
•
 
Brinton’s category of repair was further classified into five subtypes of repair – 
assumption correction, interactional repair, interactional repair, hesitation marker and 
restart – in my analysis. Another of her categories, cause, which is paraphrased as 
either ‘because or ‘I’m saying it because’ in her analysis, was also further categorized 
in this study. Those I means which can be paraphrased as ‘I’m saying it because’ 
were coded as justification while those paraphrased as ‘because’ were labeled either 
cause or reason because of the different coherence relations shown by the two 
messages linked by I mean.  
 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, the other group of newly identified functions of I 
mean on my list are not reported in Brinton’s analysis. One moderately frequent 
subfunction in my data, softener of FTA, which accounted for 5.7% of the identified 
cases, does not appear on Brinton’s function list. Another category which is absent in 
Brinton’s analysis but showed rather moderate frequency (3.7%) was those cases 
where I mean was translated as ‘so’. They were further grouped into three subgroups 
– result, summarization and conclusion. Other subfunctions such as quotative and 
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resumption which do not appear on Brinton’s list showed very low frequencies in my 
data.  
 
By following the same approach, my analysis of you know also came up with a much 
longer list than do the most recent studies (Erman, 2001; Müller, 2005) of you know 
available when this study started. Like I mean, some of the newly identified 
subfunctions of you know in this study are also the result of further categorization of 
functions of you know observed in previous research while other new subfunctions 
were identified only in my data because they were rather infrequent and therefore 
they may not have been sampled in the data used in previous studies. For example, 
subfunctions such as exemplification, explicitness and reformulation specify ways 
how you know introduces qualifying information (Holmes, 1986) or modification of 
previous discourse (Erman, 2001). The two subfunctions ‘indicating the unspoken 
message to be completed by the hearer’ and ‘indicating the most likely event’ 
revealed how the speaker claims common ground, which is claimed to be a role of 
you know by a few researchers (e.g. Östman, 1981; Schourup, 1985; Jucker & Smith, 
1998). Holmes (1986) observes that the speaker uses you know to make his/her 
narration more interesting and entertaining. The newly identified subfunctions – 
‘indicating the marked expression’ and ‘indicating the coming message meant to be 
evaluated’ – in this study showed how the speaker achieves his/her goal of retaining 
the hearer’ interest in conversation. The subfunctions which are not reported in 
previous research but showed very low frequencies in my data included cause, reason, 
result, conclusion, assumption correction and interactional repair.  
 
However, there are two subfunctions mentioned in Erman’s (2001) andMüller’s 
(2005) lists which are not included on my list. One is the role of turn management 
and the other is the subfunction of appealing. The exclusion of the former is because 
it is difficult to rule out other possible reasons which might lead to turn exchange 
(Schourup,1985). In addition, identification of this role involves prosodic 
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information Müller (2005) which was unavailable in my data. With regard to the 
latter, it is treated as the core meaning or general function rather than one of the 
subfunctions of you know because it could be extracted from all the subfunctions of 
you know identified in this study. 
 
7.2 Comparison of I mean and you know in the L1 English data  
Following the completion of the detailed account of I mean and you know a 
comparison between them was conducted. Unlike the previous comparisons (Östman, 
1981; Schourup, 1985; Schiffrin, 1987; Fox Tree and Schrock, 2002), which are 
either too brief or too general, the comparison in this study was made both at the 
level of their general functions and at the level of their specific functions.  
 
At the general level, the comparison shows that I mean and you know can be seen  
as pragmatically complementary as Schiffrin (1987:309) points out that I mean 
focuses on the speaker’s own talk while you know is about the hearer’s involvement. 
In addition, I proposed that under Brown and Levinson’s (1987) Politeness Theory, 
the core functions of I mean and you know can also be seen as complementary. I 
mean can be used to serve the hearer’s negative face because with I mean the speaker 
can diminish potential imposition on the hearer by suggesting ‘this is what I mean, so 
feel free to disagree with me’ while you know can be used to serve the hearer’s 
positive face because with you know the speaker can appeal to the hearer’s 
participation in his/her talk i.e. with you know the speaker can show his/her interest 
in the hearer.  
 
The findings of the comparison at the level of specific functions supported the 
general complementary picture of I mean and you know presented above. For 
instance, on the one hand there was no significant difference between I mean and you 
know in terms of the distributions of the three broad categories, hearer-oriented, 
interactant-relationship-oriented and speaker-oriented, which suggests that I mean 
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and you know play rather similar functions in conversation. On the other hand, they 
shared about half of their subfunctions (16 out of 26) and the complementary general 
functions of I mean and you know provides a plausible explanation as to why some 
contexts allow both markers while other contexts only allow one of them.  
 
To give a better picture of how I mean and you know relate to each other, their 
pragmatic functions are regrouped as shown by Table 7.2 below on the basis of how 
many contexts they share. As can be seen from Table 7.2, two main categories are set 
up on the basis of whether the contexts are shared by the two markers or not. 
Subfunctions in the category of shared contexts are further grouped into three 
subcategories – contexts where both markers show similar frequencies, 
predominantly-I-mean subfunctions and predominantly-you-know subfunctions. 
Under the category where only one marker occurs, two subgroups – I-mean-only 
subfunctions and you-know-only subfunctions – are set up.  
 
From the perspective of the general or core meanings of you know and I mean, the 
shared contexts are actually those subfunctions where the speaker is allowed to 
choose whether to focus on his/her own talk or to invite the hearer to participate i.e. 
whether to serve the hearer’s negative face or positive face. For instance, 
subfunctions such as exemplification, explicitness, reformulation, cause, reason and 
summarization where I mean and you know showed very similar frequencies can be 
seen as the contexts where the speaker achieves a balance between the hearer’s need 
of negative face and positive face by equally sharing the job in conversation with the 
hearer. The occurrence of either I mean you know or you know I mean in all shared 
subfunctions seems to suggest that the speaker may be aware that such a balance is 
important because considering too much of the hearer’s positive face could damage 
the hearer’s negative face or vice versa.  
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Table 7.2 Classification of the pragmatic functions of I mean and you know on the 
basis of how much context they share in the British speakers’ data  
  Pragmatic functions  
Shared contexts Similarly frequent Exemplification   
Explicitness 
Reformulation  
Cause 
Reason  
Summarization  
Conclusion  
Result  
Predominantly-I- mean  Assumption correction  
Softener of FTA 
Justification  
Interactional repair  
Restart 
Predominantly-you-know Quotative  
Indicating speaker attitude 
Hesitation marker 
One marker 
only  
I-mean-only  Resumption  
Transactional  repair 
You-know-only Introducing background information 
Seeking confirmation  
Indicating marked expressions 
Indicating the most likely event 
Indicating unspoken message to be completed by 
the hearer 
Indicating the coming message to be evaluated  
Approximator  
Introducing a new topic  
 
As to those shared contexts where one marker showed much higher frequency than 
the other, the reason could be that one of the needs related to face becomes the 
speaker’s priority at the time of communication. For example, the frequency of I 
mean was nearly quadruple that of you know in the subfunction of justification. One 
reason for the preference for I mean to you know may be because the British speakers 
feel that the act of appealing to the hearer to agree has a very high risk of damaging 
the hearer’s negative face. In contrast, in the subfunction of hesitation marker the 
frequency of you know was nearly five times that of I mean. Apparently, this is a 
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subfunction where the need for asking the hearer to share the work of searching right 
words or content is more urgent than the hearer’ negative face.  
 
As to the contexts where only one marker occurred, the general functions of I mean 
and you know also work very well. The you-know-only subfunctions are those where 
the hearer’s involvement is essential while in the I-mean-only ones the hearer’s 
participation is least needed or even impossible. For instance, the subfunction 
‘indicating the marked expression’ is a you-know-only subfunction because the 
hearer’s appreciation is the reason why the speaker produces the utterance. A typical 
example of I-mean-only subfunction is interactional repair because this subtype of 
repair involves correcting the wrong information provided by the speaker him/herself 
who knows what the correct information is.    
 
7.3 Patterns of I mean and you know in the Chinese learners’ L2 English  
Unlike most of the previous studies (Hays, 1992; Nikula, 1996; Romero Trillo, 2002, 
He, 2002; Fung and Carter, 2007) on L2 learners’ use of pragmatic markers, which 
aim to draw a general picture by reporting what pragmatic markers are used by 
learners and their frequencies, this study followed Müller’s (2005) study, which aims 
to describe the use of learners’ pragmatic markers at the level of specific functions by 
investigating what pragmatic functions are played by I mean and you know in the 
Chinese EFL learners’ data as compared to the British speakers’ data. But this study 
continued to look further into potential variables which might be responsible for the 
characteristics of the Chinese learners’ use of I mean and you know.  
 
This section will be further divided into two subsections, section 7.3.1 and section 
7.3.2 , which will describe the Chinese learners’ I mean and you know respectively.  
 
7.3.1 Pattern of I mean in the Chinese learners’ data  
Compared to I mean in the British speakers’ data, I mean was markedly 
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under-represented in the Chinese EFL learners’ data, while 14 out of 18 subfunctions 
of I mean which appeared in the native speaker data were also used by the Chinese 
learners although most of them showed different frequencies i.e. they were either 
under-represented or over-represented in the learners’ data. 
 
The underproduction of I mean in the learners’ data could be a L1-induced 
phenomenon because a small-scale study of the Chinese equivalent of I mean, wo de 
yisi shi, showed it was very infrequent in the native Chinese spoken data and its 
position was very restricted, which suggests it may not be qualified as a pragmatic 
marker in the Chinese language.  
 
But the under-representation or over-representation of the specific functions of I 
mean seems more relevant to the degree of congruence between the pragmatic 
functions and semantic meaning of I mean because the more congruent category was 
over-represented while the less congruent was under-represented and the 
subfunctions which were absent in the learners’ data were all under the less 
congruent category. However, in addition to the L1 influence and the developmental 
force i.e. congruence, there are other contributing factors such as discourse type, 
proficiency level and co-occurring linkers. For instance, the over-representation of 
hesitation marker under the more congruent category may also be caused by the 
learners’ L2 proficiency because the intermediate learners in this study might need to 
hesitate more while conversing in a foreign language. Although exemplification is 
under the more congruent category, it was greatly under-represented in the Chinese 
learners’ data. One reason for the learners’ avoidance of this subfunction could be 
caused by the co-occurring linker of I mean. When I mean functions in 
exemplification, it tends to co-occur with more transparent markers such as for 
example and things like in the L1 English data. According to previous research on 
learners’ use of pragmatic markers learners tend to use more transparent markers, 
which means the Chinese learners would more likely to use for example to I mean 
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when they need to introduce examples.  
 
7.3.2. Pattern of you know in the Chinese learners’ data  
In contrast to I mean, you know was markedly over-represented in the Chinese EFL 
learners’ data. Although you know in the learners’ L2 English served most 
subfunctions (19 out of 24) identified in the L1 English data, it only focused on a 
very small number of subfunctions. The comparison between you know in the 
Chinese learners’ data and the Chinese equivalent of you know, ni zhidao, in the 
Chinese spoken data seems to suggest that L1 influence could be the major 
contributor to the pattern of the uses of you know in the learners’ data. Unlike wo de 
yisi shi, ni zhidao was much more frequent in the native Chinese spoken data chosen 
by this study. Previous studies (Tao, 2003; Liu 2005) of ni zhidao and my analysis of 
ni zhidao all show that ni zhidao plays a very limited number of subfunctions and the 
four most frequent subfunctions of ni zhidao – justification, indicating speaker 
attitude, introducing a new topic and softener of FTA – were also among the most 
frequently used subfunctions of you know in the learners’ data. In addition, even the 
pattern of the positioning of you know in the learners’ L2 English was similar that of 
ni zhidao in the L1 data.  
 
Other variables such as language proficiency and discourse type also seem to play a 
role in the shaping of learners’ use of you know. For instance, the subfunction of 
indicating a marked expression was markedly under-represented in the learners’ L2 
data but showed a rather moderate frequency in the L1 Chinese data. The reason for 
the underproduction of this subfunction in the learners’ data could be because the 
intermediate learners have not reached a point where they could appreciate stylistic 
differences in English. The overproduction of softener of FTA also seems to be 
relevant to the tasks that the learners did in the exams.  
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7.4 Recommendations for further research  
Although this study did achieve a finer description of how I mean and you know were 
used by the native speakers and a detailed account of the usage of these two markers 
in the non-native speaker data as it hoped, the main problem it had was the 
comparability of its chosen corpora.  Therefore, to achieve a more accurate picture 
of Chinese EFL learners’ use of these two markers, future study should look for a 
collection of data which resemble more closely the native English data chosen for 
this study. To better understand how the L1 would affect the acquisition of these two 
markers, a study of their equivalents by analyzing comparable L1 Chinese spoken 
data will also be needed. In addition, to know more about how universal 
developmental force can affect the path of the acquisition, an investigation of how 
they are acquired by children will be very helpful. Finally, a comparison between 
intermediate learners and advanced learners will help to answer the question whether 
the features of I mean and you know found in this study are features of intermediate 
learners or rather features of speakers whose L1 is Chinese.  
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Appendix I
coding of I mean  in the native speaker data
locations of I mean functions
3-4b assumption-correction
3-73b assumption-correction
3-140b assumption-correction
3-167b assumption-correction
5-14a assumption-correction
5-49a assumption-correction
6-31a assumption-correction
8-60b assumption-correction
8-175b assumption-correction
11-7b assumption-correction
12-66a assumption-correction
13-18c assumption-correction
13-86e assumption-correction
13-105e assumption-correction
13-139b assumption-correction
13-219b assumption-correction
14-55c assumption-correction
15-83a assumption-correction
19-131a assumption-correction
25-250a assumption-correction
25-287b assumption-correction
29-16b assumption-correction
29-22b assumption-correction
29-53b assumption-correction
29-122a1+2 assumption-correction
29-242a2 assumption-correction
29-329c assumption-correction
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30-6a assumption-correction
30-82b assumption-correction
31-7a assumption-correction
31-11a assumption-correction
31-131a assumption-correction
31-151b2 assumption-correction
32-238a assumption-correction
35-155b assumption-correction
36-93b assumption-correction
39-317a assumption-correction
40-129d assumption-correction
43-94b assumption-correction
43-170a assumption-correction
45-255b assumption-correction
50-115b assumption-correction
52-165b assumption-correction
53-43b assumption-correction
54-139a assumption-correction
54-175a1 assumption-correction
54-181b1 assumption-correction
58-248b assumption-correction
59-209a assumption-correction
60-55b assumption-correction
60-71b assumption-correction
61-355b assumption-correction
62-76b assumption-correction
64-64a assumption-correction
66-42a assumption-correction
66-56b assumption-correction
66-104b assumption-correction
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66-133b assumption-correction
66-138b assumption-correction
66-203a assumption-correction
71-206c assumption-correction
72-49b assumption-correction
72-218b assumption-correction
73-166b assumption-correction
76-119b assumption-correction
78-180a assumption-correction
79-11a2 assumption-correction
80-280b2 assumption-correction
81-210b1 assumption-correction
84-73a assumption-correction
85-87b assumption-correction
86-224a assumption-correction
90-30b assumption-correction
4-143b cause
74-193a cause
76-101b cause
76-205b cause
79-196a cause
81-37a cause
81-210b2 cause
89-168b cause
3-114b conclusion
23-186a conclusion
27-205d conclusion
31-161a conclusion
43-50b conclusion
48-341b conclusion
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60-222b conclusion
63-26a conclusion
66-125b conclusion
70-123a conclusion
71-313c conclusion
73-49b conclusion
76-125a conclusion
3-133b1 softener of FTA
5-28a1 softener of FTA
5-189a1 softener of FTA
13-169c softener of FTA
14-231a softener of FTA
17-123a softener of FTA
18-328a softener of FTA
19-286c softener of FTA
23-298b softener of FTA
29-96b softener of FTA
29-175c softener of FTA
29-201b softener of FTA
31-86b softener of FTA
31-159a softener of FTA
33-49b softener of FTA
36-35b softener of FTA
36-103a softener of FTA
38-149c softener of FTA
42-134c softener of FTA
47-198a softener of FTA
50-196a softener of FTA
54-203a softener of FTA
58-91b1 softener of FTA
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58-105a softener of FTA
58-200b softener of FTA
59-289a softener of FTA
66-63b softener of FTA
66-112b1 softener of FTA
66-208b1 softener of FTA
69-281a softener of FTA
71-124c softener of FTA
71-261d softener of FTA
74-148a softener of FTA
75-65b softener of FTA
76-139a softener of FTA
77-257b softener of FTA
79-115a softener of FTA
80-63b softener of FTA
86-156a softener of FTA
3-82a exemplification
3-134b exemplification
5-79a exemplification
5-163a exemplification
5-179b exemplification
7-167b exemplification
13-34c exemplification
13-68e exemplification
13-191f exemplification
13-209f exemplification
13-217b exemplification
13-233e exemplification
14-157b exemplification
15-17b exemplification
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15-228a exemplification
17-115b exemplification
18-329a exemplification
19-371d exemplification
20-159b exemplification
23-209a exemplification
27-80b exemplification
37-117b exemplification
37-146b exemplification
37-164b exemplification
37-267b exemplification
42-145a exemplification
47-173b exemplification
48-344 exemplification
50-131b exemplification
53-253b exemplification
54-46b exemplification
58-257b exemplification
59-147a exemplification
60-105b exemplification
63-141a exemplification
63-274a exemplification
63-281a exemplification
66-160b exemplification
66-189a exemplification
66-191a exemplification
72-220b exemplification
76-184b exemplification
76-185b exemplification
79-41c exemplification
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79-54a exemplification
81-24a exemplification
82-34a exemplification
87-273b exemplification
2-71b explictness
4-140a explictness
5-40a explictness
6-40a explictness
6-196a explictness
6-242b explictness
6-246a explictness
7-26b explictness
7-278b explictness
8-68b explictness
8-152b explictness
9-123a explictness
15-71a explictness
15-160b explictness
15-187a explictness
18-328a explictness
25-31a explictness
29-257a explictness
31-67a explictness
38-129a explictness
39-86b explictness
45-32a explictness
46-35a explictness
50-185b explictness
54-128a explictness
54-129a explictness
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59-83a explictness
66-67b explictness
66-124b explictness
66-146b explictness
66-165b explictness
68-294c explictness
69-321b explictness
71-258d explictness
72-105a explictness
72-111b explictness
75-113b explictness
76-12a explictness
78-197b explictness
80-224b explictness
84-49b explictness
84-151b explictness
69-273a hesitation marker
2-108b hesitation marker
3-133b2 hesitation marker
45-258b hesitation marker
48-74b hesitation marker
56-252b hesitation marker
56-269b hesitation marker
60-62b hesitation marker
66-200b hesitation marker
2-12c interactional repair
3-121b interactional repair
4-11b interactional repair
4-97a interactional repair
4-98a interactional repair
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5-89a interactional repair
5-96a interactional repair
12-123b interactional repair
15-14a interactional repair
16-236a interactional repair
24-115a interactional repair
26-341c interactional repair
29-139a interactional repair
29-271a interactional repair
38-80c interactional repair
46-417a interactional repair
51-138a interactional repair
54-175a2 interactional repair
58-107a interactional repair
58-217b interactional repair
61-134b interactional repair
72-44b interactional repair
7-288b justification
2-89b justification
3-67b justification
3-119b justification
4-87a justification
5-28a2 justification
5-30a justification
5-172a justification
5-189a2 justification
6-138b justification
6-144b justification
6-317b justification
7-79b justification
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7-87a justification
10-155a justification
10-190b justification
10-262b justification
11-30a justification
11-119a justification
11-237a justification
12-29b justification
12-117c justification
12-124c1 justification
12-124c2 justification
12-208a justification
12-227b justification
13-190f justification
15-21b justification
15-58b justification
15-100a justification
15-131a justification
15-145a justification
16-165a justification
16-327e justification
17-50a justification
18-324a1 justification
18-333a justification
19-288a justification
19-289a justification
19-339d justification
19-360c justification
21-32a justification
22-57a justification
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23-40b justification
23-53a justification
23-88a justification
23-92a justification
23-325a justification
24-79a justification
26-188a justification
27-72b justification
27-131c justification
27-184d justification
27-188d1+2 justification
27-195d justification
28-262a justification
29-27b justification
29-116a justification
29-140a justification
29-159a justification
29-169a justification
29-176c justification
29-183a justification
29-202b justification
29-241a justification
29-242a1 justification
30-64c justification
30-89a justification
31-40b justification
31-41b justification
31-45a justification
31-55a justification
31-56a justification
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31-87b justification
31-102b justification
31-139b justification
31-160a justification
33-28b justification
33-95b justification
33-98b justification
34-136b justification
34-164b justification
35-186a justification
36-38a1 justification
36-38a2 justification
36-80a justification
37-178b justification
37-258a justification
37-265b justification
38-21a justification
38-77a justification
38-275c justification
39-289a justification
39-301b justification
39-304a justification
41-239a justification
41-387a justification
42-171c justification
43-47b justification
43-95b justification
43-121a justification
43-275a justification
44-351a justification
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44-386a justification
45-87b justification
45-92b justification
48-72a justification
50-221b justification
52-162a justification
54-3a justification
56-186a justification
56-261b justification
57-211a justification
57-217a justification
57-225a justification
59-103a justification
59-304b justification
60-64b justification
60-68b justification
60-74b justification
60-130b justification
61-111b justification
61-127b justification
61-169b justification
61-268b justification
61-348b justification
62-19b justification
62-199a justification
63-100a justification
63-245a justification
63-246a justification
64-47a justification
65-328e justification
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66-77a justification
66-122b justification
66-164b justification
66-173b justification
66-178b justification
66-208b2 justification
66-213a justification
67-29a justification
67-166b justification
67-178b justification
68-27a justification
68-34a justification
68-103a justification
68-160b justification
69-86a justification
69-149a justification
69-161b justification
69-222b justification
69-240a justification
69-276a justification
69-290a justification
71-61b justification
71-232c justification
71-289c justification
72-199b justification
72-232b justification
73-12b justification
73-15c justification
73-21a justification
73-102b justification
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74-25b justification
75-21b justification
75-118b justification
76-135b justification
78-148a justification
78-160b justification
79-34a justification
79-57a justification
79-63c justification
79-102a justification
79-140a justification
79-227a justification
80-88b justification
80-153a1+2 justification
80-171b justification
81-8a justification
81-31a justification
81-36a justification
81-147b justification
81-198a justification
81-285b justification
82-26a justification
82-151b justification
83-71a justification
84-2a justification
88-151a justification
90-156d justification
90-217a justification
5-23a quotative
80-280b1 quotative
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3-70b reason
5-8a reason
5-42a reason
5-52a reason
5-220b reason
10-48b reason
10-282b reason
14-137b reason
20-68c reason
27-4b reason
29-240a reason
34-155b reason
37-260a reason
39-231b reason
41-123a reason
50-43b reason
50-48b reason
50-114b reason
51-40b reason
54-23a reason
70-267b reason
76-120b reason
77-58b reason
90-226a reason
3-25b reformulation
11-21a reformulation
15-225a reformulation
24-138a reformulation
31-192b reformulation
39-285b reformulation
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46-363a reformulation
52-176a reformulation
54-190b reformulation
62-80b reformulation
63-130a reformulation
66-64b reformulation
72-201b reformulation
72-229a reformulation
76-202a reformulation
77-293c reformulation
1-125b restart
3-13b restart
3-75a restart
4-132a restart
5-31a restart
5-58a restart
5-174a restart
6-99b restart
7-174b restart
10-24b restart
12-167b restart
12-196a restart
18-336b restart
18-343b1+2 restart
19-281c restart
20-156d restart
21-133c restart
23-207a restart
24-99a restart
24-114a restart
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24-146a1 restart
26-340c restart
29-117a restart
29-134a restart
29-189d restart
29-330c restart
31-65a restart
31-151b1 restart
34-12a restart
34-14b restart
34b-125b restart
34-161b restart
36-38a4 restart
37-33b restart
37-271b restart
38-125a restart
43-102a restart
43-225b restart
45-90b restart
45-231b restart
45-298a restart
45-310b1 restart
45-314b restart
45-321a restart
45-322a restart
46-45a restart
47-97b restart
48-97a restart
48-340b restart
48-345b restart
 245
49-41c restart
50-87b restart
52-157b restart
52-164b restart
54-136a restart
54-180b restart
54-181b2 restart
55-181a restart
56-73a restart
56-187a restart
56-244b restart
58-91b2 restart
59-256b restart
60-18b restart
60-75b restart
60-139b restart
60-163b restart
62-67a restart
62-96a restart
63-275a restart
64-37c restart
66-112b2 restart
66-118b restart
66-186a restart
69-191a restart
71-184b restart
72-189b restart
78-123b restart
79-6a restart
79-11a1 restart
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79-97a restart
79-98a1 restart
79-98a2 restart
81-39a restart
83-196a restart
84-40b restart
84-232c restart
85-171a restart
89-6a restart
89-22a2 restart
37-47b result
66-57b result
10-278b resumption
12-49a resumption
21-167c resumption
21-169b resumption
27-214d resumption
32-211d resumption
38-267a resumption
43-9a resumption
46-120a resumption
62-186b resumption
63-171a resumption
71-226c resumption
78-143a resumption
84-56a resumption
2-92b indicating speaker attitude
3-120b indicating speaker attitude
3-161b indicating speaker attitude
5-15a indicating speaker attitude
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5-158b indicating speaker attitude
5-171a indicating speaker attitude
6-149b indicating speaker attitude
6-227a indicating speaker attitude
7-78b indicating speaker attitude
8-240a indicating speaker attitude
10-165b indicating speaker attitude
10-230a indicating speaker attitude
10-279b indicating speaker attitude
13-220b indicating speaker attitude
16-231d indicating speaker attitude
19-110e indicating speaker attitude
19-364a indicating speaker attitude
22-173d indicating speaker attitude
22-210d indicating speaker attitude
22-295d indicating speaker attitude
23-238a indicating speaker attitude
23-239a indicating speaker attitude
27-71b indicating speaker attitude
27-114b indicating speaker attitude
27-201d indicating speaker attitude
29-6b indicating speaker attitude
29-57a indicating speaker attitude
29-126a indicating speaker attitude
29-328c indicating speaker attitude
31-145b indicating speaker attitude
35-4b indicating speaker attitude
37-190b indicating speaker attitude
37-198b indicating speaker attitude
38-83a indicating speaker attitude
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39-309a1 indicating speaker attitude
44-385a indicating speaker attitude
44-389a indicating speaker attitude
45-119b indicating speaker attitude
54-104a indicating speaker attitude
56-139b indicating speaker attitude
57-164b indicating speaker attitude
63-74a indicating speaker attitude
66-73b indicating speaker attitude
72-198b indicating speaker attitude
76-136b indicating speaker attitude
78-162a indicating speaker attitude
80-81b indicating speaker attitude
85-25b indicating speaker attitude
85-327b indicating speaker attitude
85-366a indicating speaker attitude
86-169a indicating speaker attitude
3-92a summarisation
5-7a summarisation
10-246b summarisation
31-162a summarisation
58-274b summarisation
60-113b summarisation
60-138b summarisation
71-243d summarisation
75-122b summarisation
75-160b summarisation
3-126b transactional repair
4-2a transactional repair
4-61a transactional repair
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5-26a transactional repair
5-106b transactional repair
6-89a transactional repair
11-115c transactional repair
13-13c transactional repair
13-37c transactional repair
13-250b transactional repair
14-144b transactional repair
16-356e transactional repair
19-120c transactional repair
19-362a transactional repair
21-64c transactional repair
21-277d transactional repair
21-311c transactional repair
24-146a2 transactional repair
27-183d transactional repair
29-212b transactional repair
31-185b transactional repair
34-149b transactional repair
38-51c transactional repair
39-309a2 transactional repair
44-365b transactional repair
54-157a transactional repair
66-102b transactional repair
76-74b transactional repair
84-20a transactional repair
84-154b transactional repair
87-143b transactional repair
88-125a transactional repair
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Appendix II 
Coding of you know  in the native speaker data
locations of you know functions
3-142b approximator
10-278b approximator
13-253b1 approximator
13-253b2 approximator
23-59b approximator
26-23a approximator
31-152b2 approximator
31-154b2 approximator
64-90b approximator
76-19b approximator
84-35a approximator
90-39d approximator
90-226a2 approximator
52-165b assumption-correction
3-126b indicating speaker attitude
3-161b indicating speaker attitude
10-47b indicating speaker attitude
10-261b indicating speaker attitude
10-262b indicating speaker attitude
12-124c indicating speaker attitude
12-142b indicating speaker attitude
12-155c2 indicating speaker attitude
13-52e indicating speaker attitude
13-174b indicating speaker attitude
14-208b indicating speaker attitude
16-284d indicating speaker attitude
19-102a indicating speaker attitude
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19-364a indicating speaker attitude
20-99a indicating speaker attitude
23-213a indicating speaker attitude
23-238a indicating speaker attitude
28-7b indicating speaker attitude
29-46a indicating speaker attitude
29-150a indicating speaker attitude
31-86b3 indicating speaker attitude
31-193b indicating speaker attitude
34-175b indicating speaker attitude
35-70b indicating speaker attitude
35-93b indicating speaker attitude
37-160b indicating speaker attitude
42-200c indicating speaker attitude
42-342b indicating speaker attitude
44-385a indicating speaker attitude
45-98b indicating speaker attitude
45-99b indicating speaker attitude
47-126b indicating speaker attitude
48-9c indicating speaker attitude
48-41b indicating speaker attitude
48-137a indicating speaker attitude
48-156c indicating speaker attitude
48-192c indicating speaker attitude
49-59b indicating speaker attitude
50-82b indicating speaker attitude
50-259b indicating speaker attitude
52-18b indicating speaker attitude
52-69b3 indicating speaker attitude
52-181a indicating speaker attitude
 252 
52-193a indicating speaker attitude
54-58b indicating speaker attitude
57-136b indicating speaker attitude
57-139b indicating speaker attitude
57-225a indicating speaker attitude
57-244b indicating speaker attitude
58-158a1 indicating speaker attitude
58-217b2 indicating speaker attitude
60-113b3 indicating speaker attitude
62-40a indicating speaker attitude
62-48a indicating speaker attitude
66-73b indicating speaker attitude
66-104b1 indicating speaker attitude
66-118b indicating speaker attitude
66-170a indicating speaker attitude
68-225c indicating speaker attitude
71-265b indicating speaker attitude
71-349a2 indicating speaker attitude
73-113c indicating speaker attitude
75-119b indicating speaker attitude
75-120b1+2 indicating speaker attitude
75-121b indicating speaker attitude
76-114b indicating speaker attitude
77-176b indicating speaker attitude
81-117b2 indicating speaker attitude
81-278b indicating speaker attitude
82-52a indicating speaker attitude
84-105a indicating speaker attitude
84-153b indicating speaker attitude
84-169b indicating speaker attitude
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87-259a indicating speaker attitude
90-209a indicating speaker attitude
90-215a indicating speaker attitude
49-270b introducing background information
72-142b introducing background information
79-49c introducing background information
81-276b introducing background information
82-113b introducing background information
10-265b1 introducing background information
14-105b introducing background information
15-5a introducing background information
33-33a introducing background information
52-204a2 introducing background information
90-194c introducing background information
10-22a cause
11-246b cause
31-187b cause
52-68b cause
58-159a cause
60-139b1 cause
60-139b2 cause
8-290b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
13-111e indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
13-246b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
16-153e indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
20-135c indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
22-58a indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
45-285b2 indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
46-65c2 indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
52-176a2 indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
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66-184b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
71-353a indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
33-105b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
34-136b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
49-237b indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
52-109a indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
71-207c indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
71-317c indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
81-119b1 indicating unspoken message to be completed by the hearer
1-122b conclusion
3-144b conclusion
3-147b conclusion
10-39b conclusion
31-124b2 conclusion 
35-187a conclusion 
62-72b conclusion 
64-76c conclusion 
79-88c conclusion 
89-62a conclusion 
9-308a seeking confirmation
15-163a seeking confirmation
3-9b exemplification
3-94a exemplification
3-134b exemplification
5-179b exemplification
9-159a exemplification
10-41b1 exemplification
10-217a exemplification
10-219a exemplification
10-254b exemplification
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10-257b exemplification
10-258b1 exemplification
10-258b2 exemplification
14-151c1 exemplification
14-230b exemplification
14-232a exemplification
32-232a exemplification
35-43b exemplification
36-224b exemplification
37-41a exemplification
37-163b exemplification
37-187b exemplification
49-282b exemplification
52-31b exemplification
52-33b exemplification
52-34b exemplification
52-35b exemplification
58-257b exemplification
60-22b exemplification
60-134b exemplification
60-202b exemplification
63-244a exemplification
64-96c1 exemplification
64-96c2 exemplification
66-182b exemplification
76-198b exemplification
79-86c exemplification
80-282b exemplification
82-41a1 exemplification
82-41a2 exemplification
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82-96b1 exemplification
88-115b explicitness
2-71b explicitness
5-40a2 explicitness
7-136c explicitness
9-61a explicitness
9-109a explicitness
9-158a explicitness
9-267a explicitness
9-342a explicitness
10-38b explicitness
13-221b explicitness
14-2a explicitness
14-168b explicitness
15-261b explicitness
24-126a explicitness
30-64c explicitness
31-124b1 explicitness
33-92a explicitness
35-162b explicitness
36-82b explicitness
37-150b explicitness
39-314a explicitness
40-32d explicitness
41-30b explicitness
42-126b explicitness
43-198a explicitness
45-96b explicitness
52-24b2 explicitness
54-1a explicitness
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55-212b explicitness
56-175b explicitness
58-15c1 explicitness
58-161a explicitness
58-258b explicitness
63-278a explicitness
64-33a1 explicitness
64-103c explicitness
66-146b explicitness
67-184b explicitness
72-232b explicitness
77-373b explicitness
84-180a explicitness
85-11b explicitness
87-143b explicitness
88-58b explicitness
88-65b explicitness
13-168c softener of FTA
55-225b softener of FTA
58-110b softener of FTA
62-69b softener of FTA
35-88b softener of FTA
8-201a softener of FTA
30-202c softener of FTA
31-86b1 softener of FTA
31-175b softener of FTA
48-164a softener of FTA
66-168a2 softener of FTA
68-154a softener of FTA
78-41b softener of FTA
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3-56b1 hesitation marker
3-133b1 hesitation marker
3-133b2 hesitation marker
3-141b hesitation marker
5-14a hesitation marker
5-153a hesitation marker
16-114b hesitation marker
16-327e hesitation marker
18-276a hesitation marker
19-62a hesitation marker
19-127a hesitation marker
29-257a hesitation marker
31-98b hesitation marker
31-149b hesitation marker
31-155b1 hesitation marker
31-155b2 hesitation marker
31-186b hesitation marker
32-116d hesitation marker
34-19b2 hesitation marker
45-329b hesitation marker
48-74b hesitation marker
48-226b hesitation marker
49-4b hesitation marker
52-29b hesitation marker
52-176a1 hesitation marker
52-202a1 hesitation marker
56-19a hesitation marker
56-269b hesitation marker
58-15c2 hesitation marker
58-249b hesitation marker
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60-11b hesitation marker
60-139b3 hesitation marker
66-97b hesitation marker
67-257b hesitation marker
80-153b hesitation marker
81-92b hesitation marker
82-96b3 hesitation marker
83-150a hesitation marker
87-254a hesitation marker
88-12a hesitation marker
88-160b hesitation marker
90-72d hesitation marker
90-218a2 hesitation marker
90-241a hesitation marker
4-97a interactional repair
58-217b1 interactional repair
3-26b justificaiton
5-40a1 justificaiton
5-183b justificaiton
10-190b justificaiton
17-329b justificaiton
18-82a justificaiton
18-87a justificaiton
19-370a justificaiton
21-2a justificaiton
27-209c justificaiton
29-56a justificaiton
29-159a justificaiton
30-315a justificaiton
31-40b justification
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31-56a justification
31-102b justification
31-154b1 justification
32-52c justification
32-88d justification
34-56b justification
35-98b justification
36-199b justification
36-216b1 justification
37-219b justification
43-203b justification
44-380a justification
45-8b justification
45-285b1 justification
48-95c justification
48-379b justification
49-56b justification
54-124a justification
59-30b justification
62-151b justification
69-207a justification
69-275a justification
71-349a1 justification
73-75b justification
78-144a justification
81-19a justification
84-112a justification
1-101a indicating marked expression
3-6b indicating marked expression
3-56b2 indicating marked expression
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3-139b indicating marked expression
8-119a indicating marked expression
9-96a indicating marked expression
9-268a indicating marked expression
10-265b2 indicating marked expression
13-249b indicating marked expression
14-177b indicating marked expression
19-79a indicating marked expression
19-137a indicating marked expression
20-44b indicating marked expression
22-170d indicating marked expression
25-326b indicating marked expression
27-72b indicating marked expression
31-38b1 indicating marked expression
31-49b indicating marked expression
31-52b indicating marked expression
31-90b indicating marked expression
31-101b indicating marked expression
31-152b1 indicating marked expression
41-355b indicating marked expression
45-97b indicating marked expression
49-26b indicating marked expression
52-7b indicating marked expression
52-12b indicating marked expression
52-25b indicating marked expression
52-78a indicating marked expression
52-110a indicating marked expression
52-114a indicating marked expression
52-129a indicating marked expression
52-133a indicating marked expression
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52-202a2 indicating marked expression
52-206a indicating marked expression
56-24a indicating marked expression
57-157b indicating marked expression
57-191b indicating marked expression
58-42b indicating marked expression
62-1a indicating marked expression
63-131a indicating marked expression
63-173a indicating marked expression
63-188a3 indicating marked expression
66-165b indicating marked expression
80-233a indicating marked expression
82-71a indicating marked expression
87-82b indicating marked expression
88-114a indicating marked expression
29-80a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
31-38b2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
31-123b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
31-144b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
31-145b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
33-168b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
34-164b1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
34-164b2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
37-168b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
37-211b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
39-43a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
41-74b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
43-254b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
45-6b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
47-148b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
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48-357c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
48-361c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
49-14b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
49-22b1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-5b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-17b2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-100a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-111a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-147b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-151b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
52-204a1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
53-49b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
56-17a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
60-219b1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
64-74c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
64-112b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
66-181b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
71-109a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
71-152a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
75-26b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
79-98a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
79-197a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
80-147b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
80-292b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
80-293b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
80-294b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
81-16a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
82-34a1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
82-34a2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
82-114b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
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83-82a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
83-86b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
83-113b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
83-152b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
90-193c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
90-205c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
90-245a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
3-58b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
6-210a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
8-49a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
8-78a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
8-175b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
10-239a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
12-81b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
12-155c1 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
14-136b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
14-151c2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
14-212b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
15-23b2 indicating the coming message to be evaluated
15-80a indicating the coming message to be evaluated
19-281c indicating the coming message to be evaluated
24-155b indicating the coming message to be evaluated
3-136b quotative
5-23a quotative
10-263b quotative
10-266b quotative
10-267b quotative
12-138c quotative
18-286a quotative
31-86b2 quotative
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37-29b quotative
41-321a quotative
41-322a quotative
49-17b quotative
49-55b quotative
50-115b quotative
52-26b quotative
53-340b quotative
54-43b quotative
54-152a quotative
62-153b quotative
63-188a1 quotative
64-99c quotative
71-233c quotative
71-344a quotative
73-158b quotative
80-280b quotative
85-67b quotative
90-162a quotative
90-213a quotative
90-218a1 quotative
3-69b reason
3-160b reason
5-7a reason
5-119b reason
10-46b reason
10-48b reason
15-240b reason
27-168c1 reason
34-226b reason
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40-192d reason
48-264c reason
50-135b reason
52-69b1 reason
52-69b2 reason
82-26a reason
82-38a reason
12-157c reformulation
15-179b reformulation
16-152e reformulation
22-154d reformulation
25-248a reformulation
37-138b reformulation
41-324a reformulation
52-28b reformulation
54-190b reformulation
64-33a2 reformulation
80-163b reformulation
82-11a reformulation
84-84b reformulation
3-89a restart
3-91a restart
5-244b restart
10-41b2 restart
13-138b restart
14-228b restart
15-23b1 restart
15-177b restart
31-2a restart
33-190a restart
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36-80b restart
36-216b2 restart
39-317a restart
40-99d restart
42-159b restart
46-65c1 restart
49-21b restart
49-25b restart
49-276b restart
52-13b restart
52-24b1 restart
58-158a2 restart
60-62b restart
60-113b2 restart
60-133b restart
62-93a restart
62-95a restart
64-56a restart
66-168a1 restart
67-206b restart
72-189b restart
75-49b restart
78-84a restart
79-216b restart
80-61b restart
82-96b2 restart
84-34a1+2 restart
84-55a restart
90-211a restart
13-108e result
 268 
15-95a result
19-133a result
57-184a result
62-78b result
65-220c result
84-94b result
13-247b indicating the most likely event
15-28b indicating the most likely event
27-165c indicating the most likely event
30-85a indicating the most likely event
34-211b1 indicating the most likely event
34-211b2 indicating the most likely event
39-90b indicating the most likely event
52-17b1 indicating the most likely event
54-205a indicating the most likely event
58-141a indicating the most likely event
60-87b indicating the most likely event
63-188a2 indicating the most likely event
66-78a indicating the most likely event
71-21a indicating the most likely event
76-88b indicating the most likely event
81-117b1 indicating the most likely event
84-146b indicating the most likely event
90-226a1 indicating the most likely event
90-244a indicating the most likely event
10-247b summarization
10-258b3 summarization
34-224b summarization
36-69a summarization
45-275a summarization
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60-86b summarization
60-113b1 summarization
60-219b2 summarization
79-46c summarization
82-70a summarization
83-22a summarization
5-195b introducing a new topic
9-1a introducing a new topic
23-13a introducing a new topic
29-358a introducing a new topic
46-428c introducing a new topic
48-278b introducing a new topic
49-259c introducing a new topic
52-14b introducing a new topic
52-20b introducing a new topic
52-71b introducing a new topic
55-137b introducing a new topic
63-1a introducing a new topic
84-83b introducing a new topic
85-100b introducing a new topic
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